CHINESE AND SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF COMMUNIST FAILURE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001300050009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: December 8, 1967
• Content Type: MF

MEMORANDUM FOR: The .virector
FORM NO. lo) REPLACES FORM 10.101
I AUG 54 I WHICH MAY BE USED.
SHERMAN KENT
Director
National Estimates
8 December 1967
(DATE)
Standard Form 63
November 1961
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
8 December 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Chinese and Soviet Reactions to the Likelihood
of Communist Failure in South Vietnam
1. In this memorandum we assume that Hanoi anticipates
failure of the Communist effort in South Vietnam because of
the continued attrition of military and political capabilities.
In this circumstance Hanoi might choose to terminate the war,
with or without negotiations, or seek additional outside help.
We examine below the probable Chinese and Soviet attitudes in
such a situation.
2. Peking has a considerable stake in an outcome of the war
which would demonstrate the validity of "national liberation
struggles" in Southeast Asia. The Chinese are prepared to exert
considerable pressure on Hanoi and to increase military and
economic assistance in order to sustain Hanoi's will and ability
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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to prolong the war in the south. If requested, the Chinese would
also be willing to station combat troops in North Vietnam to make
additional Vietnamese available for infiltration to the South and
to assist, if necessary, in preserving internal security.
3. Even so, Peking is not committed to a Communist success
in South Vietnam at any price. The Chinese have allowed them-
selves room in their public position to accept failure of the
military effort in the South. If, in the end, the situation there
could only be saved by use of Chinese ground combat troops against
US forces, we feel that Peking's fear of major hostilities with
the US would be the deciding factor. Rather than accept this risk,
and even in the unlikely event that Hanoi urged direct Chinese
intervention, we believe that Peking would accept a termination
of the fighting. The setback would be attributed to deviations
from Maoist doctrines and to Soviet perfidy.
4. As an alternative to direct intervention in South
Vietnam the Chinese might consider a diversionary effort in
Laos to relieve pressures in South Vietnam and confront the US
with the prospects of a wider war. A small number of Chinese
forces could be introduced into Laos clandestinely. From Peking's
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standpoint, however, an intervention in Laos on a scale likely to
make much impact on the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam
would incur the same risks of US counteraction as would direct
intervention in South Vietnam. Thus, we think the Laotian move
would be an unlikely one for the Chinese to try.
5. While Peking in our view could accept Communist failure
in South Vietnam, it almost certainly could not accept a collapse
of Communist government in Hanoi. In the unlikely event that an
unfavorable course of the war in the South combined with internal
divisions in the North to present such a prospect, the Chinese
would probably move into North Vietnam with combat troops to
restore political order. Chinese troops might meet some resistance
but they probably could reconstitute a central Vietnamese
authority in Hanoi and restore order in much of the country.
However, the puppet nature of the new regime would detract from
its nationalist appeal, and it probably could not rally much
positive support either in the North or the South.
6. Should the US extend its ground combat operations to North
Vietnam, we think the Chinese reaction would depend on Peking's
view of the extent and nature of the threat this action presented
to the Hanoi regime itself. If Peking judged that the threat to
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Hanoi was not critical, e.g., if it involved only a US operation
just north of the DMZ to outflank the NVA troops there, the
initial Chinese military reaction would probably be limited to
a rapid and conspicuous buildup of combat forces in South China
and perhaps in the northern parts of North Vietnam as well. This
action would be accompanied by strong verbal warnings.
7. On the other hand, if the Chinese perceived US actions
as directly threatening the existence of the Communist regime
in North Vietnam, and estimated that their intervention was
necessary to preserve that regime, we believe that they would
use their own ground forces to engage US forces in North Vietnam.
8. Like most estimates concerning Chinese actions the fore-
going must be qualified because of the uncertain situation in
Peking. We cannot be sure what the impact of the internal
struggle has had or will have on Chinese policies. It is con-
ceivable that in some circumstances a foreign war might appear to
certain leaders or factions as a way out of a political impasse.
It seems more likely, however, that the Chinese leadership would
seek to avoid a major external crisis so long as internal
affairs remain in disarray.
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The USSR
9. The USSR's stake in the war in South Vietnam rests
on considerations different from those influencing Peking. The
Soviets do not have a security interest of their own in the area
as do the Chinese, but have been concerned primarily to preserve
their claims to leadership of the Communist movement. At present
the Soviet leaders probably think that a military victory by
either side is not possible. They probably prefer a political
settlement to the uncertainties and risks of a protracted struggle.
If Hanoi itself chose to seek such a settlement or to quietly
liquidate the conflict we believe that Moscow would accept such
action.
10. If Hanoi remained determined to fight on despite
failing prospects and requested still more assistance, Moscow
would probably feel compelled to respond. But the response would
still be conditioned by Soviet concern to limit the risks of
enlarging the war. Thus, Moscow might provide more sophisticated
weapons for the defense of North Vietnam, and non-nuclear weapons
with additional range and fire power which would be employed
against US forces and bases from positions north of the DMZ.
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Moscow might accompany these moves with a far tougher stand in
all its relations with the US, and generally create an atmosphere
of tension designed to pressure the US into a more flexible posture
in Vietnam. But we do not believe that the USSR, merely to prevent
a Communist defeat in South Vietnam, would be willing to become
involved directly in the fighting or to encourage high risk
diversions in Korea, Berlin, or elsewhere.
11. Finally, if the Hanoi regime appeared on the verge of
collapse, we think it probable that the Soviets would make
vigorous efforts to settle matters by diplomatic means before
the collapse occurred, and if possible before the Chinese
intervened militarily to prevent or offset it.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
25X1
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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