SOVIET REACTIONS TO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY OF SOVIET MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001500020022-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 2, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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2 April 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Soviet Reactions to Public Disclosure of Satellite
Photography of Soviet Military Installations
The main point contained in the following
paragraphs is that, while the Soviets would be
annoyed and embarrassed by the US disclosure
and would react in propaganda, the most important
effect would be on their attitude toward SALT
negotiations. Mistrust of US seriousness and
tactics in those negotiations would be consid-
erably increased.
1. In the case of reconnaissance satellites, the Russians
have found it impracticable to keep completely intact the taboos
with which they traditionally surround questions of security and
intelligence gathering. While the Soviet Government can, and
by-and-large does, maintain a virtually complete blackout on
the subject of satellite photography in its public media, the
question has inevitably come up in Soviet-US discussions of
arms control. Ewen where this is so, as in the private and
confidential meetings at Helsinki, the Russians shy away from
direct references in favor of euphemisms such as "national"
or "unilateral" means of inspection.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and
declassification
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2. Soviet reticence on this score is partly visceral and
partly a matter of conscious policy. It is felt that this is
one of those delicate subjects which should be mentioned as
little as possible. It is embarrassing to the Russian government
that its territory lies exposed to the prying eyes of foreigners
even though it has equivalent means itself. It believes instinctively
in minimum disclosure of information pertaining to its own affairs,
even of the most mundane kind, and in its right to maintain
strict control of such disclosure as there is.
3. Plainly the Russians have no taste for explicit discussion
of satellite reconnaissance, even in private. They may have come
to believe on the basis of recent practice that there is a kind of
tacit understanding between them and the US to keep the wraps on
in this sensitive area. Public disclosure of satellite photography
by a high-ranking US official would clearly say that such an under-
standing no longer exists. If only for this reason, Moscow would
be surprised and disccrnfited by the US action.
4. In reacting, however, we think it most likely that
Moscow would be inclined to stand pretty much mute with respect
to its own reconnaissance capability. It will probably limit
itself to expressing scorn for the cheapness of US propaganda
S-E-C-R-E-T
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tactics, coupled with a generalized affirmation that the USSR is
capable of holding its own in the fields of intelligence and
security. It would do this on the assumption that, though some
knowledge of the US disclosure would filter through to the Soviet
people, there would be slight chance that widespread anxiety
about Soviet security could be aroused. The Soviet military
establishment, being well-informed about the Soviet reconnaissance
program, would have no need for further information nor,
presumably, for reassurance.
5. The Chinese would, of course, do what they could to add
to Soviet embarrassment, probably pointing out that both of the
great powers, not just the Americans, were constantly spying on
other nations. These charges would be echoed in other quarters,
and present Moscow with an awkward propaganda problem. This
would, however, hardly measure up to the humiliating implications
of the U-2 affair and would not require the same violent Soviet
reaction.
6. More important than propaganda and political considera-
tions, which would affect Soviet reactions at any time, would be
the fact that this episode occurred close to the opening of the
Vienna negotiations on SALT. Moscow's reading of the meaning of
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a US disclosure at this time in terms of the US position with
regard to SALT would have a crucial bearing on their reaction
to such a US action. The mere fact of disclosure would raise
in Soviet minds questions about US motives. Those in the USSR
opposed to the talks or doubtful about the sincerity of the US
in entering the talks would use this disclosure to slow down or
in other ways seek to prevent a successful outcome.
7. Disclosure of a kind which would appear to Moscow to
be designed to build public and Congressional support in the US
for further deployment of ABM systems or for the inauguration
of MIRV deployment would at least create confusion in Moscow
among those supporting the talks, and it would probably create
serious doubts in their minds about US good faith in the SALT
talks. Some of these would tend to regard the act of disclosure
simply as an attempt by the so-called military-industrial complex
to scuttle SALT, but they would probably also reserve judgment as
to whether this group had become dominant. In any event, skepticism
about the possibility of negotiating an arms control agreement
with the US would grow considerably.
S-E-C-R-E-T
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2 April 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Proposal to Surface Satellite Photography
1. Speaking parochially, I think the proposal will create
problems on the Hill:
a. We have emphasized in congressional briefings
that this material is probably our most precious remaining
secret and urged all concerned to treat it accordingly.
b. If it is surfaced now to serve a "partisan" purpose,
the one who does so may be exposed to charges of playing
fast and loose with vital security information.
c. At the same time the Agency may be vulnerable to
charges of excessive and unnecessary secrecy in trying
to keep the lid 6n in the past.
d. In any event it will be hard to keep the lid on anything
from here on out--the obvious lesson which many will draw
is that the most sensitive "sources and methods" are expend-
able whenever the political or policy stakes are high enough.
e. Lastly, it will be hard to hold the line after the first
act of the striptease--the audience with its whetted appetite
may be expected to cry for more and yet still more in the
days ahead.
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2. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, I'd also like to venture
some personal comments on the likely Soviet reaction:
a. In the present state of apparent division, uncertainty,
and instability in the Soviet leadership such a move at this
point in time might have a traumatic effect.
b. For one thing, our action will be seen as a move to
embarrass and discredit the Soviet State. This in turn would
play into the hands of the "hard-liners" who presumably have
been arguing in Kremlin councils that true accommodation
is an illusion.
c. It may also spur the Soviet leadership to some sort
of sharp overt reaction. Historically Soviet leaders have
put up with quite a bit of annoyance from abroad provided
it isn't unduly publicized. Like the wife of an errant husband,
they'll sometimes tolerate a lot so long as there is no
publicity, but they cannot stand the humiliation of public
taunts.
d. The breakoff of the Paris talks in the wake of the
U-2 affair is but one typical example of the characteristic
Russian response in such circumstances. Also relevant,
I think, is the fact that following our gleeful publication
of Khrushchev's secret speech the Kremlin apparently
closed ranks in the face of public humiliation, thus delaying
by many months Khrushchev's attempts to introduce a more
rational and flexible foreign policy. And it is my impres-
sion that the Kremlin tried initially to keep its difficulties
with the Chinese under control, but eventually felt compelled
by the public provocations of Peking to retaliate in kind.
S F
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3. In sum, I think anyone who has spent much time pondering
Russian behavior would agree that for generations these people have
considered secrecy perhaps their most important strategic weapon.
This secrecy is, I am sure, designed quite as much to cover up weak-
nesses and failures as to conceal strength. But in any event, to the
Russian mind the foreigner who attempts to tear away this secrecy,
and advertise his success in doing so, is not seeking an accommodation,
but an advantage. So I fear that one of the most unfortunate ramifications
of the actions proposed might concern the SALT talks. It would be easy
for the hard-liners in Moscow to argue that this U. S. ploy was a sort of
threat or blackmail--a public proclamation that we had succeeded in
breaking through their shell of security and that they had therefore
better do business on our terms.
John M. Maury
Legislative Counsel
Distribution:
Original - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Ex/Dir
1 - DDI
1 - D/ONE
1 - DDS&T
OLC Chrono
1 - OLC Subject
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCi
I gave this to the Director th?e noon
requested.
ao for Director, dtd 2 Apr 70
to tic Disclosure of Satellite
s
:y of Soviet Military 4
io
(DATE)
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10.101
1 AUG 54 101 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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