THE 'SECOND FRONT' HYPOTHESIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001400010010-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 5, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
5 February 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The "Second Front" Hypothesis
1. Will the Soviets pose a major challenge to the US at some
other point of confrontation in order to as. ist the Communist
cause in Vietnam? When put previously, this question has been
answered in the negative. The present stage of the struggle in
Vietnam perhaps makes it relevant again.
2. There has not been much doubt, at least since 1964, that
the Soviets regard the "national liberation" struggle in Vietnam
and the burdens it places on American policy and resources as
advantageous to them in the perspective of the broader Soviet-
American competition. They have given great and essential
material aid to the North Vietnamese. Their propaganda and
diplomacy have been tireless in support of Hanoi, increasing
wherever possible the political costs the US has had to bear
because of its involvement. Clearly, they would welcome an
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outcome which constituted a defeat for the US, not only because
this would mean a local advance for Communist forces, but also,
and perhaps more importantly, because of the setback to US power
and influence generally. If some diversionary action of theirs
could insure this result, it might appear that they would have
every reason to undertake it.
How the Soviet Leaders Mi t Calculate
3. A Soviet decision to move in this way is more complex
than appears at first blush, however. Some sense of this can be
obtained by posing the questions which the Soviet leadership would
ask itself in making its calculations about a diversionary action.
4. Is the Soviet move necessary to Communist success in
Vietnam? -- The actual Soviet estimate of the outlook for the war
is not known. If Moscow believes that Communist victory is certain
eventually, it has no incentive to do much more than it is already
doing. If it believes the war is at a stalemate, it probably
considers that a more direct involvement would limit its ability
to help the Communist side in eventual negotiations. Meantime,
Soviet propaganda can continue to exploit the war against the US
in many areas. Probably only if the Soviets believed that a
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diversionary move by them was necessary to avert collapse of the
Communist effort in South Vietnam would they have compelling
reason to entertain such a move at all. There is no indication
that they estimate the situation in Vietnam in this way.
5. Is Hanoi's victory in the South vital for the USSR? --
It is unlikely that the Soviets believe that it is. They were
not a party to Hanoi's initial decisions, and everything we know
about the North Vietnamese leadership indicates that it would
probably not assert that the Soviets had an obligation to act to
insure success. There is evidence that in the early phase of
American direct involvement the Soviets counseled negotiations
and were rebuffed. They do not assert that any security interest
of their own is involved. Finally, the Soviets must know that,
even if Hanoi won, its support for Moscow in the latter's contest
with Peking for influence in the Communist movement would not be
assured. In this regard, in fact, a failure of Hanoi's adventure
in South Vietnam might be as auspicious.
6. Could there be assurance that pressures on the US else-
where would achieve the desired effect, i.e., cause the US to
abandon its objectives in Vietnam? -- The Soviet leaders would
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probably have to give a problematical answer. They would recognize
that a threat to transform the issue into a general Soviet-American
confrontation could harden American will rather than the contrary.
Some if not all of those in this and other countries who oppose the
American course in Vietnam would take a new view of what was at
stake. The resulting political climate might make it easier for
the US Administration to undertake a fuller mobilization of
military resources. Further, when world opinion recognized that
the Vietnam issue had broadened into a dangerous Soviet-American
confrontation, demands would mount sharply that all parties
negotiate at once. Hanoi, too, would then be heavily pressured
to abandon its dilatory tactics and to negotiate without pre-
conditions, the precise result US policy has long sought.
7. Could the cure turn out to be worse than the disease,
i.e. might a diversionary crisis bring on direct Soviet-American
hostilities, or at least high and uncontrollable risks of them? --
Something would obviously depend on the locale and intensity of
the challenge posed. But if the Soviets aimed at a significant
diversion of American military resources from Vietnam, or at
convincing the US that it faced a major setback in some other
area, then the challenge would have to be formidable indeed. Ugly
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words or gestures would not be enough; Soviet practice has long
since depreciated such currency. If Moscow actually did something
big enough to have a serious effect on the US, then it could
scarcely escape some considerable measure of risk. It is entirely
possible that the Soviets think that there is no effective
diversionary move they can make, the risks of which are not out of
all proportion to whatever stake they have in Communist success in
South Vietnam. Moreover, to make the attempt and fail would not
only be costly to the USSR itself but damaging to the Communist
cause in Vietnam.
8. Would the challenging move by the USSR involve costs for
other aspects of Soviet policy or in other areas? -- The Soviet
leaders are aware that in many countries they are credited with
having renounced bad old aggressive habits in favor of peaceful
methods. For some opinion, the US involvement in war has
heightened Soviet repute by contrast. Threatening Soviet moves
in areas other than Vietnam would revive old memories, even though
some would still find it easy to blame the US for such a turn in
Soviet policy. The tactics of Communist parties in Western
countries, now aimed at establishing political alliances with
non-Communist groups, would probably be compromised. The Soviets
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would even consider the cost to bilateral relations with the US.
Bad as these have been, they have not precluded movement on some
matters in which the Soviets have an interest, for example, the I1PT.
And Washington's hopes for certain constructive developments in
Soviet-American relations have caused it to tolerate Soviet aid to
Hanoi. Sharp new Soviet-American tensions would change the setting
and the play in many ways which Moscow would probably see as
potentially disadvantageous.
9. Questions like those above, which the Soviet leaders
would inevitably ask themselves, make it clear that a decision
to incite a major crisis elsewhere would be at least a very
complicated one. Still, they obviously have such a capability.
When they ask themselves where and how specifically they should
act, however, the decision would probably seem even tougher.
10. Berlin. -- This chronic focus of crisis has the advantage
of insuring maximum Soviet control; the screw has been turned there
with great delicacy in the past. Beyond a certain point, however,
no area of possible confrontation carries greater danger. Even
well short of maximum risk, moreover, gains which have been
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registered in Western European attitudes toward the USSR, with
all that these imply for Soviet hopes of undermining the American
position in Europe, would tend to be reversed. While some might
blame American policy for causing new tensions in Europe, very
few would accept a Soviet power play in Berlin with equanimity.
Even the USSR's allies in Eastern Europe, except perhaps East
Germany, would be appalled by a new crisis over Berlin.
11. Korea. -- The Soviets appear to have given at least
tacit approval. to North Korea's policy of armed subversion against
the ROK. So far this has had no effect on US and ROK policy in
Vietnam. And Pyongyang, despite the Pueblo incident, appears to
have no stomach for raising the ante to the point where renewed
hostilities could result. The Soviets must recognize that the
margin for additional pressure in this theater without bringing
this result is narrow. Yet, if there is war, they would be
committed in a far more overt way to a regime over which they
have far less control than was the case in 1950. The risk of
direct Soviet-American hostilities would be greater. The US
effort in Vietnam would appear much more plausibly as resistance
to a general thrust of Communist aggression in Asia. The
resultant change in perspectives would set back Soviet policy
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in a number of Asian states, and especially in Japan, where a
burgeoning trade must seem to hold promise for future Soviet
influence.
12. The Middle East -- Here the Soviets would presumably
have to act through clients whose reliability and controllability
is far from assured. The Arabs will hardly be ready for another
round with Israel very soon, and the Soviets have already demon-
strated that they do not care to take a direct hand in that
quarrel. Moreover, the June war had no effect on the US effort
in Vietnam, even though insofar as they played a part in the
preliminaries to that event, the Soviets may have thought they
were storing up diversionary trouble for the US. Other Middle
East tensions could become aggravated (e.g., in the Persian Gulf),
but it is hard to see how these could be either on a scale
sufficient to have a bearing on the US effort in Vietnam or
manipulable by the Soviets to that end.
13. The three areas mentioned are obvious examples; no
doubt there are others where Soviet mischief-making might contrive
to produce crises of some sort. But it is doubtful that such
crises would meet what would appear to be essential criteria: to
create a disturbance significant enough to have a real effect on
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-.moor Noe
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American Policy in Vietnam; to permit close management of risks
by the USSR and preclude irresponsible conduct by clients; to
avoid important compromises or setbacks for Soviet policy, in the
immediate area or generally, which could outweigh whatever the
Soviets might gain from possible communist success in South
Vietnam.
Conclusion
14. This analysis, like that made in earlier estimates,
finds little to credit in the "second front" hypothesis. It still
in
unlikely that the Soviets, in order to further Communist aims
in Vietnam, would move against the US elsewhere in some dramatic
way. it seems out of character for the present leadership, and
incompatible with what it appears to believe it has at stake in
Vietnam. But, as indicated, the calculations involved are
complicated, and there can be no complete assurance that Soviet
judgments would fall out in the manner set down here, either now
or at some later stage as the context changes.
15. It is certain, however, that short of the kind of
dramatic move considered in this paper, Soviet policy will
continue to seize all occasions to harass and complicate the
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American effort in Vietnam. Where possible, others will be
incited to do the same. Anywhere that the American preoccupation
with Vietnam offers an opportunity to extend the USSR's influence
and reduce that of the US, it will be taken. This much at least
seems clearly dictated by the Soviet leaders' present vie*s of
their interests.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
JOHN HUIZENGA'
Acting Chairman
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