THE JORDAN REGIME: ITS PROSPECTS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS DEMISE*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 13, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
5- P.- r-- Ft-- Fr- T
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
13 December 1966
NEMORAN M FOR T' DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Jordan Regime: Its Prospects and the Consequences
of its Demise
1. King Hussain has stayed on his throne in Jordan despite
slender domestic political support, military weakness relative to
his enemies,, and the hostility of radical Arabs who regard him as
a Western puppet. His survival has been due in part to his own
courage and resourcefulness and to US support. But it has been
Ithe Arab radicals generally tolerated
Hussain's rule as an alternative to conflict with Israel for which
they knew they were unprepared. As a consequence Jordan served as
a kind of political buffer between irreconcilable opponents and to
an important degree kept the unstable elements in the area in equilibrium.
This memorandum has been produced' solely by CIA. It was prepared
by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the
Office of Current Intelligence and the Clandestine Services.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and
declassification. _ 1URI/CD Fades 1-1 1
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
2. During the past few months, a series of events has put
the future of Jordan in question and has thereby threatened this
precarious modus vivendi. The Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO),* led by Ahmed Shugairi, became more violent in its criticism
of Hussain for his refusal to admit its military forces to Jordan
and to station them on the Israeli frontier. A clandestine
terrorist organization, Fatah, stepped up its sabotage raids
into Israel, mostly through Jordan, which tried to prevent them.
The increasingly radical Syrian government was the prime backer
of Fatah and announced open support for it. As terrorist raids
continued, Tel Aviv, on November 13, made an unprecedentedly
large reprisal strike, directing this strike, not against Syria,.
the source of the trouble, but against Jordan.
The PLO is a radical organization, established by agreement
of the Arab rulers during the recently ended period of Arab
harmony. It functions as a kind of government-in-exile for
the whole of Palestine, not only Israel but that port which
fell to Jordan, commonly known as the West Bank. The PLO
has trained a "liberation army" of Palestinians in Egypt and
sponsored terrorist activities in Israel. There are other
terrorist organizations, however, which are independent of
the PLO. The most active of these is called the Patch.
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
moire
S., E- C-R-E-T
3. The Israeli raid has ba(!-I;r shaken King Hussain and his
government anY. ' =iliated the Jordan ax-Ay. Palestinians in
Jordan have always disliked Hashemite rule anyway and consider
Husaain a US stooge who is "soft" on Israel. But they assumed
that his amenability to US influence at least brought tranquility --
since they believe that Israel is in Washington's pocket also. In
the aftermath of the 13 November maid, Hussain appeared to his
su'aJects, to his neighbors, and perhaps even to himself to have
been badly let dawn-by the US. The Palestinians have agitated
and demonstrated against him and his government for over three
weeks. They have been enthusiastically egged on by the Syrian
government and by UAR-based PLO propaganda campaigns. Disaffection
in the Jordanian armed forces -- the mainstay of the kingts
position -- has grown greatly. Hussain is aware of his weakened
position at home. He probably believes that the threat from
Israel is greater than he had calculated, and has probably lost
faith in the modus viverdi. He is also deeply concerned lest
the US fail to give him firm support.
4. Hence,, his first priority is to demonstrate to the
Jordanian arnj and citizenry that he continues to enjoy the
full backing of the US. He has asked the US for a large
- 3-
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200060003-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
S-E-C-.R-E-T
additional supply of arms to help him allay dissatisfaction in
the armed forces. Beyond this, he probably hopes that a show
of heightened defense activity will keep pressures manageable.
The Israelis are probably willing to cooperate by refraining
from reprisal raids on Jordan in all but the most serious
circumstances.
5. Meanwhile, Hussain was put under severe pressure at
the Arab Defense Council meetings last week in Cairo, and he
agreed to the stationing, within two months, of Saudi and Iraqi
forces in Jordan. Implementation of this plan is likely to be
slow, however, and Hussain is certainly averse to it. He
probably hopes that if extensive US aid buttresses his army,
the presence of other Arab troops will be unnecessary.
6. Hussain obviously fears that the US may not come
through with military aid in the magnitude he wants, and that
the stationing of Iraqi and Saudi forces may not suffice to
keep matters under control in Jordan or to dampen down the
criticism, agitation, and subversion coming from Damascus and
Cairo. He is therefore examining the possibility of recommending
to his brother Arab leaders that they collectively take over the
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
S- C-R-E-T
defense of West Bank. This would amount to abandoning political
control over the most populous part of Jordan and, would at least
foreshadow the emergence of a radical Arab state in Palestine.
Husscto may be threatening this step in order to scare off his
Arab critics. He would actually take it only as a move of
desperation, designed either to save his throne in Jordan or
in case he decided to abdicate.
7. Steady agitation and pressure on Hussain by the UAR,
Syria, and PLO could wear down the staying power of the regime
over a period of time. Although demonstrations in the West Bank
area have been brought under control for the present, Mugairi
senses that Hussain is in serious trouble and will keep all the
pressure he can on him. The PLO's efforts will probably stimulate
coup plotting against the monarchy. We know of at least two
groups in the Jordanian armed forces working separately against
the regime, one of Palestinians, one of East Bankers. There
may be others.
8. The intention and tactics of Nasser and Syrians are
among the most important variables in the situation. The
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
Syrians can be expected to keep up harassment and subversive
efforts against Hussaints regime in almost any circumstances.
Nasser's role is not so easily predictable. He is personally
and politically hostile to Hussain and everything the Hashemites
stand for, and no words of sympathy for the Jordanian regime can
be expected to emanate from Cairo. On the other hand, Nasser
has, in the post, shown considerable awareness, in practice, of
the comparative advantages of the modus vivendi, and the dangers
and uncertainties involved in upsetting it -- including the
risks of the UAR having to fight the Israelis. If Nasser chose,
he could do something to suppress the activities of Shuqairi and
to calm down the popular turbulence on the West Bank, though his
control is far from complete. We believe that he might come
to see the advantages of moving in this direction, though in
Cairo's present mood this is for from certain. In any case,
if he made such efforts, they would necessarily be quiet and
discreet; public pronouncements by him on these questions
pretty much have to be militant against both the Israelis and
Hussain, especially in view of Syrian competition.
9. The US response to Hussain's request for aid will be
an important factor in the situation. A military aid package,
_6-
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
w
if it included prompt delivery of some showy items, would
help the king g:-eotly. A US refusal to extend aid, or to
give only token amounts of it, would weaken his position
and discourage him. Th.sspin himself already entertains some
suspicion that the US and Israel are collaborating against
him, and he would feel that these suspicions were confirmed.
Although no amount of US aid could guarantee Hussaints
tenure, prompt and substantial assistance could help him to
maintain political control. It will not bring him increased
support among the Palestinians. Over the long term, the
mutual distrust he and they have for each other is certain
to increase.
10. In sum, Hussaints chances of surviving this crisis
depend on a number of variables, nearly all of them outside
his control. It is clear that he is in deep trouble, and that
there are significant dangers to him and to the modus viven+ii,
which has helped maintain an uneasy peace in the area. Never-
theless many of the forces or considerations which have hereto-
fore helped keep him on the throne are probably still there; these
include the loyalty of much of the army. Moreover, the awareness
among some of his neighbors that the collapse of his regime would
introduce great risks and uncertainties has probably not entirely
disappeared.
-7-
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
S-B-C-R-E-T W
III. CONSEQLXENCES CV HUSSAIN'S FALL
11. If Hussain's rule came to an end as a result of
assassination or abdication, he might be succeeded by his
brother, the 19-year old Crown Prince Hasan. The regime in
that case would probably present about the some face to the
world that it does at present -- seeking to keep its neighbors
at bay and to maintain quiet along the Israeli border and
looking to the US for money and arms.
W f 4M4 " 4-1t I k, 6wtve4, 1 4 ALY -n+wt ~r`llt~gm~a 4C
12. Huee,ain, is--far more likely to fal n circumstances
which would bring a radical regime to power in Jordan. In
such a government, Palestinians would probably have an important
role., .Cairo and Damascus would compete for influence over it,
with the Syrians taking a more x'adical, militant line. Nasser,
while claiming credit for a great victory for the forces of Arab
nationalism would face serious problems as well. A radical
goverment in Amman, or even on the West Bank alone, would make
appropriate Arab nationalist noises, but it would also be certain
to badger Nasser for money and other forms of support. Moreover,
it would probably not be totally under Cairo's control, and thus
could embroil the Egyptian government in unwanted confrontations
with Israel.
_8-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200060003-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
S-E-C-Pv-E" T
13. A radical regime would almost certainly turn to the
Soviets for economic and military aid. It would probably be
faced with immediate problems of replacing the $45 million
annually in grants and loans it has been getting from the USS.
The USSR would probably provide considerable military aid and
some economic assistance, though the Soviets usually do not
provide budgetary support to nations they are assisting.
Jordan's impressive economic progress of the last several
years would almost certainly be halted, or at least slowed
drastically.
i1. The existence of a radical regime in Jordan might
in itself be taken by the Israelis as enough of a threat to
their security to require military action to deal with the
situation. They would almost certainly take such action if
the radical Jordanian regime stationed sizeable armed forces
on the West Bank or mounted terrorist operations into Israel.
Such an Israeli move would carry the risk that other Arab
states might become embroiled. It would assuredly bring on
a major international crisis, involving considerations of US
prestige, the position of the USSR, the longevity of other
states friendly to the West, and perhaps major Arab-Israeli
hostilities.
- 9-
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200060003-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
15. The US is. clearly identified as the Mhief tracker of
,the Jordanian regime and would stand to lose considerable political
influence and prestige should that regime, into which it has put
half a billion dollars in the past decade, be overthrown. The
effects would be especially felt in the pro-Western states of
the Middle East, which would tend to attribute Hussain's
collapse to US failure to support him. There would be one
less voice arguing the side of moderation and caution in Arab
councils. The more pro-US states in the area would be alarmed
and discouraged, seeing the event as tipping the whole balance
in the Arab world in favor of radicalism supported by the USSR
and the UAR. They might be disposed to adjust their policies
to take some account of this development. However, we do not
believe that Hussain's fall would be followed by the similar
collapse of other conservative Arab states. At present all are
relatively well entrenched; none face any serious radical threat
at home. The appearance of a radical regime in Jordan would
increase the degree of polarization between the US and the
USSR in the Arab world, with the Soviets standing to gain from
their consistent support of the winning radical forces. The
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200060003-2
rrr
S-E-C-R-E-T
polarization would also extend to the Arab-Israeli situation, as
the US would become even more closely identified as the associate
and protector of Israel0
FOR TAE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
25X1
SIIERMAN KENT
'Chairman
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200060003-2
 Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060003-2