LETTER TO ARTHUR W. BARBER FROM SHERMAN KENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001300040032-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: March 1, 1967
• Content Type: LETTER

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DISTRIBUTION:
0 - Addressee
2 - Covering cys of Memo fwd to William H. Carpenter
1 - Reading Room
1 - D/NE File
INR/DDC, Room 6635, Dept of State
Memo to Director "European Security -- Themes for
East and West" File
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
3 February 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: European Security -- Themes from East and West
1. The movement of political forces in Europe appears
increasingly to forecast change in the relationships which have
obtained there since 1945. The form and fortune of the Western
Alliance, the role of the United States within that alliance, and
the relations between the two Europes, East and West, are in a
state of flux. The question has been raised whether or not to
redefine the American military role in Europe. And the USSR has
sought through various means to move West European discontent to
its own advantage. At the moment, the Soviets have revived the
proposition that all differences between Eastern and Western Europe
can be resolved peacefully and permanently through the means of an
all-European security conference. This paper addresses itself to
that proposition, to the motives and the meanings of the Soviet
proposal, to the responses of the West Europeans, and to the pros-
pects for significant movement within this sphere within the fore-
seeable future.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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2. In biref, we have concluded that: (1) the USSR's
current campaign for European security is consonant with its
traditional interest in diminishing the US presence on the
continent and in preserving the status quo in Germany; (2)
there is, in fact, rising interest in Europe in some form of
settlement with the USSR, in part because of growing questioning
of the US role in Europe, and in part because of a yearning to
believe that an active Soviet military threat no longer exists;
(3) the West Europeans, nevertheless, still generally recognize
the Atlantic connection as vital to their own ultimate interests;
and (4), in any case, there appear in the near term to be few
prospects for the actual convocation of a security conference,
or the acceptance of new security arrangements, both because
of a Soviet disinclination to press the issue and because of
West European reluctance to complicate relations among them-
selves, and especially with West Germany, by accepting Soviet
terms for accommodation.
Soviet Policy
3. The USSR has generally avoided the use of crude pressures
in Western Europe since 1962. The Soviet leaders aee:rtd after the
Cuban missile crisis to appreciate the grave risks involved in
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threats and demonstrations of power, and at last to comprehend
that such tactics only served to consolidate the Western Alliance
and the American presence in Europe. But, though the USSR's
policies toward Europe have been relatively quiescent in recent
years -- as, for example, in Berlin -- its basic strategy is
still to isolate West Germany, disrupt the Western Alliance, and
sever the close ties between Europe and the United States.
4. The Soviets have seen new opportunities in recent fric-
tions in European-American relations and have sought, especially
since last spring, to play a more active role in European politics.
They have played on Western European concern over US actions in
Vietnam, seeking to encourage skepticism over the reliability of
the US commitment to Europe and to stimulate opposition to US
policies generally. They have continued to cultivate France,
with an eye to heightening tensions and contradictions between
Europe and the US. And they have emphasized the desirability
and feasibility of a European detente and the need for an all-
European conference to promote security.
5. For the Soviets the heart of a European security arrange-
ment is a settlement of the German question on Communist terms.
This means first of all a legalization of the division of Germany,
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and if possible, agreed limitations on arms in Germany. The
hoped-for effects are a weakening of the Federal Republic's
alliance ties and ultimately its political isolation. In power
terms, this is the outcome which Soviet agitation of the benign
theme of European security is intended to promote.
6. Soviet advocacy of an all-European security conference
has implied that a grand European settlement would be made without
American participation or at least in a way which gave the US
no choice but to ratify the result. Moscow clearly recognizes
that there is a strong desire in Western Europe to believe that
increasingly constructive relations with the East are possible,
and apparently believes that there is receptivity to the view that
the US is an obstacle to general detente. To encourage the growth
of such sentiments in Western Europe, Moscow has carefully sought
to further the impression that the cold war is over in Europe
and that the need for NATO has vanished along with the threat of
Soviet attack.
7. Soviet use of the slogan of European security is not
new; it dates back at least to 1954. Specific Soviet proposals
for zonal security arrangements go back to a year later, to 1955,
when Foreign Minister Molotov suggested that all of Germany and
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at least some of its neighbors be subject to arms limitation and
inspection. A series of such "plans," both Soviet and East European,
were issued throughout the remainder of the decade and into the
196O's.:/ But the current Soviet campaign for European security
did not begin until last March when Brezhnev revived the idea in
general terms in his address to the 23rd Soviet Party Congress.
Other Soviet leaders soon echoed Brezhnev, and in July the USSR
convened a meeting of the Warsaw Pact which, among other things,
issued a call for a "general European conference" to consider
"questions of European security and cooperation." 11
1 For example, the Baltic Sea of Peace Proposal of 1957,
the Rapacki Plan of 1958, and the Gomulka Plan of 1964.
2/ The Warsaw Pact declaration contained seven. proposals
(1) thc: development of general European cooperation based
on good neighborly relations and the renunciation of all
forms of discrimination and pressure; (2) the relaxation
of military tensions in Europe through the simultaneous
dissolution of the military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw
Pact; (3) the adoption of partial measures toward "military
relaxation," including the "liquidation of foreign bases,"
the withdrawal of troops from foreign soil, troop reductions
by "both German states," and the establishment of de-
nuclem ized zones; (4) the exclusion of the "possibility of
access by the German Federal Republic to nuclear weapons in
any form, directly or indirectly;" (5) recognition of the
"immutability of frontiers," including the Oder-Neisse line
and the "frontiers between both German states;" (6) the
signing of a German peace settlement which would proceed
from "recognition of the fact of the existence of two
German states;" and (7) the convocation of a European
security conference.
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8. Since July, the USSR has sought to arouse Western
European interest in the Warsaw Pact proposal but has not com-
mitted itself to any explicit course of action. Thus various
Soviet spokesmen, including, for example, Kosygin in France, have
tried to emphasize the USSR's sincerity in seeking a conference
for settlement, but they have done so without explicit references
to an agenda (this should be worked out by the participants) or
the selection of participants (this is up to European countries
themselves to decide). Nor have they indicated any sense of
urgency concerning the timing of such a conference.
9. This lack of urgency probably stems from a number of
considerations. The Soviets may not wish to convene a security
conference until prospects for some tangible breakthrough appear
substantially better than they do now. And, though perhaps
optimistic about the long term consequences of frictions between
Europe and the US and about the eventual dissolution of NATO,
they almost certainly do not count on any dramatic developments in
the short term. In any case, the Soviets are eager to extract as
much propaganda advantage as possible from Western European
interest in the Pact proposals before binding themselves to the
specifics of a conference; they surely understand that eat
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difficulties will arise once they have committed themselves to
concrete proposals. In addition, they almost certainly see
benefits in maintaining their flexibility while awaiting the out-
come of US-British-German talks concerning the status of allied
forces in Germany and while sizing up the impact of the new
government in Bonn on German foreign policies. Finally, before
getting down to particulars, the Soviets must deal with problems
within their own camp.
10. These problems, while not insurperable, probably act
as constraints on Soviet policy. There is, first of all, a
general difference in attitudes between the Soviets and some of
their allies. Some East Europeans have privately indicated their
desire for US participation in a security conference, and seem
genuinely interested in some sort of European detente and security
arrangement. Some of them, more or less like the Soviets, see
such an accord as desirable in terms of maintaining the status quo
in Germany, but all of them, except East Germany, see it as
necessary for the maintenance and growth of their national
sovereignty. Crises, they fear, limit their ability to maneuver
vis-a-vis the USSR and to press forward with policies of their own.
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11. There is, in addition, some dissension among the East
Europeans themselves. While willing to associate themselves with
a collective call for the recognition of East Germany, as in the
Warsaw Pact proposals, a number of the East European states wisl
to avoid this issue in bi-lateral contacts with the West and with
West Germany. The East Germans, whose own proposals for detente
in Europe center precisely on this issue, have been dismayed and
antagonized by this lack of allied concern and, most recently,
by Rumania's eagerness to open diplomatic relations with Bonn.
Indeed, the East Germans have openly implied that those states
which seek to normalize relations with Bonn are helping the
West Germans to separate the socialist countries and to isolate
East Germany. Poland, for reasons of its own, seems to share some
of this East German concern.
The West European Response
12. Rising hopes in Western Europe for improved relations
with the Communist states have been accompanied by increased
interest in new East-West security arrangements for Europe. At
the same time, France's partial withdrawal from the Western
Alliance has resulted in extensive discussions of a reordering
of defense arrangements within the West itself. Differing views
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on the relative importance of these subjects have led to some con-
fusion in the West European response to Soviet suggestions for a
European security conference.
13. Although they do so now with less urgency, most West
European governments continue to give priority to the maintenance
of effective security arrangements within the Western Alliance.
All of them including France regard the link to American nuclear
power as essential to their security. All, except presumably
France, still believe that no major East-West negotiations over
Europe could be successful without a strong -- though perhaps
altered -- Atlantic Alliance. Specifically, they would consider
the continued presence of US military power in Europe important
to the success of such negotiations. They believe that it would
only play into the hands of the USSR if new European security
arrangements were bought at the price of drastically reducing
the US role in Europe. In addition, many who support this line of
thought argue that no East-West arrangements on European security
should hinder the eventual economic and political unification of
Western Europe or perpetuate its present division into relatively
small and weak states.
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14+. Nevertheless, the trend of European thought in recent
years has increasingly favored those who want to Set on with East-
West negotiations on all-European security arrangements. As the
mood of detente in Europe has deepened, the need for a strong
Western alliance has appeared to be less pressing. De Gaulle,
of course, has assiduously cultivated such sentiments. In addi-
tion, as the frustrations attending the European unity movement
have grown, an increasing number of Europeans have discarded the
political unification of Western Europe as a practical goal and
have sought to replace it with visions of harmony between all
Europeans, both East and West. And in this, they have to some
extent been sustained by their belief that their views are generally
consistent with those of the United States, which has also stressed
the idea of detente between East and West.
15. The response of most West European governments to re-
newed Soviet suggestions for a European security conference has
been mildly favorable. Most of the governments would probably
respond in similar fashion to anything which held hope of further-
ing detente in Europe. But they have all moved cautiously, have
not accepted Soviet views on the subjects to be discussed, and
have emphasized that a meeting should be held only after thorough
diplomatic preparation.
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16. Most West European nations also would clearly want the
US to participate in such a conference, both to provide a counter-
weight to the USSR and to assure adequate controls over Germany
in new European security arrangements. Even the French have
never explicitely opposed US participation, although recent
French statements on the subject have been as ambiguous as those
of the USSR. We believe that both Soviet and French leaders are
aware that such a conference could not be held in the foreseeable
future if the US were excluded. Hints to the contrary from
Moscow or Paris are probably intended mainly to encourage the
long-term growth of sentiment in Europe against a major US role
on the continent.
17. The French, in their several high level discussions
with Soviet leaders in 1966, appear to have treated Soviet
suggestions for a European security conference very gingerly.
De Gaulle probably would like nothing better than to negotiate
with the USSR on European security questions. But he would only
do so as leader of a West European bloc, or at least with the
support of West Germany. He does not want to isolate France from
Germany on this issue, and we believe that he would actively
support a European security conference only if he felt it would
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lead to arrangements in which the Germans could acquiesce. West
Germany, for its part, would certainly oppose a European security
conference unless it seemed to offer some hope for progress toward
Germany's national goal of reunification. A conference on terms
as proposed so far by the USSR would obviously not do this.
The Outlook
18. A formal multilateral conference on European security
is not likely in the near future. The bilateral contacts and
negotiations among individual West European countries, and the
USSR will almost certainly continue and probably increase. So
will the amount of talk about mutual disarmament, "thinning-out"
schemes for central Europe, and the possibility of ultimately
disbanding both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
t9. The Soviets will be likely to step up their propaganda
and diplomatic activities to persuade the West Europeans that the
US is beginning to disengage from Europe and that detente with a
benevolent USSR is an ever-growing possibility. They will prob-
ably continue to manifest a generally conciliatory approach to
European problems and a willingness to act with restraint in
such areas of policy as Berlin. They will seek to expand
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cultural exchanges and economic relations wherever possible, and
will probably continue to offer various security undertakings,
such as nuclear free zones. They will probably continue to treat
West Germany as a pariah, but are likely privately to test any
hints that Bonn would be willing to come to terms with Soviet
power and the division of Europe. They may at some point move
unilaterally to reduce Soviet troop strength in East Germany.
Alternatively, they may revive proposals for military disengage-
ment in Germany together with limited arms control measures in
the Central European area. It is unlikely, however, that the
Soviets will be willing to make their complete military with-
drawal from East Germany a part of any security arrangement which
might eventually be negotiated.
20. It is doubtful that a great deal will come of the
present talk about European security unless real progress can be
made on the crucial problem, Germany. ogress here will pre-
sumably depend in some degree on the eastward probes and nego-
tiations which the Kiesinger government is now initiating. The
new German coalition has clearly signaled its intention to give
top 1siority to the improvement of relations with the USSR and
Eastern Europe. Kiesinger probably believes that this is the one
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area of foreign policy where he will not antagonize either France
Or the US and where he may be able to create an image of activism
and independence for his regime. In addition, Kiesinger probably
expects to gain domestic political mileage by this course from an
electorate which had grown increasingly impatient with Bonn's
previous failure to achieve even slight movement toward German
reunification.
21. We believe that the present West German government may
make fairly major concessions to the USSR in coming months on
two of the three conditions always cited by Moscow as prerequisites
for a German settlement. First, it may be willing to renounce West
German acquisition of nuclear weapons more explicitly than its
predecessors. Second, it will probably move toward recognizing
the present eastern boundary by giving clearer assurances that
Germany will accept the Oder-Neisse Line in any future European
settlement. On the third major condition posed by the USSR,
that of official reco giition of East Germany as a legitimate
sovereign state, Chancellor Kiesinger will almost certainly not
give in. He probably will allow greater West German contacts with
East Germany, even at fairly high official levels, but will declare
at the same time that these contacts do not constitute de ure
recognition of the GDR.
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22. We believe, therefore, that for the foreseeable future
the moves for an all-European security arrangement will continue
to founder on the issue of Germany's division. Bonn will not
agree to an arrangement which in effect terminates hopes for re-
unification, and its allies will not wish to affront the Germans
on this issue, even though most of them apparently have no active
desire to see Germany reunified. For its part, the USSR is almost
certainly not yet prepared to revise its views on Germany. Con-
sequently, comprehensive European security undertakings are likely
to remain for the indefinite future a subject of diplomatic
discussion and agitation but not of serious negotiation.
25X1
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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 S D ILL C FI ?qp
L Cb F SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
Mr. Kent
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks: Sherm:
We think Barber's letter is pretty silly stuff
.
It misconstrues our memorandum, it is vague in its
complaints about our views on Germany, and it
advances a contrary thesis concerning Soviet policy
which is rather badly informed and a bit odd to
boot. Anyhow, herewith is a draft of a possible
reply which, I hope, is polite but not overly
concessionary.
S. T can -W fkf } r( _ w e hi4 i
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JOD;also W"'] he o igIna(ly ad1I?c t:d h,, /ef b
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
DCf was persvtad rd c~4oge i yeu,
rve ARWM* 2qO5/11 N
4
0032-1
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