NOTE TO SHERMAN KENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001300020007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 31, 1966
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001300020007-1
31 March 1966
TO: Sherman Kent
J.J. Hitchcock is overseeing the preparation of a briefing
the Director is to give the President on the OXCART matter. A
part of the briefing is to be "reactionsand J.J. wanted to
use SNIE 10-2-66, but in "gisted" form.
USIB-a ----- ~~.~ -e-D ~~ a VCS-y iL.erc
pproved document (particularly on a controversial topic)
should not be taken lightly, I have merely broken the paper down
in outline form leaving in virtually every point made by the SNIE.
The on1
major departure is the addition of a section
I Iwhich J.J. requested.
I am passing this on to J.J. with the admonition that any
further tinkering should be cleared with us.
25X1
25X1
After a short discussion with some of the Board and with
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Principal reactions in Cyst and non-Communist countries to
reconnaissance over China and North Vietnam by OXCART vehicles,
based in Okinawa. %ken from SIDE 10-2-66,, . 17 March 1966.
1. China
A. Chinese would quickly acquire knowledge of operation,
and identify it with new and advanced aircraft announced
by President in 1964. Likely Chinese would quickly
relate overflights to base at Kadena.
Assuming failure to destroy aircraft, Chinese would
probably remain silent as they have done with successful
U-2 overflights. In this contingency, Chinese pressure
on Japan or any other Cooperating country would be slight.
C. If aircraft came down in China, however, a major political
and propaganda can aign would ensue.. Peking would hope
to persuade world of Chinese strength and of "reckless
aggressiveness" of US policy, and would try to mobilize
public opinion in Japan and Okinawa against US control
of latter island and against US bases in Japan.
Chinese reactions would be related to presence of large
US ground forces in South Vietnam, and apprehensions
regarding possibility of US attack on China itself.
Although Chinese may fear series of actions and reactions
in Vietnam which would lead in time to Sino-US war, they
probably do not expect it at early date. These apprehen-
sions may grow or diminish between now and time over-
flights begin.
E.laeree is some chance Poking would conclude US, in using
advanced system at this time,, was seeking target
intelligence which it meant to use at an early date.
This chance would be greater if program began intensively,
or if It coincided with a major expansion of US air
attacks on North Vietnam.*
'C Il -members from State Department and NSA believe following
should be inserted at this point: "In any case the US employ-
meat of such a sophisticated reconnaissance vehicle would tend
to Increase Chinese fears that the US was expecting an eventual
escalation of the Vietnam conflict into open conflict with China."
25X1
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On the other band, Chinese have become accustomed
to frequent probes of their air space and are aware
that inrovements in their defenses have increased
vulnerability of older systems. We conclude, there-
fore, that, barring special circumstances mentioned
above, Chinese would regard this vehicle as another
stage in US collection; program with no special
significance of broader US intentions, and that they
would not take any drastic new military action.
North Vietnam
The 11W, already under heavy US air attack and
reconnaissance, would attach little extra significance
to OXCART operations.
liZ. USSR
ugh a variety of intelligence sources, Soviets would
quickly acquire a fairly con +lete picture of operations.
They would probably reinforce any Chinese or North
Vietnamese propaganda built around a downing of an
aircraft.
Their primary concern would be to forestall use of the
aircraft over Soviet territory. They might rake
private representation to the US stressing seriousness
with which they would view any intrusions over USSR,
but they almost certainly not sake US overflights of
China the occ a* on of a major crisis in US-Soviet
relations.
1V.
A. The aircraft's presence on Okinawa would soon become
known and might be vigorously publicized in Japanese
newspapers. Japanese leftists would try to mke an
issue of it, probably portraying the aircraft as a
nuclear-capable weapon, and they probably would try
to raise fears of Japanese involvement in Vietnam war
or its actions against Communist China.
Sato, assuming operation did not come as complete surprise
to him, could probably deal with situation and not object
to continuance of Operation.
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If an aircraft came do~}n in China and the Chinese
extensively publicized the event, difficulties for
Japanese government would be greater. Sato would
stir probably weather the stem, though he might
have to ask the US to discontinue the program from
Okinawa.
Other Non-Ccisnunist Reactions
Some elements would try to make an issue of OXCART
deployment, especially if an aircraft came dot in
Chine, and there would be pressure on the President to
discontinue the operation lest it increase the risk of
Chinese Cs nunist overt intervention 3n the Vietnam mar.
25X1
B. However, in our opinion nothing approaching the outcry
over the U-2 affair in 1960 would ensue. Most govern-
ments would ignore or play down the matter and adverse
reactions and pressures are unlikely to be very powerful.
25X1
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