AN AMEMDED STRATEGY FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001300010020-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 26, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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443 Riverside Drive
!.Y., x. Y. 10027 9-6 may 66
Dear Sherman j
I am enclosing tree items !
I. The abridged version of the article on
Vietnn, as published in took.
The much fuller version of the article
on Vietnsm (which ran considerably, beyond
the nueiber of words that the editors set
for me, when they ordered the article written),
in. An article an the laud problem in Latin America
and its bearings on the development of Communist
revolutions in that region.
I. I wonder whether ym would be willing to go through the
printed article again? (a) In this article I suggested a method
alina t with peasant land-hunger (by issuing official
certificates in the very region where the Buddhists are strongest?
in of the local population ff; and certainly it is in this
region that the Buddhists have been most agressive.. These
certificates might do a good deal to reconcile the Buddhist
peasants to the Saigon Government -- but they (the certificates
would have little or no effect unless the government were demon-
strating its good faith by pushing rapidly a wide and deep land
reform in other areas of the country where ample arable loud is
: cutely available for distribution. (B So far as I know,
the latest more-or-less detailed praise of land reform by des
government was made , my article was already on the press;
I managed to insert an evaluation of this government statement
(a very unpromising wie) into the final page proof. The press
reports on the Honolulu Conference (President Johneon, Mr. ,,
etc. etc.) mentioned lid reform once or twice, but certainly
gave it no special e sis. The same is true of the accounts
that I have seen of "the rural pacit~tion plan" one report
that I saw provided a "table of organization' for each pacifica-
tion team; each team is to have one member (out of those dozen
or so) who will devote himself to eagriculture8 -- but that term
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vague that it may not cover lend reforul at an. my
ion, from such scrappy press reports as I have, is
no reform is moving only very slowly, if at W U --
required a grreeat deal of the gave mat's attention.
It %
The published article foresaw a grave danger that the
gon 0overnment would lose the first genera, election
and co late f irn?s unlese the Saigon Oov zament put into
effect a wide and d land reform before the election. Yet
that goverrnseema tom#~ on
to
_ ~..
Peasant votes - - - --.
by 'l.r_ _e-~lsat~ land aye.
II. The VMd text of the Vietnam article, before cutting,
*avers in more detairn the printed text a gt many subjects
t h a t got into IOW's. p r i n t ; also the t y p e d text deals with some
woad a great favor if
you would read the kzd text. I
Should think Gardner Cowls would give permission for the repro-
duction of the full typed text if it were marked "Per Official
Use Only. " (This Is Just in ease you should want it reproduced. }
Ill. The second t d arttole entitled "Agrarian Worm
or Communist Revolution, -bas been, published; I intend to
revise it to some extent, aspeciai,y by expWing the treatment
of Santo Domingo and by mentioning that country's land problem
very near the beginnin of the piece. I have no objection to
Use Only, "if you so desire This second typed article
d very= largely with tin America., but it gives more
c uesti; in all, or nearly all backwa..rd countries -- and perhaps
as the major question in a Urge majority of such countries.
I should be very glad to *me dovu later for discussions of
both the Vietnam paper and the Latin American,. paper, If you feel
that this might be useful to you and to some of your colleagues.
W
ithout any question,, such a discussion would be useful to
Faithfully yours,
/e/ Amy
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Tht3 Memo vex written
in very grebt baste r
because of the pressure
of many other things
that Idt13t be done
before I go.
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 Approved For Release 2005/11/29: CIA-RDP79R00904A00196('16d-7 _:! L
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By Garold Tanquary Robinson
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a:Ze Communists are pa:.
t rrasters of the strand ztrategy
of revolution - their kind of revolution; and vwi ;h .ec
:' orosight, they have z elected the under-developed countries
as their chief target for years to come. The Co:~mue;yctu
count on ctimulatina agrarian revolts that will smash up
:e economic, social and political structure of these under-
developed countries, one after another, and will enable the
Communists to climb to power on the ruins.
There is one form of non-violent Counter -: trater;l that
ives good -promise of preventing this kind of revolution f c
d:velopinv - if the Counter-strategy here proposed is nut into
effect with speed and thoroughness, in a given country, well
before agrarian violence breaks out on any considerable
scale. If this precious opportunity is missed, and a
Ce munist-led agrarian revolt, supported in part from abroad,
sews into .all swing in a given country the is now the case
j South Vietnam), this revolution cannot be checked without
the use of armed force - but a vigorous application, at the
time, of the non-violent str3GC-'ry"y ~
~y proposed below could
be counted on to reduce substantially the cost, in dead and
wounded, of turning back the Communist advance.
In South Vietnam the revolutionary crisis has semis t,c ?
"er twenty years and is now in its period of maximum intensit~r,
-a Russia, and subccquei.tly in China, the Communists could
not have come to pot cr the
h lp of season's la,d-hunt y.:~r
z:W.d a massive peasant drive for the possession of the land.
v= e ? r Y dtstSr& e!Mnda enta principles of4Communi t2 strategy
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1 to promise the land o the peawanto; but neIt er in Rues; :,
nor China, nor South Vietnam nor any other under-developed
country do the peasants know in advance that when the Communict.:
have established their co:.trol this promise is broken.
Between teem 18- and ~9 1383, China's ancient and rather
s adowy overlordship, in the area now called Vietnam (_.orth and
South), was replaced by a more effective control by France.
En the rich alluvial plain of the lower I.11ekon3 River, in
South Vietnam, great reclamation projects wore carried out
ur. er French direction, the amount of cultivated lad in the
rice plain was increased Wore than five times over in oeventy
years, and this river basin became one of the great ri:.Te-
e :,porting regions of the world. Throughout the remainder of
South Vietnam; most land-holdings were 5-10 hectares in eize,:
b,-,t in the great 1ekon plain, the large holdings of n.,.-_J-iv,:,
French landlord: predominated. .:ere 'lapproximatel:r 2.5
cent of the owners, w th more than fifty hest; rez dish,
possessed roughly one half of the cultivated land." At the
other end of the scale, 70 per cent of all the ow nerz : this
southern pit
than five hectares each, while Vwo-
t :irds of the peasant fa hies in this region owned no land
at.' all, but cultivated rented plots, or worked in the -fields
of others as hired laborers. When the landowners prov_dcd
the land and nothing more, "the rentals were as heavy as any
to be found in Asia - ,t3 ~?
nor cent of the crop,;' and alr:.ost
t .o tenants and landlecz laborers were deeply and perennially
in ' Yed D~J Oa?J4Aon the O ti3a!01 OO2O Corr -unisto
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found ready for hem in the riche -t sec :ion of South iet.n
In 19:;O, several Communist rows were combined to
form the inuochinese Communist Party. This merger was arrange;:
_ the Comintern rcproscrtat .ve in Southeast Asia., later to
well onouch known c '_o Chi Iiirh. :harinC World 11ar Ii
nd the Japanese Occu:a;;ion of Vietnam, the Co aunist '~.eaders
formed a sort of "national front" O he Via'(.- : irth) c:es ~ ned to
draw people of many different political opinions into a united
movement for liberation from Franco. r:, as in m,-,ny "fronts
in other countries, the Communists played the leading role,
S
but their Party always pr e: er veA its own identity w: i %,hin :ch
conglomerate groups. Shortly of ter the Japanese surrc:nder in
:a
,5, Ho Chi Minh and his supporters announced (in = ~re+i, mar
the Chinese frontier; ;;he formation of the "Democratic lepubl~c
of Vietnam., " with 11irh at its head; but the French ; een
in Via.Pl/ed attempts 1Pta 7 1to r-a., ~~Jlish their control in li: ~narz,
K~w..wt presently there developed a so-called "People's of
Liberation" which cragged on for nearly eight bitter -,ad
bleddy years. To secure wider suppvt:.? against the Frcneh, the
"::emocratie R.,public of Vietnam" dleavowed its Communist
character, but after the Communist Chinese reached the Vietnamese
border late in 1949, and C1inese military supplies f or the
Viet Minh arm my began to roll into Vietnam, the government
Eanoi publicly affirmed the leaders mip of the Communist Party,
now called the "Vietna A. :.o~~tiera' Party"; and Communi .: this
government has remained .:vcr since.
Approve
government at Hanoi. the French set un at Snicon
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in 1949, an independent n^i'
4. 0.0 U
I.Ctn: '; but not until Vietnam via-- n.'"ovitalionally cut in
half by the co-- r1 }?-'- c t~ y 21, 19
at .,, `-`... t.,iaE,'nt of Lu154., C.ia the
9
uovern: ten t o ie Saig t.ro M' s to ' o;. ,~..... build, tin any real tat3f;_.o~^lty _
and then only in the sout;hcr: half of the country, of source.
I the r:^antolme the rural areas of South Vietnam were Governed
only no :inulIy, or not at all, by the Covern1 ent i... ^ai on.
,ar,d.-hu A-zer, anti-colonIz.lism, and the disintegration of
author ty raiCht well have been enough to stir many of the reaoc nt
of South Vietnam to action a.-rain,-Mu- the landlords, but Corm--un1er?.,,
strongest in North Vietnam., had its missionaries and its Iceal
adherents in the south also, and these Zealots told t,e
easants they would get all the landlords' land for nothin ,
and did all that they could to bring on a general f ry~ ,~cr ~.,~
r Az a re;,ult of all this, rents were very rarely St t i~t ar??`y,C' rj
y paidA the old
? ,ecorc's of landholdin^s were burned in many villages, so/yv~yye o of
V l/if
the landlords were killed ::.Nile many fled in a panic to the
t-o,, ns, and ouch of the landlords' acreage was occup ec by t e
pea ants, sometimes with the confirmation of docu o: is is` L ed
by the Corr.r * The United State.; had riven substantial finai.cial aid
to the r nch military aot vities in Vietnam, but t hen the
forces of the Co., unis' government at I-'anoi captur eed the ma f or
.drench position at Dien -fen Phu a cease-fire agrecr. z n`.; soon.
followed (at the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954), i
for the provisional par titi.on of Vietnam at the Ccventc::.>nt.a
::)uxroehQy R!VGW9ci15Po'7e0au10t~30hiCh Civilian:
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could rove freely between the two zor ess. All the e bcre of
the Geneva Conference cxccn;; the United States and Viotnam a;;recd to a provision for a uen oral election to be
Id throughout: "north z:_nd South Vietnam in July l95u, on t -y
,..:o, Lion of uniting the two halves of the countr,; . In, rospce tt
to the proposed election, the United St tes made a rrtoacntous
independent statement to which we shall return at the c_n.d.of
this article. The Government of South Vietnam simply refused
to reco;njze the partition of the country.
Under the Pre::icrahip, and su secruently the Prccie eney,
of N o Dinh Diem, the Sovern :ert of South Vietnam A-'-,-cod
by m any contending forces uit:rin the country. Amon- the
actors favorable to t_he Diem Government was the major increa
of American economic aid, and the assumption by the United
`ta Ues of the training and the main ;enance cost of the South
Vietnamesc aj q. The Diem Government mot with acute d_ .fficult1
u tab3.iw ~ing its authority over the countryside and in sore
" lions it never succeeded in doing this. Very consci. uz of
this dangerous sit,OM tion, Diem's Government initiated t,ao
agrarian prove' s: Under one of these proMrams the
1 ~ , overnrr.:ent
resettled more than 125,000 peasants (_any of then drawn fro.
the narrow and overcrowded coastal plain of central Vie;;nam)
i new Communities ectablishcci on uninhabited ane sl , c iefly o
the high central plateau o:.- is the nz r _z ~hcs of the south.
The other and much r.o_ze imporvant pro-ram was c.%-.1)-,died
in tApprov'OdPoreRAR'asPe'200'11-I'I/214 ctlR-Xtepft
1 04 U0~4 D1~b (t7 s rpl
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reduced 4 :e prcvailin;; rents, anc prove ed a ;i lted :: _: Ya~?
(of 1956 956) on the ~, f_ .?.`- c
of Ver~uy 'e; and Crci so No.
:._ .._ ~ai..
57 (or ~~s
of additional land amoa t I.,,e peasants. Ordinanc : 57 pi'ovll'. d
:?.at no native landlord could continue to own more t ian about
100 hectares (plus 15 hectares of in eritcd land to support
, .~ expenses of ancestor worship): the surplus was to be
.:, rchascd by the gover .mor.t (at a modest figure, in ear h and
_, bo ds ), and resold to peasant to :arts (at a very ,o:: pric.
c.:,_v ded into six annual payi ents, but later spread over ttiaice
a: on period). sf s.ccit:.an to the tsurp1ua !ands of the
?:Letnamese, the overn-m-ent acquired t ho entire hold1n of ;
reach 1;,~. ~ ~ncr:s, who were Indemnified at a very low I'i;ure
by the French governn:nt. Accordir: to the latest sou. ce
available (is ucd in Au;ust, 1964), the distribution of the
surplus land of the Vietnamese landlords had not yet be n
:orpleted, and no final decision had yet been made as to the
disposition of the far?=:~:r French however, If the
pattern previously followed under Ordinance 57 were applied to
-11 these lands, a rand total of leas than one third of the
country's la* ter .n to would beco o peasant proprietors,
and about two thirds of Who tenants would still own no/land.
Likewise, an unknown nu cr of landless farm laborers would
still possess no land of their own.
:ror some time two~ r0 %0 sirmirrr of the Geneva
a. ,.d the rise of Ngo Dl:L: epic w to power, the author ;:; of the
overnment atR~Saigon sLc:,; Ctpo_Rbpe 7sprcacinZ throu h the country-
CA ;r ~? 1rt"1ep 1 o ~t 5/ j/ i1r t~i?i~ PY1 ver90su e 00 A0 n ri z ins
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of Y' y -nz-r Lns-cr control
x:iou:O ic....r.~...., .. ~..~' i'C,'_.-d07s for
partial cuccess oft 2 SaI on Coverrment in sprcad r.- its
authority may have been: the exceptional energy and abisit .
of its leader; the very : L: tantiGl aid p ovi(: d uy he Urlt: i
States; the homeward ta,- ration to I~ orth Vietnam of L'aa of t ;e
:?cvolutionist c;ho had entered South Vietnam in the ho' o
" un .szjn the cou' t`-y t. t
-:~ j and ere no do- - follow;: d of r t it:~.~~
of the converte t _cy had made south of the 17th para.l:~e? ;
migration in the opposite direction of nearly 9C3,7000
: onz (chiefly Catholics) from Dorth Vietnam who did not
,nt to lyve under the Red Flag; t:-.e colonization of Luz; rehab iced
- - s, and the great devastation r.nd war- weariness of orth
>na: , which had bowie the chief b1urden of e?.cfca;;i ~ the
reach, an needed to recuperate before re ewin its t- --c ; is
arry the Con nn:uniat revolution beyond its proviaio_-a
v:~or~a frontier.
Diera's rarian ref cru pertaining; to rent reduction,
eurity of tenure and : :n d. partition is not i :cludcd i the
is Just given, for the reason that these measures ::_~ ;' well
have created the villacers of South Vietnam nor; anti enjc ;
an suppor, for the Saigon Gover :.. int. For a very ? t F,~_
:: villc ~ rs had nurse;' the grievances cog + on to land-i_un~ r y
,ea ants wherever thee,. give in the neighborrood of lar-;e
enviable landholdin ;s; but all through the eight year... of the
.'.Jar of Liberation" r ,
had been heated z:_.rc
'oy agitators from the nor h and_their converts in the south,
10 6j3tWveggo iftjq. , 0 0r,~~ ,112 i1pU D~I~ RQO~YOt~
1A~h10 ~~~1t10023 tr'?LII d b
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Sao;
and for na!- /..,i:?^c-,, y o thy Or`~:z rto v take it
theirs ".
, c:f
_.~ pc:azants uou-ily, pez'- pss th-c who were L~.U attz.L t
their follow vill crc j, Lladly aces ted and c.ctcd
provisions for a s7s:'c-,tV1- rc(Guced rcn , with m oree scC-r: -- of
tenure, or for an ouiri ht nureh.ane at a low pr S.uo o blc.
the landlord's land. Lu wh V ' x~. It he refor m r" a z ;.o
vy
ach larger number oi' tie:. ailants or laneless a ricultura ' laborers
frho had now been land? ors' c land illegally, often or
years, without paing any rent at all - much less any purchase
on vy: To those pea anti, Diem's reform meant the restoration
to the landlords of all t_1e land that the pea ants had taken
aver without sanction, p er-haps with. tI>e:-~ exaction of r'e.t for t .e
? ntleos years tha : had '.iot gone "o;., and certainly w h t .:
~ _y~nent of either rent or purchase money for any of t :- 1a ilords
l-:;,~r ?`2at any peasant or laborer was to use in the tu.t:4re.
iern. errs
soldier end police would bring the landlords back
.th the:, and cat them up on their old estates once ;:.a e;
..i ue, te law said that each of the lamer holdin-s a:.uct
reduced to about a hundred hectares in size, but to a labor_ -
w o had never oc; red or rented any lzmd, or a pea-an` -ho ha--'
?:en trying to d1Z a l ivirrg for i:..-.:ce: l and his fa ~:_l out of a
hectare or two., a ia1.1_ndred_ hectare,-, nu_it have seemed- an V
or ain. After eight year of ~ lawless seizures and :a o nisec,, Dien's agreriaL reform have seemed to :. t O_.1'..,0
peasants and landless a:Z:1 laborer c to re-present an aar 4 r a :
counter-revolution.
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ind so it 1 sus t s V Ali seem to rIos G o_ > . oday, if they
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ti._e do'stin a 4tod above all C-lse by e. :ire to ri z in
..~ t they have Weizcd w? 1o-al ly. P:I'Zo the eivill .rr ,..se ;
'?'."x~oc~,altin; fro:,Y the bo' ":.~fi r.' of vj`_11,n,~'clz believed to
anti ri , . v F. ?.
..:ber of n t1te ?4.Q et h we Crc Vo?w
1 J. L ~i r. e t, s- ,v, w..t a tf a.
ct aye rn ,,er;t '?t ric i~
' `.,', . : y
..:.
'ova
td o cou :.e 1'... V
+, -r oo r + f , f
i ' ,~..,, < e'. the s :"i V' ;. cans; p
riiyi',rr -..r ti J,. 6.i lI c, i~l~: ~:. '.7i~:+? on the
ve oft :n been treated very harLh:4 `j~ ~s b~? '{ f.;
w Ci n`~, Vii.:-~~ ~v 'a.~' v12~.
t1 s.,et"+ Co.-,::;., v:ll`:L1 ;_1 the k1 oA. of heavy
wcz..l g, i,_:?.
:ter.,, Z N of c n A r
.:..,aced Co??iver r o_ e for
oar-wor hlc s paper, the ru;hlec execution of vilic,:,erc ?? :.>
oppose Vi --"U- Cony or ar,, sucpec tec1 of oppositioi. uch
~~.,,,, IAa.` f
a ices .F'sir? a.rav ~~;: ~..a:.. - 0 1:w.O % i e .;, -mot will 1 ;.
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r:.oro cf thcia to vol ccr -o:: ?uch crv?.::.
?;ill attract defccto:s the Vi:::: Con, and t o
_ 4 _..
>e.4.., controlled by 4h T'ct Cons,
VJ111 mobilize a -ultitur1e of to ~r
on
a$e in 6shi.e lt'"nd of war ffanthat .(~i~-L of
"lliy i icn tr (cverl ins our
. but the ta. of
Individual initiative _ni dovotion Turs;`' think hoi e,~ it
for a guerrilla to cdz iert,, if h e happens to feel iikc it).
R
to all :)Ian and yY..r--,r cut an a rairitin reform :;i11 b
4 air to a l cancerneS. is a very tedious and rather
;.3.. ess. S.: ut to advance 1-1h e war to,Yar d a
suoceo ~.,t.L V s~
.... >4. to keep down the cosit in iete': 3 ?~ and .1 ine. ;n ?+ .~~
V 4_ 2cse a. 1C'm i ivo+.,
. in -e1vtine; On ~wh a reform aV will appeal to t` e w i o
indis-ensable.
._.:ar;.ures t:lic~. 3r 1s:-Lt: be taken are: to Cancel all `pa,,ri ntu
.~ ~. ill due on land al-afily purchased by the pea a
aaad ref :i":u law o:f to wipe OE t,, at the
a?rOr'Y~ peasant 1 an
1 be levied on such lands during '-_he war,
The wholezale gratis distri1-,ut- "Lon of
would be, of course, the ':. Zasurz v would I nave r
f. .....tu fi the : 4rv:.y '"~~Tr
impact. Th $ir s~,/ s tep in that direction 1.ti' h / 4.} ti1'4114.~1ar
to the pea-ants gratis an lanc, : '?.~ec to i t-.,.? . tivi ~
9 ! ,~ t fro dlor.
Under the O r t_Inance of 1957, but not yet aa ctual Coal, of further under ,,,
aabl; be to pr;rv2 . e:2ch peas at or landle f :r. :~orare:
w VflrcWe1ff3 00 /11ii9~ : ?y 8P889RQ~~~i ~ Q02 ?,
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,Iubsistence for a fa::iily of avcra;-~a size - ~.'? t'i a
and added for each me: ter of the _ous~hold ccrviM the
armed forces of South Vietnam; provisional allott;;c :t.> of and
could be rack with a in ear deed provic in for a
subsequent review if t e holder of the deed, or anyowho claimed
' hat hio own inter c:;~~ .~Ls d Ica .: f it, should apply for ,.a`.ch a
r~evicw within a specified number of y carp after the war, if
provisional diztr1t ution of land were aosi ned in each
villa o to a co xrittce t lccted by t be I~xe e:s of house olds,
n.,z::,. , of apncalo for post review by a i-i-lcr aut-...,-.,1ty
vaould probably be r:.oCest. If the head of a riven houceho?
-.were a'boent on uili'tary service for South Vietnam:, hi:; wife
could vote in his place.
in the rice-plain of the I?:Lko n River, the a d necCdc;J
for the additional allotments could probably be Trade vaiia:jie
local ly, if the ma it u a size of each landlord's holds: wcv
_u duced from 100 hec ~o r : e to, per.-:apS., 30 heetarc: ; ~n
addition, as w az done ir. the law of 1955, a modest plot of
:;hereditary land could be loft do c:eh landlord ~ :ta.n ;.`-e
to =,: :.
expenses of ancestor worn -.ip - a provision designed to prevent
the new reform from stir?rii: up additional friction, o 'n rc1i* 1ouo
3)roundv ~+ S 7yi~'t
1/central ietn: m/~' the n :ccz ;ary acreaSe of c ltiv ;~ c
land for the new 4: _,..A :cr:us simply would not be availe le "or
v-ar-:,7.>oe.~.t 7cd here, Lie G is an 2tCt,;;t~,.. ^,
the or~. need Approved For Release 2005/11'% 9 CIA PT9 0`tt04- `g~00 1`~y who r"" '' v AnUaMl- inadequate ilotrrzents, to settlements to be developed on new
 Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904401300010020-7
:ds rl available by ~}r1t- that will do far lrss he a resou n
ian the proposals offered here to Communists on earth but a profound
th 1t disaster for the rest of the world-and
t 11 s c
- } b t1 7;11S~ s1;1: .- o
after this din, triumph fur all they
The ultimate o12lecltyc of the pie
A ; 1 the present article oiled countries that are still sitting on
L t'-Communist
1
gram suggestec
the fence between t e an l
is to move toward a better life for the and fro Communist camps. END
peasants of South Vietnam. But the 1
 Approved For Release 2005/11/29: CIA-RDP79R
A0013000100210-7
Wit' j
!s. ::.ti~.iiced
A Ti? ouEand Million
People
C V Sys 1 1 U nl b i J f R E V 0L
----------- ------
! 45 -' veruide Drly
u
27, I.Y.
;3y Geroid
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CRA RIA ~ R.? `'0R14
 Approvec4For Release 2005/11/29: CIA-RDP79R%p4A001300010020-7
The total ropulazion of y ? . r_devc o ~e : non
vo:2TT?LlT39solfi countries is more th':' -' "')U sand million souls,
send a very large propoz,tion of t , .. oople are pea:::ts
In nearly all o:" t ce land-hunger
need that is most w del?; and most felt; also, it
-w the need that is most easily e. , o:ced by the Coirmniuni: t
and ae~re afar n., he r.~, .L -? ~.; ~ar ent completed in 1;64 a series of land tenure studico
v
in seven countries of :;'4h America, and the United Nation-
has made sir lar studies of twoA countries in Central Ameerica.
In their, most surx--nary form, eight of these studies indicate
the estimat ",n t of "rural 'amiltos requiring land and
other .stance "'(teat is, peasant families that hold an
inadequate acreage, plus the fam!.lies of low-income rural
workers who have no land at n.ll )
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 Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01300010020-7
NEW
Chile
48 per cent
Brazil
56
/C 01 C-n'.: ^ a
64
'.onduras
75
Ecuador
82
Guatemala
84
Peru
84
El Salvador
89 "
Of more than six million needy rural families
covered by this table, more than half are found in one
country - Brazil -- the largest, the most populous, and the
_ost strategically located of all the countries of Latin
.:erica
he data-year for three of the countries listed in
the table is 1950; for two others the year is 1961, while
.he dates for the remaining three countries fall between 1950
and 1961. The figures quoted are taken from a publication
of the Inter-American Development Bank. In calling attention
to the variations in the data-years, this publication makes
a grim coma.cnt t "Even though some of these figures refer
to earlier years, little or no improvement has since occur
The same publication says that the studies that stand behi:"'xd
the above table "generally show a very precarious situation,
and confirm the earlier views on the vast number of rural
families requiring land and other as istance,"
In response most particularly to the rise of Ccz:~ur....
in b yedf j asat2Dca lag: %1WR''989f9Q HVWKW2 i '.cluding
 Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R0090.r4AO01300010020-7
the United States) established the Alliance for Prorss
in April 1961 and adopted for this or anization a Ca-~r ter
pledging the member people:, and govsrnmenvs to join in "a
S.-cat cooperative effort to accelerate the ,e onom.c and
, r..
bit, , ( n~E?i- c~ 1 u(a..( .r
..ocial development of the participatin corntries''n and,
z mong other things, "to encourage, in accordance with the
characteristics of each country, programs of extensive
agrarian reform...so t::at...the land will become for the
man who works it the basis of his economic stability, the
foundation of his increasing welfare, and the guarantee
of his freedom and dignity;" (Thomas Jefferson would have
approved very heartily of this passage in the Charter.,
Since 1960 thirteen countries in Latin America (not
including Communist Cuba) have adopted land-reform laws.`
-..o universal intention Zo-f the now laws of the 13 non-
Communist countries7 is to establish the beneficiaries on
family farms." However, these laws are essentially permissive;
the extent to which they are put into effect dcpencc upon the
w'll of each and upon its assignment, fro z
time to time, of the neccssary funds. A report publish d
by the Pan American Union in December, 1964, says: "...to
date very little has been accomplished...especially in the
matter of land distribution, when one considers the magni-
tude of the agrarian problem facing Latin America. The
laws promulgated have not yet generated.,, significant
p pprovedVer R eOd 2~~51 '/lgnC R 91~ - 1:~~ g of the
region."
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Of course the exist+ng situation is loaded with
osoibilities of explosion. "A recent observer notes that
'there are only a few instances where land reform has been
pushed ahead by Dover zi..c to without the active pressure
of the peasants"'; and this observer ren. in"ss us that in
Mexico and polivia, and more recently in Venezuela and -.eru,
a: rarian reform followed land invs.?.ion by the peasants.
Among the Latin American states, the one that
recently has been most often in the headlines is, of course,
vac Dominican Republic, where about 70 per cent of the
people live in rural areas. In 1960, 50 per cent of all
the "farn:s" in this country were less than one hectare in
size, while 36 per cent fk1l into the next group, with 1 to
S hectares each. At the other extreme, there were 9514
estates with 101 to 150 hectares, and 677 with more than
500 hectares each; this last group included "a fens extremely
large holdings". Considerably more than half of t e terri-
tory of the country is cultivated or used as pasture, and
because of the ruggedness of a substantial proportion of
tihe terrain, it may be very difficult to make any considerable
enlargement in the area under crops - unless it be at the
expense of the pasture lands. "Ga most of the small units
V. t is, the sa, ll peasant fa .m i 7 which for the most part
contain marginal farm land, the agricultural activity io
barely above subsistence level."
Surprisingly, the current disturbance in the Dominican
tie YQ .r' e . ~r 8fi5% ,4 ih1 iLCI gPMPBIJPd 0 VO&W3ital,
 Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001300010020-7
-W 141MV7
with no repots of pcaLan? disturbances; on the other hard,
. has been several tiros reported tha'; arms have been
carried away from the capital and hidden in the interior.
the Organization o. :.::erican States can establish a temporary
compromise government 71nd can maintain sufficient forces on
the island to assure that the subsequent election is freely
an democratically conducted, a thoroughgoing r r
agrarian
.form (with generous financial aid from tzbroad) should
.follow promptly therea.~ ter. If things do not work out in
thh:s way, the next disturbance in the Dominican Republic
.Ia ;r well begin in the villa ,es and develop into cone thing
far mor.., widespread and racre violent than a moderate amount
of gunfire in the capital.
Once the peasants have a grip on the land, they can
exp c ted to fight to retain it. The resistence of the
Chinese peasants to enforced "communization" by the new
dictators is well known, as is the resinfence to compulsory
:,collectivization" in the Russian satellite states of eastern
Europe. In the homeland of Russian Communism the peasants
thought th-T_;~ :..e r volutionary "nationalization of the land"
simply amounted to an approval of their retention of their
own pre-revolutionary holdings and to their partition anong
themselves of most of the holdings of the landlords as .?:ell
as most of the old State lands of European Rucsiap By the
: d of the 19201:; Stalin o ,ht that his govermme a
strength enou;h to impose a new s4 ,"em of land holding and
.andAl '~9v? F9 Be ~ %aW ;1/i~tCnelqi ~ R X
90 ~k l lany subsequent
clic
A
time has the Soviet rrovrnmpr:t: f'A?- +.,-^- ...
 Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01300010020-7
a ant masses to accep=t the form of a~,ricu1.tural or 4rizat=
t :at has always been most aClUred by the Soviet Cor.:m nisto =
the lure State Farm, operated under profevoional ...anr:-eru4 ,
by hired laborers. In Stalin's treat agrarian drive o2 the
early ' ::hirtieo the chief goal wary to "collectivize" the
:"armers and their farms - that is, to force the peavc =.ts to
v:ecept a form of orr anizatio n that rcpr e rented a
between the Cornaunist ideal and the traditional form to
which the peasants were accustomed. The drive for colleetiv Y
i svolyed a loam; and bloody struC.ple between the Cor ak:~'~sto
nd the pcaoants, but since the mid 'thirties the
or koll.hoz has been the dominant form of organization in the
vountr;;s. de. Yet the vtr- le between the peavantc and the
C?o..: uni is still continues, thouZh with greatly reduced
t:
%
nsity; since the id 'thirties, this perennial contest
Luu centered '..chiefly on peasant attempts to enlarge, and the
C:o::runi?:t attempts to reduce, the small plots and the very
ma l~ number of animals that each member of a peas a nt
"collective" is perraitted to hold individually and suite
apart from the collective as ouch. In sun, it may be said U
the only massive and continuous domestic resistance that
the Soviet government has been obl gyred to contend with, ever
since the early 1920's, 13 the resistance of the pea: ants.
here the land is concerned, history testifies that very
ten the peasants are far from being as submissive as many
landlords and rulers .=aouid like them to be.
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Commonly the two mot urgent needs of an ur:er-developQu
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:...1 w
-;Dn--Com unist country are, f .rot, rc sonably .u::q uatc
Protection against attack from abroad (thin protection to
we provided by a national military force, au tinted i:.
any major crittia by the asalotance of one or more dcpvndable
:Alice); and s econ~dA..ueh a development under the protcotion
of this military sereea. as will make life more com orEl4Jle
in a material sonde, and at the same tL