THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001400020019-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: April 30, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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GENZ'RAL IT,TELLICFENGE AGETdGY
OFFIGE QF T+tATIOTdAL ESTIMATES ~/~ ~~ ~~
(~ 1y.1^ ~ L?a.
3d April 1968
~;MaRr~r.~n~~~ ~ oR ~~ ~ ~a~
T n The Political Role of the T~Ii.litary in Latin A~zerica
The policy of the United States is to encourage peaceful
change in Latin America as the a1t~:rnativP to violent revolution.
In most Latin Amerl.can countries the military is the only force
capable o:~ preventing or control.Ling the periodic political and
economic crises that could open the way to destructive revolu-
tionary upheavals. Fregt~ent~r,, this is either the reason or the
pretext For the asstanption of paver by the military lesa~rs, On
some occasions they have used their cantxe~l of ~overn~ents ar
their influence as the ultimate arbiter of natiana:L politics to
initiate reforms for peaceful charge. Qn others the role of the
military has been in defense of the status qua against any real
change. On bal~sncea the view of this paper is that if change in
Latin America is to be canstrrsctive it is more likely to come, in
same countries, under military rather than civilian goverranentg.
Finally in scone countries where mean3ngfu? change will be long
in corning in any case, the interim role of the military estab-
lishment will be to serve as a restraint an irresponsible
officials and as a goad to stand-pat regimes.
GRC7~JP 1
E.ac^I.uded, from automatic
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I . IN~'tOI~JCTION
1. In the best of all possible Latin Americas the
governments would be in charge of honest, able civilians
chosen in free elections and dedicated to attaining the
announced goals of the Alliance for Progress. The distressing
fact, however, is that this kind of government remains an ideal
rather than a reality in moat of Latin America. The failure of
civilian government in much of the area is a complex subject.
We do not propose to deal with the causes of that failure but
only to suggest some of the effects of it at this time. One
obvious result is that when a political power vacuum exists in
a particular society, other elements of that a~aeiety will move
to fill it. This leads us, then, to a consideration of the
political xole that the military have played in various Latin
American states.
~. Historically the military and the Roman Catholic Church
have been the two most highly developed and powerful institutions
in Latin America. In the past the influence of these two insti-
tutions has, at times, inhibited the growth of representative
political parties and institutions. The military, while yield-
ing place to the Church in certain fields such as education and
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social welfare, have been a particularly inhibiting factor since
they have generally been the most important pressure group in
Latin American politics. Despite some striking changes in the
attitudes of the military leaders toward their role in govern-
ment they continue to exert a major and, at times, dominant in-
fluence on national politics in much of the area. Until the last
decade that influence was generally accepted and received rela-
tively little critical attention from observers of the Latin
American scene. Except when they came in bunches, as in 1930,
military dictatorships tended to be viewed as a part of the poli-
tical wa;~ of life in Latin America.* Woodrow Wilson had obviously
failed in his stated objective "to teach those people to elect
goad governments." And there is the perhaps apocryphal story
that when Harry Hopkins remonstrated with his boss over giving
Tacho Somoza ("that S.O.B"), the red-carpet treatment, President
Roosevelt could reply, "Ah, but Harry, he's our 5.0.$."
~ At the end of 1930 the governments in power in Argeri~:ina,
ER~~zi1, Bolivia, Chile,, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, and several
of the Caribbean countries were either in the control of mili-
tary c?,',,ctators or under strong military influence, In the
m:c;.-~.9~0's the same was true in Argentina, Colo~ii~ia, Paraguay,
P~~rt~~ jenezuela, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and much
of Central America. In 1954, for example, 13 of the 20 repub-
lics were controlled by the military,
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3. In recent years, however, it has become increasingly
the fashion, particularly in the United States, to denounce Latin
American military leaders as disruptors of democratic procedures,
destroyers of constitutions, and barriers in the path of the
Alliance for Progress. Thus to some observers military govern-
ment is ipso facto bad government. A recent example of this
point of view is Edwin Lieuwen's study, The Latin American Mili-
tary, prepared far the Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The record of past
military takeovers of Latin American governments provides abundant
support for such a thesis, particularly when the Procrustean
method is used in selecting the cases and the supporting evidence.
We believe, however, that this attitude fails to take into account
the changes that have been taking place within the leadership of
the Latin American military during recent decades. It will be the
thesis of this paper that in same cases the military establishments
have been developing both the skills and the incentive for under-
taking modernization of their societies. This paper will not
argue, however, that any military takeover is per se good or bad.
On the contrary, its intent is to show that a wide variety of
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motives and consequences are involved in military takeovers and
that each case must be evaluated individually and against its
particular background.
~+. Our ~ud~aents on the political role of the military
are relative and not absolute, and they will often be based on
two implicit comparisons. The first of these is between the
chaotic conditions that have developed under some civilian
govexrunents and the efforts of military governments to establish
order -- whether successful ar not. The other is between the
aims of the old-fashioned military takeover and the more recent
concern of some military governments with the need to get on
with modernization of their societies. And we emphasize again
that each case must be examined on its merits. For we believe
that an assessment of recent Latin American history indicates
that in some cases the alternative to military intervention was
not the maintenance of a reformist administration nor even the
survival of representative and responsible government, but the
continued erosion of civilian institutions, attended by economic
~ discussion of each case is ma a in the Annex "An Examination
of the Record in the Eight Most Recent Military Interventions
in Latin American Politics." These involved Peru (July 1862),
Guatemala (March 1863), Ecuador (July 1863), Dominican Republic
(September 1963), Honduras (October 1863), Brazil (April 1864),
Bolivia (November 1q6~+) and Argentina (June 1966).
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stagaatian and political turmoil and, in some cases, by the
threat of civilian dictatorship or civil war.
I.I. G:~1L QBSF~ftVATIONS
5. Indeed, the starting paint for an understanding of
the political role of the military in Latin America is a sober
examination of civilian institutions in the area. We believe
that mast of the military interventians in the 1g60's have been
occasioned by the failure of the civilian politicians ~ dA their
baba even tolerably well. Ta put it bluntly, we believe that
these interventions have been the result and not tae cause of
Latin America=s political, economic, and social ills. Past ex-
perience in most Latin American countrie+a makes it difficult to
argue that representative, constitutional government is much
a
mare t3~an?remote idee~l towards which these nations are striving,
In the last f?ur decades more than i40 unconstitutional changes
of gavernm~ent have occurred there. During this period only three
countries (Chile, Costa Rice, and Uruguay} have paid much more
than lip service to the requirements and restrictions embodied
in their constitutions. In Mexico, politically the most stable
country and one where modernization has been proceeding more
w 6 r
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rapidly than in the rest of Zatin America, an of~icial party
has domingted politics on all levels and has tolerated little
mare than taken opposition.
6. Furthermore, in recent years the role of the military
in politics and the character of military regimes have been.
changing. These changes are, in part at least, the result of
developments that have been taking place over a longer period
as the military leaders have become interested in upgrading the
professional capabilities of their forces and have been devoting
mare of their time and efforts to that end, particularly since
World War II. Althou~ the quality of training varies c~nsider-
ably from country to country, military academies have been
established in each Latin American state. In Argentina and
Chile, for example, their graduates receive the equivalent of
12 to 16 years of academic training. On the other hand, thaae
in El Salvador and Honduras provide an equivalent of from six
to ten years of such training. Each country also provides for
more advanced training in its own universities, war colleges
and command schools, by foreign military missions, and in uni-
versities and military schools abroad. The result has been a
very considerable increase in the military expertise of these
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military school graduates and a broadening of their knowledge
of other fields including the technical changes that are taking
place in the more advanced countries.
~. At the same time the ?ocial. origins of the Latin Ameri-
can ,military officers have also been changing. Increasingly they
axe being drawn from lower-middle and ltrwer class backgrounds.
Where the younger son or sons of an upper-a~tiddle or upper class
family mi~tat formerly have opted for a military career, such
individuals ;latterly have been more attracted by the opportunities
that have become available in industrial or comm~ercia.l establish-
ments, and in the civilian bureaucracy. And increased attention
to public education throughout the area has enabled members of
the lower classes to quel.l.fy for entrance to military academies
that was formerly denied them. While race remains a barrier in
a few countries? in others the darkening skin tones of Latin
American military officers indicate that this barrier has been
lowered and that Indians,, mestizos} and mulattoes are moving up
through the various levels to the top ranks. This is more no-
ticeab]~e in army and air force components than in the naval
forces where the off~.cers still are predominsntly from upper
and upper-middle cl+~ss backgrounds>
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E3. As these changes have taken place the military leader-
ship has tended to veer away from its txaditional identity of
interests with the oligarchy, in defense of the status qua. It
has even exerted pxessure far modernization of the particular
society, ofttimes in alliance with middle class and lower class
eiemetYts of their particular society. And when military leaders
have taken power they have been removed, in some cases, by other
officers who preferred a return to civilian, constitutional
government to a continuation of corrupt military rule. In
Colombia (197} and Venezuela (1956), for example, the bulk of
the military leadership joined forces with moderate civilian
leaders to overthrow the military dictatorships of Rojas Pinilla
and ~'erez Jimenez. Since then the military establishment ham
supported the civilian government in both countries despite
effoxts to reimpose a military regime.
9. Nor do we think that future Latin American military
governments are apt to be as repressive or as those mentioned
in the preceding paragraph. We would note that at the present
time the two most authoritarian and despotic dictatorships in
the Western Hemisphere are both dominated by civilians -- Castro
and Duvalier. And each of these dictators moved quickly to
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reduce the military eetc~blishment to a dependent position in
order to canaolidate his control over the entire country.
10. In the eight most recent military interventions there
is certainly much that can be criticized. On balance, however,
and when compared with their civilian predecessors, the ma,~ority
of these military governments have performed rather creditably.
In three cases -- Brazil and Bolivia (1960 , and Argentina (1966)
-- the military leaders took power reluctantly and only after
their civilian predecessors had revealed little ability to cope
with basic national problems, including mounting threats to
political and economic stability. In all three the military
regimes have used a heavy-handed approach, but none has resorted
to the kind of police-state tactics used by the Paz Estenssoro
government that was overthrown in Bolivia. And in each of these
countries the. military government has undertaken long overdue
economic reform programs about which its civilian predecessors
had done little mare-than talk, In three other cases
(1962), Ecuador (1963), and GuLatemala (1963) -- the military
leaders took powers on an interim basis to correct situations
they considered intolerable. In these three the military inter-
vention did little to resolve basic problems but the military
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leaders are supporting the civilian authorities to whom they
returned or relinquished power.
11. On the other hand, when judged from their performance
in Honduras and the Dominican Republic, during 1963, the mili-
tary forces in those countries were a predaceous lot,, whose
actions warranted the harsh criticism they have received. One
would be hard put to it to argue that the military leaders who
intervened in Honduras and the Dominican Republic were mare
capable of governing those countries than the administrations
they removed. A depressing aspect in these two cases, and in
Peru and Guatemala as well, is that the military leaders probably
would not have acted when they did and the way they did if the
civilian political leadership in each case had demonstrated even
a glimmering of political acumen. But Presidents Bosch and
Ydigoras, and the rejected civilian candidates in Honduras and
Pexu as we11, acted as if they were oblivious of the concept that
politics is the art of the possible -? especially when dealing
with the real locus of political power in their particular society.
12. We believe that there will continue to be a wide variety
of military governments in Latin .America over the foreseeable
future. We would emphasize that not all the military establish-
menu are moving effectively towards modernization and
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professianalizatian; some have made very little progress and
some have impeded any progress. `T'hus their performances probably
will range from poor through commendable. We would also emphasize
that these military governments will reflect the particular
societies that produced them -- an aspect of the problem which
is so obvious that it will probably continue to be overlooked
(Peron at his worst was not a Trujillo). While some military
gaverrmients will relinquish power when civilian political forces
evie~ence an ability to govern, it may require revolutions to get
rid of others. In some cases the leadership of the revolutions
which sweep away the vestiges of the peat and prepare the way far
more enduring representative government 4rill come from the military.
In others the military will continue to support the kind of sta-
bility that serves only as a barrier to the changes that are pre-
requisite to modernization. But in any case the military leaders
will continue to play an important and often dominant role in
Latin American politico; at least until their societies develop
~ We would also Hate that when civilian or military dictator-
- ships have been averthrawn~ part oi' the military establishment
has always been involved.
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political and social. institutions able to cape with their
particular problemsR
FQR THE BOAR17 QF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
25X1
A$Bar sMITH
Chairman
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An Examination of the Record in the Eight Most
Recent Military Interventions in Latin American Politics
1. Peru (July 1g62)
In 1g62 the Peruvian military leaders intervened to
pre vent a politician they despised and mistrusted from
attaining access to power. They held power for a year
and relinquished it when a new election provided an ac-
ceptable civilian president.
In the presidential election of June 1862 none of the three
principal candidates secured the 1/3 plurality needed for direct
election. Between the election and the meeting of the Congress
which would choose among those three candidates, a deal was cut
between ~ctor Raul Haya de la Torre, the APRA leader-candidate,
and Manuel Odria, former dictator (1g48-1g56) and candidate of
r
the National Odriista Union (UNO). Odria, who had run third,
would be elected president, an Aprista would be first vice-president
(in line to succeed Odria who was not in good health), and APRA
would control the Congress. It was clear that APRA and the UNO
had the Congressional strength to carry out this arrangement.
Such a deal, however, was anathema to the military leaders on
three major counts. In the first place, it would put Haya de
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la Torre, wham they regarded as a homosexual and the instigator
of the assassination of military officers during an Aprista up-
rising in 1932, in a .position to influence government policy
immediately and to inherit power if Qdria became incapacitated.
Secondly, it would have restored power to a former dictator
(Odria), who was widely disliked by the military leaders. Finally,
it left out in the cold the one candidate favored by the military,
Fernando Bela`~inde Terry. In order to void the election, the
military removed President Manuel Prado from office (1$ July 1962),
and installed a military junta to hold power until new elections
were held. Incidentally, Bela~unde's reaction to his failure to
win the election was to flee to his hometown, Arequipa, where he
tried unsuccessfully to launch, a rebellion in the interval before
the military took power.
Since spokesmen for the Armed Forces had made it abundantly
clear that they would never permit Haya de la Torre to come to
power in Peru, the seizure of power by the military was no sur-
prise. Their performance in-power was not impressive even though
they went further towards agrarian reform in one year than their
civilian predecessor had in nearly six years. In essence what
the military junta did was to conduct a holding operation while
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~r
Belaunde arranged an electoral coalition with the Christian Democrats.
After a freely contested and honestly counted election (June 1963)
gave Belaunde a clear plurality, the military leaders relinquished
power to him and have supported his efforts to modernize Peru. They
did not respond affirmatively to US official and public pressure for
holding elections "soon," and they gave short shrift to one member
of the junta who tried to use it as a springboard to power. It is
also clear that if Haya de la Torre had been elected in 1863 the
military leaders would not have permitted him to assume power; nor
will they if he is elected in 19n9. His insistence on being its
candidate eras a real tragedy for the Aprista movement; particularly
since there were other Apristas who probably could have established
a modus vivendi with the military leaders.
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S-E-C-R-E-T ANNEX
2. Guatemala (March 1963)
In early 1963 Guatemala was beset by a recurrent Latin
American problem -- the orderly transfer of political power.
The military leaders provided a temporary solution by seizing
and retaining power far three years before balding an ele ction
that provided a successor to whom they then returned power.
In 1963 President Miguel Ydigoras, according to the country's
constitution, had to hold elections to choose his successor. This
presented a problem. The candidate Ydigoras preferred had little
backing among Guatemalans, If open elections were held, the proba-
r ..~
ble winner would be formex President Juan Jose Arevalo (19+5-195p)p
widely regarded as pro-Communist and with a lengthy record of anti-
US activities. When Ydigoras equivocated and let Arevalo return to
the country, the military leaders took power under the leadership
of Col, Enr que Peralta. Peralta and his followers apparently believed
they were acting in the interests both of their own country and of the
US in preventing Arevalo from returning to power. Thus they were
rather dismayed whEn US recognition was delayed and US public opinion
was somewhat critical. Their reaction becomes even more understand-
able when one recalls the arbitrary and capricious style of the
Ydigoras regime, its gross corruption and bumbling, its failure
to make any effective progress towards goals of the Alliance for
Progress, and its obvious intention to install an even more corrupt
and reactionary politician as its successor.
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Governing from his post as minister of defense, Peralta
undertook no basic reforms; his circumscription of civil liber-
ties further alienated leftist and moderate groups, and he largely
ignored the insurgency movement that was already underway when he
assumed power. Nevertheless, by Guatemalan standards Peralta gave
his country nearly three years of reasonably honest and effective
government. And to the surprise of everyone -- including the
candidate he favored -- Peralta not only held open elections but
also overrode military and civilian efforts to nullify the election
results when Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, the candidate of the
moderate left, won a clear plurality. Tt is perhaps ironical
that under Peralta's liberal civilian successor civil liberties
and due process of law have gone a long way down the drain, and
that terrorism -- from the extreme left, from the extreme right,
and by government forces -- has become the order of the day. Only
recently has President Mendez moved to rein the government-sponsored
terxar by removing the military leaders in charge of it. Whether
he can make his action stick remains to be seen.
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3? Ecuador (July 1963)
The most recent of numerous military interventions in
Ecuador was carried out to remove a chief executive whose
public and private conduct was disgraceful by almost any
standards. The military leaders had little success in
imposing reform from above and in .less than three years
civilian pressure groups forced them to relinquish power.
Jose Mara Velasca Ibarra, a four-time President of Ecuador,
has declared that his is a difficult country to govern.# In 1g61
he was removed early in his fourth term by a military coup which
had some civilian support. His successor, Carlos Julio Arosemena,
had enough political cunning to retain power for some 20 months
despite his frequent public drunkenness, and his general inept
performance in office. When the embarrassed military leaders
finally removed Arosemena in July 1963, they formed a military
junta whose declared aim was to carry out extensive political,
economic, and social reforms before returning the country to
civilian rule. But the Velasca Ibarra dictum was verified ante
more when civilian agitation, including reactions against such
reforms, forced the military junta to resign (in March 1g66) after
it had carried out only a small portion of its program. Since
then a provisional civilian government has received support from
the present military leaders who appear to have little stomach for
another try at running Ecuador.
~ Since he completed only one of the four terms to which he was
elected, Velasca Ibarra speaks with some authority.
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4. Dominican Reps (September 1963)
The Dominican military leaders were able to over-
throw President Juan Bosch without a struggle because
he had alienated the country's most powerful political,
economic, and religious groups and had not retained his
wide popular following. The military leaders, however,
were unable to set up a puppet government that was both
pliant and effective; their removal of a hand-picked.
but capable executive led to the Dominican crisis of
early 1965.
The overthraw of President Juan Bosch (September 1963) by
a military coup was widely regarded as a severe setback for the
Alliance far Progress. Bosch, elected by a decisive majority
less than a year before, had received extensive material assis-
tance and vocal support from official and unofficial circles of
the US. His administration had undertaken a program of wide-
ranging reforms to rnodernize a society that had recently emerged
from three decades of repressive and often brutal totalitarian
military dictatorship. But even as Basch was antagonizing the
country's vested interests -- the military, the large landholders,
commercial interests, and the Church's hierarchy, he was letting
his popular support melt away. When the military moved to take
ovex, in the face of US suppart for Bos:r_h, there was almost no
resistance.
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The Dominican military leaders had acted against Bosch. to
protect their privileged position and used the fiction of a
Communist threat to disguise their actions. They installed a
provisional civilian government whose performance was so inept
that the military finally asked Donald Reid, a businessman who
was serving as Foreign Minister, to take charge of the executive
triumvirate, In a little over a year Reid had "taken charge" so
effectively that he was threatening the perquisites and political
power of the military leaders. In April 1965 they reacted by
intervening to remove Reid from power. The events which have
occurred in the Dominican Republic since then suggest that
military leaders have not moved very far towards an apolitical
position and that concern far the national welfare is not yet
the determining factor in their conduct. The military establish-
ment however has su `~
, , pported President Joaquin Balaguer, a con-
servative civilian who defeated Bosch in~the election of June 1966.
~ Some of the middle and lower-level officers, who joined in
overthrowing Reid, did so because they wanted to restore
Bosch to power under the Constitution he had promulgated
in 1863. Once Rc:id was removed the factionalism within
the military came into the open.
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5. Honduras (4ctober 1963
In 1963 the probable winner of the scheduled presi-
dential election made it clear that he intended to reduce
the ini'luence and. prerogatives of the country's armed
forces. The military seized potirer, cancelled the elec-
tion, and retained power behind a :t'a~ade of constitutional
goverrvnent.
In early 1963 it looked as i,f President Raman Villeda
Morales would complete his term of o:['fice and turn over control
to another civilian. His Liberal Party's candidate, however,
did not have Villeda's common sense. Vlhere Villeda had. care-
fully made and maintained his peace frith the country's military
leod.ers, Modesto Rodas Alvarado not only avoided any agreement
with them, hE also declared openly that once elected he would
cut the military down to size. He wa.s obviously prepaxing for
such action, while still a candidate, by taking measures to
strengthen the civilian militia forces of the Liberal Party.
Under the Honduran constitution the ~~rmed farces had a special
position, including virtual out o~ny in military matters. A
few days before the election was to be held the military leaders
moved to overthrow Villeda. They cancelled the election, easily
overriding the resistance of the Liberal Party's civilian mili-
tia. Subsequently, t~7e leader o the coup, Col. 4swalda Lotez,
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cooperated with the opposition, minority Nationalist Party and
was selected to serve as "constitution~,.l" president (193-1871}.
Zopez has retained his control over the military and uses the
new constitution as a facade for military-conservative domination
of the country. Progress towards the goals of the Alliance for
Progress has not been headlong.
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6. Brazil (April 1964)
The Brazilian military removed presideni-, Jo~'o Goulart
because his actions threatened military discipline and
Brazilian institutions. The military controlled adminis-
trations have carried out badly needed economic reforms
but have not been able to make similar progress on politi-
cal problems ,
When president Joao Goulart of Brazil was removed by a
civilian-backed military coup, US recognition was not long
delayed. Although Goulart was a constitutional president
his maladroit conduct of the government had brought the country
to the brink of economic disaster and had alienated a wide spec-
trum of opinion which normally opposes military intervention in
politics. His penchant for demagogic tactics and extreme leftist
advisers had also aroused the fears of anti-Communist leaders in
Brazil and abroad. When Goulart intervened to set aside military
disciplinary measures which had been imposed on enlisted men far
political agitation its his support, the anti-Goulart military
leaders used his action to unite the military establishment against
him.
After removing Goulart the Brazilian military government
carried out an extensive purge of the countryts political leaders,
abolished the political parties, and organized new ones. It also
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undertook unpopular but sorely needed economic measures to reverse
the downward slide in the economy and to restore fiscal solvency.
The farm of constitutional government has been maintained, but the
military establishment remains the locus of political power; a
second general has succeeded the first in the presidency and
elections are carefully controlled to keep the apposition impotent-
After nearly four years of responsible government by the military,
however, the odds are that a withdrawal of the military from
politics would be followed by a return to the kind of civilian
regime that produced the economic problems and political strife
which led to the military takeover in the first place-
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7. Bolivia (November 1864)
In 1964 the Bolivian military removed a civilian
administration that had alienated many of its supporters
and was using police-state tactics in its efforts to
retain power. fihe military-based administration has not
tried to reverse the 1952 Revolution, has restored reas~n-
ably effective government, and has shown more respect for
civil liberties than did its civilian predecessor.
One of Latin America's few real revolutions was carried out
in Bolivia, after April 1952, when civilians supported by the
police overthrew a repressive military junta flznctianing in the
service of the country's landed and mining oligarchy. But by
1964, and under the guise of civilian constitutional government,
President Victor Paz Estenssoro had set up a police-state dictator-
ship which, in fact, was mare repressive than some of the area's
contemporary military dictatorships.
Meanwhile, the Bolivian military farces had recovered from
the physical beating and institutional disarray that befell them
in 1952. Early in 1964 the military leaders forced Paz to drop
his announced choice for the vice-presidency on the MNR electoral
ticket and to accept Air Force General Rene Barrientos as his
running mate. After an uncontested election (May 1964), the
existing tensions between Paz and Barrientos increased. By
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November 1g6~+ students were rebelling against Paz, the military
leadership refused to support him and he soon departed for exile
in Peru. A military junta, which included Barrientos, took over
and in mid-1866 Barrientos won election to the presidency. The
military leaders are back in control, as they were before April
1g52, but they are a rather different kind of military leader and
they have not tried to reverse the 1952 Revolution. They have
restored reasonably effective government with far more in the way
of civil liberties than were permitted under the civilian regime
of 1g60-1g6~+. They have also adopted measures to make the important
tin-~,i.ning sector of the economy s,n asset rather than a financial
rathole subsidized by US funds.
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S. Argentina (June 1966)
The Argentine military leaders seized power in 1966
because they were dissatisfied with the way the civilian
government was handling the problems of Peronism and
modernization of the nation. The military government
has undertaken basic economic reforms and insists that
it will retain power indefinitely to ensure that modern-
ization of the country is carried out.
President Artur Illia took office, in November 1963, only
because Lt. Gen. Juan Carlos Ongania, then commander-in-chief
of the Army, had insisted that elections be held and that the
country be turned back to civilian control. Illia assumed
office as a minority president (some 26 percent of the total
vote), and without a coherent program. $y June 1966 he had
what passed for a program but had ..done little to implement it.
And the Peronists were again at the electoral gates, having
emerged as the principal gainer in the congressional elections
of 1965. Illia's government showed great respect for civil
liberties but little ability to get on with the job of resolving
the country's pressing political and ecoa~,omic problems. In late
June 1966 the military leaders removed him between dusk and dawn
with scarcely a hand raised in his defense.
~ Arturo Frondizi had been ousted by the military, in March 1962,
after he miscalculated the electoral strength of the Peronists,
and could find no support among non-Peronist political parties
who preferred a military takeover to Frondizi's continuance in
the presidency.
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The military junta, formed by the commanders-in-chi~:f of
the armed forces, abolished the political parties and termin-
ated all legislative and executive tenures on the national and
provincial levels. They then installed Ongania as president to
exercise both executive and legislative pawErs. The military
leaders set no terminal date for Ongania to relinquish power
and made it clear that elections would not be held until the
economic and social problems involved in the modernization of
the country had been resolved. The present government is a
presidential dictatorship supported by the armed forces, which
has not resorted to extensive use of repression. Instead of
taking the easy road to popularity, it has adopted austerity
measures and maintained controls over wage and price levels.
It is a sad but just commentary on Argentine political leaders
and the country's electorate that the military government has
been much more willing to carry out needed but unpopular reforms
than its civilian predecessor.
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