GMIC VS. SEC FOR COORDINATING ACTIVITIES IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00961A000200010022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: July 5, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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5 July 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence
FROM: Chief, Guided Missiles Division, SI
SUBJECT: GMIC vs. SEC for Coordinating Activities in
the Guided Missile Field
I. Assumptions
a. That the guided missile intelligence problem is of such
immediate and critical importance that one inter-community group
must be designated to coordinate all facets of the intelligence
program, with the exception of physical collection itself.
b. That responsibilities of above designated group regarding
collection will be confined to keeping itself closely informed
as to activities in this field, submitting guidance to collectors
in the form of requirements, collection guides, target dossiers,
recommendations concerning new means of collection and recommenda-
tions for direct collection action through prescribed channels
where indicated.
II. Comparison between GMIC and SEC as coordinating bodies
Discussion: There have been two significant factors added
since GMIC was first introduced. These should be considered now
in CIA's evaluation of its policy position. Both factors stem
from the Clark report and are roughly as follows:
a. DCID 3/4+ should be recinded, including SEC, and
SIC should be reconstituted.
b. State Department should be relieved of its current
responsibilities of scientific intelligence and these functions
given to CIA.
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Both recommendations, if adopted in the future,would considerably
change the activities and responsibilities of OSI/CIA and the inter-
community group (SEC - SIC) coordinating this area. The first
recommendation, however, will cause quite some controversy,taking
quite a few months to resolve; and the resolution of the problem may
not be nearly as clear cut as the recommendation. Should such
steps ever be taken, however, it appears quite reasonable that the
SIC should have permanent subcommittees to consider critical fields
and two such fields are currently indicated, e. g., those of atomic
energy and guided missiles. It is quite reasonable, also, that in
the future other critical fields will be revealed during the early
stages of R & D and that designated permanent subcommittees should be
cognizant of all phases of intelligence in these fields until such
time as the extreme criticality has abated to the extent that the
problem can safely be handled by a diverse and more loosely coordinated
mechanism. This could well be a long term policy objective of CIA,
and such adoption would tend to pull together the dissenting factions
of CIA.
The big question to be decided at this time is whether CIA
(representing national interests) can be assured that SEC can
handle the guided missile problem during the interim period until
the much larger, but no more critical, problem can be resolved
in the face of certain restrictions and limitations the military and
other activities of CIA would like to prescribe. It is felt that
the acquirement of guided missile intelligence is so critical to
national security that CIA cannot afford to guess as to the quality
of the attack on this problem but must press with all possible means
the adoption of the most complete solution possible, that of forma-
tion of GMIC. Specific disadvantages of the adoption of SEC to
handle the problem are listed below:
a. The guided missile problem cannot be handled fully by
SEC alone or with only part time support by subcommittees. Depth
and continuity of knowledge would be sacrificed to an unacceptable
degree.
b. The military will not permit any changes in SEC charter,
such as authority to set up a permanent subcommittee, which can be
construed as reflecting any change to DCI] 3/l+.
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c. SEC cannot handle the problem without changes made in
its charter or without being issued a supplemental listing of powers
by IAC, which is tantamount to changes in charter.
problem.
d. ORR and EIC are not in accord with SEC handling entire
e. The uncertainties of the quality, amount, and continuance
of support that the military would accord SEC in this expanded role
is questionable and cannot be assured.
f. The satisfactory functioning of an ad hoc subcommittee
to a committee whose authority and capability is questionable is
severely questioned.
g. The time lost and "watering down" of any worthwhile
coordination or guidance through such a mechanism, described above,
is unacceptable.
h. The endorsement by CIA of a questionable solution to
this problem is unacceptable.
25X1A
cc: DD/I
Ch/IPS/SI
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