IMPLICATIONS IN THE MOSLEM WORLD OF FORCING THE STRAIT OF TIRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001300040020-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: June 1, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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S-E-C-R-E-T
1 June 1967
SUBJECT: Implications in the Moslem World of Forcing the
Strait of Tiran
Problem: To estimate the reactions of the Arab and other
major Moslem states to keeping open the Strait of Tiran by
naval escort forces of the US in association with other countries.
1. The course of the present Arab-Israeli crisis has already
done considerable damage to the US position in the Arab world. Most
Arabs believe the US is the staunch ally of Israel and can in effect
control its actions. The US cannot expect to receive sympathy
if it employs force in the Strait, but it will also not get any
gratitude if it fails to do so. This is so even though many of
Nasser's Arab adversaries hardly welcome the kind of sweeping
political and psychological victory he would enjoy if he brings
off his move with impunity. Even King Hussein in Jordan and King
Feisal in Saudi Arabia feel increasingly compelled to move into
camp with Nasser and to reassess their ties with the US.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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2. Nasser himself, whether or not he resists the forcing of
the Straits, will take advantage of the opportunities provided to
discredit the US and reduce its influence and presence in the
area. He may at the same time find in the US action a release
from the danger of Israeli attack and a way out of his present
dilemma which would leave him with most of his gains.
3. Reactions in non-Arab Moslem states would be much less
intense than in the Arab Middle East. US military and intelligence
facilities in non-Arab Moslem states (Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan)
probably would not be significantly affected, though the Turks
would be unlikely to permit their soil to be used for staging
military operations against any Arab state. Over the longer
term, however, if this action set in motion a permanent trend
toward increased Russian and Egyptian influence in the Middle
East at US expense, Iran, Pakistan, and even Turkey might feel
it necessary to adjust their policies to these trends.
4+. The Arabs would consider any such multilateral force,
no matter how constituted, to be an instrument of US policy. The
climate of popular opinion toward the US would become more hostile
and emotional, and popular anti-US demonstrations would almost
certainly occur, possibly including violence. The seriousness of
such outbreaks would be greater if US action in the Strait
involved shooting.
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5. All Arab governments would feel compelled to demonstrate
solidarity by making anti-US gestures or taking more serious
anti-American actions. The UAR would probably close the Suez
Canal to US naval ships and at least during the height of the
crisis might refuse passage to other American flag vessels,
particularly oil tankers. Jordan, the only eastern Arab state
receiving any significant amount of US economic aid, would feel
compelled to minimize its US ties. Hussein would then become
politically at the mercy of the UAR and economically dependent
on the other Arab states. King Feisal would probably feel it
necessary to make a public accommodation with Nasser, though he
would try to avoid breaking relations with the US. The Libyan
Government might feel compelled to terminate the US base at
Wheelus. Throughout the area US communications facilities, air
traffic rights, etc., might be withdrawn or subjected to strikes
and harassments.
6. The main target of attack against the US in the Arab
world would be the oil industry. Unquestionably all US oil
operations would be subjected to harassments. In all Arab
countries sabotage incidents would be likely against American
oil facilities. Strikes of oil workers with accompanying rioting
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S-E-C-R-E-T
are likely to tie up oil production and might threaten loss of
American life. IPC and ARAATCO pipelines across Syria might be
cut. The effects in the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms would be less.
Iran could of course increase production to offset in some
measure a slowing in Arab output. There is, however, some question
about Iran's willingness to do so. Algerian oil is produced mainly
by French companies and would probably continue to flow.
7. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya will be under very
heavy pressure to retaliate against American companies, but will
be concerned with the effects on their own revenues of any
retaliatory measures. They might halt oil production by US
firms only temporarily. Libya might attempt to institute a
selective boycott against those countries which contributed
ships to the effort to force the blockade. Initially, at least,
outright nationalization seems unlikely even in the UAR.
8. Once the situation in the Strait of Tiran was settled
in one way or another, and assuming no major hostilities in the
area occurred, many of the anti-US activities would tend to
slacken off. The chief producing countries are almost certainly
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hoping for some outcome which will not upset the highly profitable
flow of oil. The Egyptians themselves are heavily dependent upon
the West for the processing and marketing of petroleum. Even if
nationalization occurred in some places, it might prove more a
token than a definitive change.
9. The Judgments above would not give a balanced picture
unless some mention is made of the consequences of failure to
end the blockade of the Tiran Straits. Unless the issue can be
resolved in some manner tolerable to the Israelis, the odds are
at least even that sooner or later they will feel impelled to
take some form of military action. The Israeli Government is
already under severe domestic attack for having failed to take
prompt counteraction against Nasser's move a week ago, and Israeli
military leaders are almost certainly pressing hard for a military
move against Nasser. In their view, acquiescence in this kind of
a victory for Nasser would spell more and more trouble for Israel
as time went by, and we believe these fears are well grounded.
Hence, their temptation will be great to fight back while their
forces are mobilized and their supporters are rallied -- even if
the costs and risks are comparatively high. They probably would
not prove able to pull off the kind of smashing defeat of Egyptian
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forces they accomplished In 1956, but we believe the alternative --
of impotent acquiescence in a formidable political and psychological
victory by Nasser -would incline them to accept the risks.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN RENT
Chairman
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