VIETNAM: THE COMMUNIST BALANCE SHEET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001400010013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: February 8, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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''OFFICE OF 1 TIONAL ESTIMATES
STAFF MF MO IMUM NO. ' . 68 (ONE Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: Vietnam: Th C9r=unist Balance Sheet
This is only an effort %o~ provide some basis for continuing
the debate on Vietnam; obviou )y it is still early in the game
C+'.'rf A., N
GROUP I
E eluded from automatic
d grading and
S-E-CA-R-E-T de`'lassification
to be very confident about whaj has happened or what happens
next. No effort made in this rn mo to survey the US GVN side,.
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
8 February 1968
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 8.68 (ONE Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: Vietnam: The Communist Balance Sheet
1. As in every major military-political effort by the
Communists in Vietnam, the present offensive serves several
objectives. Some are fairly obvious, such as the psychological
shock of a sudden and massive assault on areas hitherto believed
secure. In this they succeeded. Beyond this more or less
minimum achievement, however, Hanoi and the Viet Cong apparently
had and may still have much more far-reaching military and
political goals, general uprising and the establishment of a
new "`coalition regime".
2. In general, what we have been witnessing since last
September is a shift from the protracted war theory to what the
Communist now call an "all-out attack". This does not mean
that the fighting has to be over soon; the Communists have by
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
S-E-C-R-E-T declassification
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no means exhausted their military capabilities for continuing
the conflict. But they have gambled a good deal on the present
offensive, an effort which bears considerable resemblance to
General Giap's final campaign against the French in the winter
and spring of 1953-54.
Background
3. The concept of the present military and political
effort was apparently worked out by the summer of last year,
and embodied in a high level decision in Hanoi. The essence
of this decision was subsequently conveyed to the troops in
quite general terms, under the rubric of a "General Offensive
and General Uprising." Heavy indoctrination courses were
held throughout South Vietnam in October, November and Decem-
ber. The general tenor of the new political line is reflected
in the following notes of a briefing on the party decision:
The Central (Executive Committee) of the Lao Dong
Party came to the conclusion that the time is ripe to
directly stage the revolution. The opportunity for the
General Offensive and the General Uprising has presented
itself. The Central...and Uncle (Ho) order the SVN Party
Headquarters and the entire army and the entire people of
SVN to carry out the General Offensive and General Upris-
ing in order to gain a decisive victory for the revolution
during the 1968 Winter-Spring-Summer phase... Strong violent
attacks must be launched with the people rising up like a
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surging wave that carries away everything in its wake. Then,
we will establish our administrative control...Our troops
will get ready for movement to the lowlands in order to
march forward towards liberating the cities. We must use
each regiment and division to take over the liberated
areas on a continuous basis. Propaganda must be conducted
far and wide.
4. Other documents indicated the broad scope of the new
offensive and the shift in tactics. One cadre, for example
was told that the three phase concept of the first Indochina
war was now to give way to the doctrine of "all out attacks".
Another document noted the "urgent requirement" to mobilize
manpower and resources so as to obtain an "extraordinary
victory" in a relatively short period of time. Finally, some
documents indicated the formation in the provinces of "'suicide
units" .
5. Another aspect of this new line was the increased
emphasis on a "coalition" government. While the blueprints for
such a new regime were intentionally blurred, it was neverthe-
less held out as a near term objective which would be achieved
within the context of the General Offensive.
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6. By mid-December the Communists began to make careful
plans for the attacks which were to take advantage of the be-
ginning of Tet. They announced a proposed seven day Tet truce
(and one can imagine what might have happened if this had been
accepted by the GVN and US). Actually, at that very time,
special training had begun for the attacks. Some more NVA
replacements were scattered throughout some VC units; village
guerrillas and raw recruits were impressed into Main and Local
force units, and clandestine cadres and units began briefings
and planning for the wave of attacks against cities and towns,
and the formation of the new "Peace Fronts". A document just
captured, but dated 16 January, mentioned "Emergency Directive
No 1". Just prior to the attacks an order of the day by the SVN
Liberation Army was apparently read to all the troops and cadres.
It asserted that:
"This will be the greatest battle ever fought through-
out the history of our country...it will decide the fate
and survival of our fatherland."
7. The VC rank and file were further motivated by three
general promises. They were told that major reinforcements would
arrive within the first day of the attacks, so that the troops
were to hold for as long as possible until help arrived (in
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some cases this was true but definitely not so in other areas).
Secondly, the troops were led to believe that the populace
would rally to the Viet Cong. And, finally, many cadres and
soldiers were told, or chose to believe that a new government
would be quickly established and peace negotiations would soon
follow.
8. The Attack. The offensive against the province
capitals and district towns was apparently to be launched all
over the country in the early morning of 30 January. As a
country wide operation the attacks were fairly well coordinated.
But in their execution, there seems to have been a breakdown in
many areas. The total picture as it now emerges is a rather
bizarre kaleidoscope. Many obvious targets were not struck the
first day, particularly in the delta. Some cities escaped al-
together or for several days, when all element of surprise
had been lost (Tay Ninh). Other attacks were little more than
probes or harassments, while others developed into major engage-
ments.
9. The general plan called for two stages and perhaps a
third. First, the local city units, sappers and political
cadres were to seize key objectives such as radio stations,
police headquarters, province chiefs, US compounds and so forth.
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This was to be exploited psychologically by broadcasts and
proselytizing teams announcing that the VC had actually assumed
power throughout the province and country. This initial effort
was supposed to be followed up by actual infrantry assaults. In
some areas this second attack never materialized, or quickly
bogged down. For example, several prisoners from a VC company
attacking Saigon have said that their units were stalled on the
outskirts before reaching their objectives. In some areas, such
as Nha Trang no reinforcements were ever intended. A high level
political cadre there nevertheless believed that though their
local efforts might fail the country - wide attack would succeed.
10. There may have been plans for a third phase, which has
not begun and may never begin. In this phase the larger NVA
units still in reserve would be cormnitted, especially in areas
where there was a promising situation. In Hue the initial
attack was by the VC city unit and a VC Battalion; they were to
fight for seven days, and of reinforced for 15 days. Some of the
units for a second attack are still in place and could attact,
in some areas, particularly in I Corps. Their failure to do so
yet could mean that this was only a contingency plan. However,
in some cities there have been two general attacks (Hoi An,
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Can Tho), though the second wave seems to have been a weak one.
The decision facing General Giap in whether to commit good
troops to retrieve an unpromising situation. He may have no
choice.
11. The "Uprising". As a purely military effort to seize
and hold, the Communist have failed thus far. In part at
least, their failure was because of the total lack of popular
support. While it is difficult to know just how much support
they expected, they must have counted on some in many areas.
Initial propaganda exploitation heavily emphasized the idea of
a "general uprising". The premature announcement of new "Peace
Fronts" also fits in a patern of fomenting a popular seizure of
power. Finally, the rather meager military effort in some
cities suggest that the only hope in those areas was for the
people to rally to the VC banner.
12. This failure is probably the single most impressive
fact of the last few days. Given the excellent political cadre
system developed over decades, one would think that political
agitation and exploitation would be one of the Communists'
strongest instruments. In practice it proved the weakest.
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And in the process the Communist have sacrificed theirclandestine
apparatus throughout most of the country. This cannot be quickly
replaced, nor can the sapper and special action units that bore
the brunt of the initial attacks. This aspect may prove more
costly than the thousands of foot soldiers who have been killed
in the last week.
The Co a~ttr :'s de
13. The effect outside the cities is less clear. Strangely
enough the pacification program apparently was not a major target
of military attacks, perhaps because the only units not engaged
were the guerillas. Nevertheless, in the process of assaulting
the cities the Communists may have achieved significant damage
to the revolutionary development program. Many cadre teams were
forced to pull out of their areas once the protecting forces
were withdrawn to the cities. In other areas, previously se-
cured hamlets were invaded by propaganda and foraging teams.
And of course there were outright attacks and assassinations.
Thus, there may be more significant damage in the countryside
than in the cities. If so, it will be a major blow to the US
and the GVN.
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14. Khe Sahn. The picture is also a mixed one if considered
against another probable Communist objective. If Khe Sahn is
parallel to Dien Bien Phu in Hanoi's thinking, then the Tet
Offensive is analogous to the attacks which the Viet Minh launched
in the winter-spring of 1953-54 against many of the same targets
which were struck in the past week. At that time Giap's objective,
in his words was, as follows:
"By successively launching strong offensives on the
points they (the French) has left relatively unprotected,
we obliged them to scatter their troops all over the place
in order to ward off our blows, and thus create favorable
conditions for the attack at Dien Bien Phu..."
Thus one of the military aims of the Tet Offensive was to draw
ARVN?Arnerican and Korean units into the defense of urban areas.
Obviously, this has succeeded to some extent. But at the same
time, the attacks have not yet succeeded to the point where the
outcome of Khe Sahn has been affected. Indeed one of the
mysteries is the failure to launch the Khe Sahn battle simul-
taneously with the other attacks.
15. If this is Giap's current strategy, however, then
repeated attacks throughout SVN will have to be made despite the
heavy costs. Not until the issue is decided at Khe Sahn will
Hanoi be in a position to judge the total impace and effectiveness
of its bold but costly moves.
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16. The Outlook. The main question remains: is this the
final effort of the Communists. Will they be forced into a
peace settlement as their failure becomes clear, or, alternatively
do they have every intention of suing for peace at a time when
their political psychological "image" seems strong.
17. To begin with it must be remembered that the Communists
conceive of the present effort as a campaign, openly announced
to run through the spring, at least. It is not a single burst,
even though the recent attacks were concentrated within a few
days. There is still the battle of Khe Sahn, and the entire DMZ
to be fought; and in many areas there is still a second cycle
of attacks that could be initiated.
18. Equally important, all the dimensions of the political
strategy are not fully apparent. The Communists are not going
to quitely drop the new "Peace Fronts". There may still be some
sensational developments in the political realm. For example,
one rather doubtful report claims that General "Big" Minh will
emerge as the head of a new "coalition" formed between the 1'FL
and the new insurrectum committees and fronts. Thus it may
still be a matter of months before the Communist play all their
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19. Nevertheless, they are now fully committed to the
proposition that the very last phase of the revolution has begun.
They will try to claim an enormous success; and they may even
believe that much has been achieved both politically, militarily
internationally. They will certainly expect the debate and
controversy in the US to be aggravated and the tensions within
the GVN to be heightened. However, they must also know that
there will be no uprising, no massive takeover, and no collapse
in Saigon. In sum, they are almost back to square No. 1, and
their forces are decidedly weakened. The question uppermost in
their minds must be whether US and South Vietnamese confidence
has been so shaken that within a few months the US will sue for
peace.
20. It is in this context of uncertainty over their own
prospects and the position of the US that the Communist may follow
their military moves with further political initiatives. They
will almost certainly want to test the US position in the wake of
the Tet offensive and while the Khe Sahn battle is in doubt. The
peace offensive if it comes could be as massive as the military
one. From the Communist standpoint, after a major show of force
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and demonstration of military capabilities, there is not likely
to be a better political and psychological time to try for a
political settlement.
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