PROBABLE REACTIONS OF CERTAIN ASIAN COUNTRIES TO A POSSIBLE US MILITARY ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200020006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 13, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
13 December 1965
SUHJECT: PROBABLE REACTIONS OF CERTAIN ASIAN COUNTRIES TO A
POSSIBLE US MILITARY ACTION
To estimate probable reactions to possible US use of Thai,
Philippine, and GRC airfields as bases for B-52 operations against
enemy targets in North or South Vietnam.
1. Thailand. For the past year or so, bases in Thailand
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have been used for US air strikes against Pathet Lao~DRV forces
throughout Laos. For the most part, these operations have been
carried out with the knowledge and consent of Thai leaders, who
view the survival of a non-Communist Laos as essential to the
security of Thailand. At the same time, however -- and despite
a clearcut commitment to the anti-Communist cause -- Thai leaders
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nt to avoid
provoking Communist China and irritating tYte USSR and the left-
leaning Afro-Asian states. Domestically, they are concerned ovex
possible public changes of toady'ix~; to the hmera.cans and incurring
unnecessarily the danger of retaliatory air attacks by the Chinese
Communists.
2. The increased publicity given in recent months to
T~xailand-based, US air strikes in the Laos panhandle and to the
prospect of their intensification and the introduction of US ground
combat forces to the area has made the Thai leaders even mare
sensitive on the issue of US bases. Under these circumstances.,
US efforts to initiate B-52 operations, which would inevitably be
highly visible, would probably be opposed by the Thai government
at this time. Though Thai assent could ultimately be gained, the
negotiating process would draw heavily on US political capital
and would involve substantial casts in terms of increased military
and economic assistance.
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3. If targets in North Vietnam were involved in addition
to those in the South, the Thai leaders would fear intensification
of the P~T~ing-supported subversive campaign recently commenced at
low levels in northeastern Thailand, and would estimate the
chances of overt Chinese military action against Thailand to
have increased. They would thus be moxe reluctant to agree to
attacks on North Vietnam than to attacks an the South.
4. The 1'~;Ilippines. Under the terms of an informal agree-
went, the US would have an obligation to notify the Government of
the Philippines of the use of Clark :Field or other 1US bases there
for direct air attacks on Vietnam. Whether or not this agreement
is legally binding, the US would, for practical purposes, have to
have Philippine consent. President-elect Marcos has indicated
that he is willing to work closely with the US in Southeast Asian
security matters and. he would probably not be personally opposed.
He would probably calculate that such operations, whether against
North or South Vietnam, would not involve a serious threat of
retaliation against the Philippines.
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5. Nevertheless, Marcos would probably be unwilling to give
the green light to the US move before he fudged that his political
position vis-a-vis the Philippine Congress -- upon which the
success of his administration will largely depend -- had been
established; and this could take several months. M~.,rcvs would
be especially concerned over the impact of the 8-52 proposal on
influential congressmen and journalists who now oppose plans to
dispatch a Philippine combat force of 2,400 men to South Vietnam.
Adverse public reaction, on the other hand, would probably not
be an impa~?tant factor in any delay, though Marcos would probably
expect small-scale leftist p~^atest demonstrations in N~anila.
6. GRC. The Government of the Republic of China (GRC)
would probably welcome the use of its air bases by US B-52s far
operations against either North or South Vietnam. The government
would construe the move as a further indication of US determination
to stop the Communists in East Asia. Tt would also see it as an'
action which would certainly put the US in even more bitter
opposition to Communist China and which could, before long, lead
to war between the two. Taipei would consider that both of these
eventualities would favor its own objectives. The GRC would also
take this occasion to press the US for more military hard~z~~?