SOME HISTORICAL NOTES ON LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001500010008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 3, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
3 October 1969
Subject; Some Historical Notes on Laos
1. By almost any measure., Laos should not exist as an
independent country. Historically, for the past 700 years Laos
has been an area populated by people who are Thai,, and except
for brief early periods of independent kingdoms, and the short
75-year span of French control., it has been under That influence --
which was aporadically and bitterly disputed in the eastern part
of the area by the Vietnamese. Ethnically., most of the population
is Lao., a branch of the Thai race, living in the valleys., partic'u->
larly along the Mekong river. The remainder are a variety of
tribal peoples living in the mountains., overlapping the Annamite
ridge line in the east into Vietnam., and in the north overlapping
into Tunnan province in China. Geographically, Laos is one-half
of a valley., the other and more populous half being in Thailand.
In a contorted application of Gallic logic., the French mapmakers.,
In creating Laos., split the Lao off from their That brethern
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on the one hand,, and split the mountain minority peoples in half
on the other. Within this freakish boundary,, they tried to glue
the patchwork of family baronies together., declare the leader
of one of them king., and call this contraption a country.
2. When the French finally reluctantly granted independence
to their creation on 22 October 1953 after some seven years of
relinquishing various degrees of control, Laos as the French
defined it was accepted as a country because its independent status
seemed to offer advantages to all. The Lao obviously preferred
independence to subordination either to the Vietnamese or the Thai.
To the French, this solution was certainly easier than working
out some division of the territory., or promoting its unification
with Thailand. And the idea of a buffer state between the
Vietnamese and Thai appealed to the French., the USA and other
geopolitically minded countries. The Thai in 1954 were not really
capable of reasserting their ancient influence and saw in France
and the US proxies who would do it for them., or at least hold
the fort for them more effectively ,, until they got around to it
themselves. And the Vietnamese Communists, in their imperialist
view that all of Indochina was to be their domain., saw the French
version of Laos as more desirable than any division of it along
geographic or ethnic lines, since they were probably confident
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they would obtain it all in the long run and the French version
of Laos would net them more territory. This view was probably
generally shared or supported by China and the USSR. And so
the fate of remoter weak., exotic Laos as a cold war battleground
was foreordained.
3. Since World War II., there have been a series of clearly
distinguishable watersheds in Communist strategy in Laos: 1954,
1959, 1962. Beginning in 1946 the Vietnamese Communists sponsored
a separate Communist movement in Laos. Prior to that time Laotians
who later became Lao Communists were either members of the Lao
Independence movement., the Lao Issara, which came to terms with
the French in 1949, or were members of the Vietnamese "Indochina
Communist Party" which was dissolved in early 1951. Until 1954
the Viet Minh nourished their Lao underling with the object of
expanding its strength, giving it a territorial base, and using
it in the fight for independence from France. In the Geneva
Conference of 1954 the Communists were successful in achieving
a certain amount of legitimacy and the important territorial
base of Phong Saly and Sam Neua (now Houa Phan) provinces.
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4. 1. 1959 was a turning point in Indochina. From 1954
until then the object of the Hanoi-dominated Pathet Lao was merely
to strengthen their forces and consolidate and expand their terri-
torial base with an eye towards eventual control over all Laos.
But in 1959 the Third Party Congress of the Lao Dong Party in
Hanoi resulted in a decision to step up the insurgency in South
Vietnam., and with this decision Communist strategy in Laos changed.
It became critically important to gain control over the territory
in the Laotian panhandle through which men and material enroute
to South Vietnam would have to pass.
5. At the same time the year of 1959 brought other important
internal changes in Laos. In May 1958 the Communists had made a
surprisingly strong showing in the elections and an anti-Communist
reaction led to the installation of a strongly right-wing govern-
ment in August 1958. By early 1959 the new anti-Communist climate
h ad ended previously serious efforts to unite the Communists
a nd the Royal Lao Government and the resultant confrontation
together with the changed Vietnamese Communist strategy made
increased violence inevitable.
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6. For the next two years there was chaos in Laos, and
when President Kennedy took office in January 1961 he was con-
fronted with a serious situation. The Communist military offensive
was making steady headway and Soviet support of the Communists
in Laos had become of such nature and proportions that it appeared
the USSR and the US were on a collision course. In April 1961
the two super-powers agreed to defuse the situation. A cease-
fire was to be arranged and an initial conference called to find
a way to take Laos out of the East-West conflict. After some
14 months of negotiating and fighting the Geneva Conference held
its last session on July 23, 1962.
7. Toting. up thega ins. In the eight years since 1954
the position of the Lao Communists had improved greatly. Militarily
their forces, together with the NVA, Kong Le's neutralists, and
Soviet support had expanded their area of control from something
less than two provinces to approximately half the country and about
1/4 the population. Politically they had achieved full legitimacy
and a 1/3 position in a coalition government where the neutralist
1/3 was not entirely unfriendly. In fact at that time the Com-
munists probably felt they could exert strong influence over them.
The Pathet Lao Army had grown from 1,500-3,000 to about 20,000 tre-;Dps.
(NVA troops in Laos numbered about 9,9000 in Ju.:..y 1962). And from
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Hanoi's point of view they had the vital portions of the Lao pan-
a
handle corridor in their hands arid/much better buffer providing
security for their borders with northern Laos. In short., Hanoi
had achieved her objectives in Laos. Until South Vietnam was
;eon., there was no strong incentive to do more in Laos, and good
cause for restraint.
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84. At the date of this writing, some 12,000 NVA troops,,
including possibly the entire 312th NVA Division, are estimated
to be strung out along route 7 in North Vietnam and Laos enroute
to the Plaine des Jarres area. This is the latest increment in a
substantial buildup of Ncrth Vietnamese forces in Laos over the past
two or three years. In the spring of 1968 we estimated total
North Vietnamese combat and support personnel in Laos at about
35,000, a total of some 10-14 battalions over the previous year.
A year ago NVA forces had grown to 47,000. The location of these
reinforcements had been a good indicator of the forthcoming
areas of military action. In 1967-1968 the reinforcements were
concentrated around the Bolovens Plateau area in the south and
around Phou Pha Thi in Houa Than (Sam Neua) Province in the Nort'lir,
In 1968-1969 they were concentrated mainly in the north where they
took Na Khang (Site 36) and Muong Soui, but there were some in the
south where they took Thateng. In the north, NVA units have
usually been from the 316th NVA Division headquartered in Moe Chats
North Vietnam just over the border from Houa Than Province and
they usually returned to North Vietnam after the dry season
campaign was finished. Last year for the first time they
remained in north Laos.
Input to Draft Memorandum on Laos
3i?tobe:1969
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9. The present movement is unprecedented in several
respects. (Continue with para 8 then add last sentence:
Obviously their military campaign in North Laos will be vigorous
this year and will probably be centered around the Plaine des
Jarres and targets to the south and west of it.
Input to Draft Memorandum on Laos
3 October 1969
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9a. The evidence on Communist intentions is substantial.
25X1
says that the
main objective of the coming dry season was the liberation of
Vang Pao's bases of Sam Thong and Long Tieng, and then a move
down route 13 to the Pram Lik River at Ban Hin Heup. He said the
mission of his company was to reconnoiter the Sam Thong area.
25X1
and agent reports. Lao Communist radio broadcasts confirm these
general intentions in their continual references to the infamousneos
of the present Vang Pao Plaine des Jarres campaign which they
claim was launched from "the bases of Sam Thong, Long Tieng and
Vang Vient." Moreover, the statements of the NLHS representative
in Vientiane, Sot Pethrasi, also bear these intentions out.
Input to Draft Memorandum on Laos
3 October 1969
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WORK;WG PS UM SECRET
16a. Hanoi must also consider possible Thai reactions to a
more aggressive move in Laos. From our point of view, the Thai
appear woefully unprepared to defend their traditional and vital
security interests on the eastern side of the Mekong. Despite
Thailand's possession of all the ingredients to make it the
peninsula's strongest power, it does not have at this moment,
and probably will not in the foreseeable future, the military
wherewithal to operate effectively in Laos. This is partly
perhaps because they have concentrated on economic development
rather than military expenditures. While this may make them
better off than Hanoi in the long run, in the short run they are
very dependent on the US. And it is probably because they have
counted on the US to use its own military power in Laos in case
of need that the Thai have done so little in support of their
interests there. Even if Hanoi views Thailand's readiness in
this way, however, we would doubt that it dismisses Thailand's
potential completely when considering its policy in Laos.
North Vietnam is still a small country and common sense would
suggest not becoming too provocative in too many directions at
the same time.
Additional Paragraph
Memo for Director on Laos
3 October 1969
F I
SECRET/
25X1
25X1
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