THE WAR IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001300040041-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: January 9, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T ELL I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
9 January 1967
SUBJECT: The War in Vietnam
TIM OUTLOOK IN GEI' ERAL
1. In the course of the past year and a half the chances
that the Communists would in South Vietnam by military victory
have vanished. This is the clearest development of the period;
in other respects the course of the struggle remains inconclusive.
In Saigon the political health of the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment is still precarious, though much better than it was a year
ago. The program for pacification of the countryside has made
some progress, but results continue to be spotty. The fighting
capabilities of the South Vietnamese arty remain generally poor,
and its eventual usefulness in pacification remains uncertain.
The sympathies of much of the non-Communist world, and the efforts
POPI/CDF 116649-
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Excluded from automatic
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of many non-Communist governments, are more concerned with
stopping the war than with the terms for settlement. There
is no evident dimunition of the Communist capability to
continue the struggle. In any case, there is no evidence of a
dimunition of Communist will to continue the war.
2. The matter of will is crucial. Hanoi's determination
probably is strengthened by hopes that the US will lose heart if
the struggle is prolonged and by its belief that South Vietnam
cannot create a viable political structure capable of winning
mass support. But the strains upon the Communist side are
great. and are increasing. Above all, probally, the Communists
face problems in recruiting manpower of goad quality within
South Vietnam, and in preserving the morale of forces which
have been disappointed of quick victory and must continue the
struggle under increasingly difficult circumstances.
3. We do not know how long the Communists will remain
determined to persist. There are some indications that they
may be reviewing their strategy and pondering their prospects.
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They may decide at some po.int, perhaps even at a fairly early
date to taper off the conflict, or conceivably to enter into
negotiations. We see no good reason to believe that such a
decision is likely in the near future, though it could happen
with little prior warning. At present, we think the only safe
estimate is that the struggle, if it is aimed at the creation
of a peaceful South Vietnamese state which can stand on its own
feet, will still be long and costly.
k. In the following paragraphs we discuss various aspects
of the situation in greater detail.
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5. Certain trends, vihich were already apparent in late
1965, were confirmed during 196.6. The capability of the Com-
munist main force to conduct offensive military rperation3 was
blunted, while the US and Allied forces gradually gained the
battlefield in.itiattve. Ccmmunist main force units were mauled
time and again by the increasingly effective "search and destroy"
tactics of the US command. Com_raunist preparations for major
initiatives have been repeatedly spoiled by a. combilation of good
fie,;, intelligence and quick response capabilities. Communist
forces suffered heavy losses from the combined fire power of US
artillery and tactical air support.
6. Nevertheless, the NVA/VC main forces remain in the
field. During 1966 the total strength of these forces increased
from about 83,000 to 106,400, largely because of the heavy input
of men from the North. There is no reason to doubt that the
present force level can be sustained if li not chooses. As far
as materiel is concerned, capabilities for transporting supplies
to the main forces have been more than adequate and well above
requirements.
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Communist Military Tactics in the Next Phase
7. There is considerable evidence that the military
developments of the past year have led the Communists to re-
appraise their strategy and tactics. Probably because they now
recognize that an outright military victory is impossible, they
appear to be adjusting their military effort primarily with a
view to sustaining a long war. Their objectives in the coming
phase will probably be to achieve a more favorable ratio of
attrition rates by avoiding large-scale battles in favor of
numerous, widely dispersed small-unit actions, to harass and
obstruct the US/GVN pacification program, to raise the cost of
the bombing program, and, in general, to create an impression
that real progress, let alone victory, is impossible for the US.
Hanoi appears to believe, in the light of its reading of the
American body politic, that American will to persist will not
prove equal to a protracted and costly struggle.
8. The Role of the Main Forces. During the phase which the
struggle is note entering, the Communists will almost certainly
attempt to keep major elements of their main force, including the
NVA elements, in the field. Thea:r principal unions rill be to
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protect base areas and to force the US and ARM to maintain large
forces dispersed and in action against this threat. Large-scale
attacks will almost certainly be launched whenever conditions
a;Tear to augur success, and especially when such an attack holds
saiie promise of having an important political effect on the US.
Sustained large-unit operations, however, seem likely to continue
to diminish as the Communists seek to cut the rate of attrition
on the main forces. This could mean that it will be more difficult
for US forces to strike large enemy concentrations with "search
and destroy" operations.
9. In order to accomplish these aims, it is not necessary
for the main forces to expand greatly. It is possible that Hanoi
plans to slot-r down the expansion of main force units, especially
if there is to be greater emphasis on guerrilla tactics. This
could result in a decline in the introduction of complete units
of the North Vietnamese Army Into South Vietnam. There are some
signs that this may already be taking place. Since l July no new
units have been identified; hcnwwever, because of the time lag
which often occurs between actual infiltration and confirmation
by US intelligence, it is still too early to say that a decline
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has occurred. In any event, North Vietnam will almost certainly
have to send sizeable gr,:)aps of replacement personnel into the
South in order to maintain existing NVA main force units at
adequate strength.
10. The Role of the Guerrillas. The next year is likely
to witness an increased emphasis on the guerrilla war. This war,
of course, never ce,ed though it was conducted at a somewhat
lower level this past year. Communist strategists apparently now
believe that intensified guerrilla operations offer the best
prospect of countering the impact of the US military buildup.
The missions of the guerrilla forces will probably emphasize
harrassment of the bases and LOC's of the US and ARVN forces in
order to pin down these forces in defensive operations and,
secondly, disruption of the pacification program by attacks on
security forces assigned to RD, on RD cadres, and on pacified
Hamlets. To achieve these goals, some VC main force units may be
diverted to guerrilla operations, and the VC may make even more
intensive efforts to motivate the population under its control.
In addition, the Communists will almost certainly attempt further
"spectaculars" such as the mortaring of major airfields and US
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supply depots. Such operations which involve relatively little
risk, commit few assets and, if successful, achieve major political
and propaganda effects.
11. The Communists will continue and probably step up
what has been termed the "criminal" war of assassination and
terrorism. In the provinces such activity has always been one
of the Communists' principal means of attacking the local roots
of central authority and of cowing the rural population. The
recent assassination of Constituent Assembly member Tran Van Van
and the attempt on Dr. PhFm Quang Dan suggests that the Ccmmunists
may be embarking on an intensified campaign of urban terrorism.
The initiation of such a campaign under present circumstances w
would actually be more a sign of Communist weakness than of strength.
(Ideally, urban assets would be saved for the final push to topple
a government softened by military defeat.) The Communists may
feel, however, that politically and psychologically they must
compensate for battlefield reverses and, further, that by care-
fully selecting their targets, they can exacerbate regional tensions
within the Vietnamese body politic and fan already existing
suspicion and hositility among contending non-Communist politicians
and factions.
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12. A VC effort to press the guerrilla war will pose a
serious challenge for the allied forces, especially since the
h of the irregulars may have been underestimated in the
strenI/
past. For some years it has been estimated that there Caere
about 100,000-120,000 irregulars, but there is now documentary
evidence which strongly suggests that at the beginning of 1965,
irregular strength was about 200,000 and that the goal for the
end of 1965 was 250,000-300,000. More recent documentary
evidence suggests that this goal was probably reached, at least
during 1966.
CommLvnis t Problems and Prospects
13. Man-rower. Though we may have erred in underestimating
the size of the irregular force, this is not to say that the
Communists are free of manpower problems. The heavy losses suffered
by the Communist forces are a continuing burden, particularly for
C
the Viet Cong. Total losses for 1966 were about 120,000, including
f Irregulars are divided into full-time guerrillas, part-time
militia, and secret guerrillas who operate clandestinely.
2/
A statistical analysis of manpower problems is inhibited by
serious deficiencies in the available data. The three vital
measures of manpower are estimates of losses, the level of
infiltration from the North, and the Order of Battle. The
large areas of uncertainty which surround each of these key
inputs mean that the judgments and estimates based on them
rest on an inadequate factual underpinning and are thus
subject to significant changes as more information is obtained.
Nevertheless, the statistics do permit judgements on major
trends.
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65,000-75,000 lost to the IWA/VC main forces. Against its on
losses of 30,000-35,000, however North Vietnam was able to
sustain an input of about 75,000. And as noted above, the VC
irregular force was probably expanding to 250,000-300,000, as
well as making up for combat losses in its awn and in Viet Cong
main force units.
14. During 1967, we estimate that the Viet Cong recruiting
and training apparatus will be required to supply about 7,000-
10,000 personnel per month. The VC are capable of this effort,
but it is probably close to their maximum capability. Of this
total requirement about 3,000-4,000 will be earmarked for replace-
ments in main force units. This can be done, but upgrading irregulars
at this rate would probably mean a decline in the quality of re-
placements sent to the Main Forces. The North Vietnamese, however,
seem to have been more successful in meeting their manpower require-
ments in 1966 then they were in 1965.
15. There is already evidence that competition for manpower
was creating problems during 1966. A staff officer of the VC 5th
division, for example, stated that his division was having
difficulties in keeping up to strength because of lack of adequate
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replacements. The division was using North Vietnamese as re-
placements, though one .?ould normally expect upgraded guerrillas
and local draftees to be more than adequate as replacements for
the VC Main Forces. A recently captured document also indicates
that some hard-pressed guerrilla commanders were using subterfuge
to prevent guerrillas from being assigned to main force units.
16. Morale. Morale is likely to be a more critical
factor than in the past. We know that in general Viet Cong morale
is less good than a year ago. The reasons include the defeats and
harassments resulting from superior US firepower and mobility and
good tactical intelligence; some -czar tiaeariness accentuated by the
diminishing prospects of any foreseeable end to the par; the raan-
power pinch which has forced, the VC to send recruits to main
force units from their native Delta habitat into the inhospitable
and disease infested highlands; food and medicine shortages.
T?one of these manpower or morale problems is likely to be
significantly alleviated in a protracted war, assuming US-ARVN
and Korean forces maintain pressures on VC base areas and main
force units.
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17. There is bound to be some sense of a loss of momentum,
which could have an important bearing on the attitudes of officers
and cadres who were led to believe that victory was not far off.
And perhaps i:;xr : ri;,there may be a psychological impact on
the people. It can be fatal to a guerrilla movement or a
revolutionary war if the people decide that the rebels may not in
after all. But, as already noted, the Communist main forces no
longer have the capability of gaining the kind of major tactical
successes which would sustain their momentum.
18. To sum up the military outloo1,the focus of the Com-
munist effort is likely to be more on small unit actions,
terrorism, sabotage and those tactics i?7hich pose the most
difficult challenge to the allied forces. As far, as capabilities
and will are concerned, the Communists are encawtering growing
problems, but none of these appear to be critical. Thus, from
the purely military standpoint there are good reasons to believe
that the Communists will persevere.
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THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE
19. The political aspects of the war may now loom somewhat
more important to the Communists as the military situation assumes
more and more the character of a protracted and costly struggle.
The Communist efforts of course, still depends to a great extent
on the dedication and caamnitment of its cadres and their organi-
zaticnsl. and military skills. But these would be of no avail with-
out the active or enforced support of a substantial par', of the
population. If this support could be denied, the VC would be
highly vulnerable, and probably could be driven off into the hills
to starve or slowly deteriorate in strength and morale,
20. The Communists lost ground in 1966 in terns of what they
can offer the people. They are likely to lose even more ground in
1967. The development of a degree of stability in Saigon, the
holding of elections, and the process of building national institu-
tions began to provide the first credible political alternative
since Diem. At the level of more particular and immediate concern
to the villagers there was no decisive shift, but the strains on
the VC apparatus and the pressure of US/ARVNmilitary, pacification,
civic action, and economic and construction programs were beginning
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to tell in particular areas, if not generally throughout South
Vietnam. The VC have been driven increasingly to treat the
population more harshly. Increased taxation, forced recruitment,
and less selective acts of terrorism have hurt their image as
defenders of the people. And association with the VC seems in-
creasingly the wrong path to what the villagers want most of all.
-- peace and security.
21. The VC ability to defend villages against US/ARVN
attacks has decl:Uied, and it has become increasingly likely that
the presence of VC forces in a village will bring down a rain of
bombs and g afire. In contrast, in government-controlled areas
schools are being built, medical assistance is available, economic
activity is possible, there is a degree of iunuunity from bombings
and battles, and the sheer weight of the resources available --
trucks, earthniovers, airplanes -- suggests that this may be the
winning side. There are, of course, many shortcomings on the
government side, including the pervasive threat of terrorism against
those who go over or take active roles. Nevertheless= whole
villages have moved to government areas, others have been
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"pacified," and recruits have been found among the people to
take an active role in all the various phases of revolutionary
development and pacification.
22. Pacification. The Communists recognize the critical
importance of defeating the pacification program. Over the next
years they will probably attempt to roll back the program just
as they rolled up Diem's strategic hamlets in 1963 when these
began to threaten the VC grip on some parts of the countryside.
The pactfication program depends on many factors., not the least of
which is the steady commitment of the Saigon Government. But
in the near term., the key factor probably is going to be the
protection of pacified areas. And this rests to a considerable
degree on the AWN and the Regional and Popular force troops.
23. The Role of ARIN. The ARVPT today is not in good shape.
In general, its morale is poor, and its training has improved
little. Only 4 of its 11 divisions are capable of reasonable
performance in cctnbat. This is primarily because of the wide
diversity in the qualities of division level leadership.
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24. Nevertheless, A~RVN is not necessarily doomed to fail
its newest role as a security force in the ure in
pacification Program.
A saving element in the
present situation is the Presence of
and RO.c troops to keep the large main force units off the ARVTdt s
buck and in general gain some time for the ARVN to begin retraining
for its new missions iluch will depend an whether Saigon maintains
Its interest and sins
pressure and on how the local commanders respond.
It is likely that -,
perfor1; ce will be spotty for some time and
that both pacification and
APVTdrs effectiveness support in; it
will advance only slMrly.
25. Vietnamese pol
Leal Deve1o eats The :outlook for
contained stability in the politics of South Vietnam seem
brighter. To be sure s soinc hat
r fundaments]. problems remain and no assurance
can be given that sar,~e incident min
?ht not provoke a major crisis.
Over a period of 1a months, however., the KY regime has suer'
xved
-x -fuller discussion of the Vi
contained in discussion
53-66, "Problems ese Political, outlook is
in South Vietnam Overthe~xeYe of Political Devel?
15 December 1966 Ye ar or So r dated ptnent
y SECRET.
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several crises of a bind which have brought down earlier regimes.
First steps have been taken toward creating a sense of national
identity and the institutions to embody its ~ The enlarged L1.;
Presence has helped Sreatly, and despite the danger of incipient
anti-Americanism, will probably continue to be a force for stability.
26. If, as seems likely, South Vietnam does make more
progress, passim; throuh national elections during 1967 and
fording a new government, then this cannot help but have an impact
on Hanoi. Any improvement in the chances for orderl
evolution in South Vietnam is discouraging y political
.:sin;, to Hh.rzoi, particularly
at a time when the OPpor'1%unity for military victory has been
checked. Hanoi would be even more impressed and discouraged if
Saigon also seemed to shots progress in en_;a;fig the loyalties
of the people.
27. Protects. The outlook for the political, phase of the
trot is quite mixed, Pro ress in pacification and winning over
the population is likely to come slowly and painfully. The
Communists are going to i,age the political battle as vigorously
as the military contest. They will almost certainly allow one
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and probably two years to determine the success of their strategy
in the next phase. But is the pacification program moves for-
ward steadily, even if slowly, and Saigon continues to gain in
stability, then the impact on Hanoi is likely to be far greater
than a y statistical measures of progress might suggest.
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low
THE BOMBING OF NVIT AS A FACTOR
p of will probably expect further US escalation of the
bombing and. will take additional steps to make the US air attacks
on the North increasingly costly and difficult. With Soviet and
Chinese assistance, Hanoi has already built up its air defense
step by step: conventional AAA, SANIs, MIGs, then more advanced
MdGs, air-to-air missiles, improved radars, integrated warning
systems with China, and finally, North Korean pilots have appeared.
We cannot exclude that as the next step to check the US bombing,
the Vietnamese will begin to use Communist "volunteers" in combat,
the North Koreans being the first test of US reactions.
29. It is not demonstrable that the bombing of North Viet-
nam has thus far zeakened Hanoi's zzill to continue the var.
There appears to be confidence that North Vietnam can live v ith
the present types and scale of attack and can also increase the
attackers' losses. The principal economic cost to Hanoi has
been the diversion of manpower, although me estimate that the
diversion reached its -peak in late 1965, and may now be declining.
Losses to the economy are almost certainly vieti zed by Hanoi's
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leaders as tolerable given what is at stake in the war. The
bombing of infiltration routes has not resulted in shortages of
materiel for the forces in South Vietnam, or significantly
reduced Hanoi's ability to maintain logistic support of these
forces. It seems clear now that the air campaign by itself cannot
persuade Hanoi to abandon the war. Other factors would neigh much
more heavily in the North Vietnamese leaders' appraisal of the
prospects of victory and therefore in influencing
persist.
DO. Hanoi has even seen political advantage in the bombing
campaign. Together Z rith its allies and supporters it has used
the bombing to discredit the whole US effort in Vietnam. The
propaganda to maximize international pressure on the US to desist
from bombing is no doubt seen as a means of persuading the US to
alter is war aims. There is no persuasive evidence at this time
that a halt to the bombing t could produce a Communist move for a
truce and negotiations. Other considerations would figure more
importantly, in particular the Communist judgment as to likely
political developments in the wake of a truce.
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THE AIRERNATNE OF NEGOTIATIONS
31. The option of trying for a favorable political settle-
ment through negotiations is probably given periodic consideration
in Hanoi. That it has been rejected so far has probably been due,
at least in part, to a deep suspicion of the entire concept of
achieving Hanoi's ends through political bargaining -- a suspicion
well grounded in what the North Vietnamese must regard as the sell-
out of their interests in 1954. Moreover, their revolutionary
mystique impels them toward a decisive victory won through their
own military in the field rather than a qualified victory won at
the conference table with the help of other powers. Though they
probably recognize that a decisive victory is not aoi,- in sight, they
probably still hope that persistence in a protracted war will
bring the US to withdraw or consent to a settlement clearly
advantageous to Hanoi.
32. The only other circumstances in which Hanoi seems likely
to negotiate would be those in which it came to believe that its
aims in South Vietnam were actually being prejudiced by continued
war and. that a negotiated political arrangement offered a chance
to preserve its assets there, for use in a purely political
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struggle or in a new revolutionary attempt later. At present
there is no clear indication that such a turning in Hanoi's
attitude is in the offing, but this could come at any time and
we would be unlikely to have advanced indications of it in any
case.
33. Another factor bearing on the issue of negotiations is
the influence of Hanoi's allies. The argument is often made that
Moscow will eventually persuade Hanoi to settle the war, in order
to remove Vietnam from the international agenda and get on with
the business of liquidating the cold war. In fact, the Soviet
attitude toward the va.r appears to be mixed. The Soviets can
see certain advantages in the problems which the war generates
for US policy, especially in Europe. On the other hard, they are
aware that the situation carries risks of direct confrontation
with the US, which they wish to avoid. For the Soviets, the
optimum outcome would be one in which a political process, perhaps
including negotiation, gave Hanoi a good prospect of achieving
its aims in South Vietnam; this would inflict a major reverse on
the US and would win credit for the USSR in the international
Communist movement, perhaps even to the detriment of Peking.
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Evidently the Soviets do not think that the moment has yet come
in which they can set in motion a scenario which would end in
this way.
34. China's adamant stand against any negotiations has been
one of the constant factors in the war, and it seems likely that
Peking will continue to reject a political settlement and urge a
continuation of the fighting. But we cannot ignore the momentous
developments in Peking and the possibility that in the next year
or two great changes may occur in the leadership. It does not
seem likely that a future Chinese regime, following after Mao,
will see its interests in Vietnam and Southeast Asia in a
radically different way. But it is possible that the demise of
Mao would bring important reappraisals, which almost certainly
would have to include the Vietnamese question.
Conclusion
35. We conclude not only that the Communists are capable
of fighting on for at least another year, but that they are
probably determined to do so. In our view, however, they face
important problems, and we believe that the Communist position,
both militarily and politically in South Vietnam, will deteriorate
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further over the next year. Yet, Hanoi has a strong political
incentive to keep the T aar going, especially until it has some
clearer notion about the stability of the GVN, the US Presidential
elections, and the possible impact of both on US policy.
SHCHMAN KED1T
Chairman
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