PROBABLE REACTIONS OF CERTAIN ASIAN FREE WORLD COUNTRIES TO A POSSIBLE US MILITARY ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200010023-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: June 25, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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TS# 185869
25 June 1965
25X1
SUBJECT: Probable Reactions of Certain Asian Free World
Countries to a Possible US Military Action
To estimate probable Philippine, GRC, and Japanese
reactions to possible US use of their airfields (Okinawan
airfields in the case of Japan) as bases for B-52 operations
in Vietnam.*
1. The Philippines. Under the terms of an informal
agreement, the US has some obligation to notify the Govern-
ment of the Philippines of the use of Clark Field for the
stated purpose. Whatever the legal effect of this agreement,
the US would, as a matter of practical politics, have to
give notice of its intentions. President Macapagal would
be inclined first to seek the support of other leading
Philippine political figures; the forthcoming (November 1965)
* For significant air distances involved, see Attachment.
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presidential election has made Macapagal extraordinarily
cautious in this respect. We do not believe that he would
encounter sufficient objections to make him withhold his
assent. The government would probably calculate that the
US action (whether against the VC in the south or the DRV
itself) did not involve a serious threat of retaliation
against the Philippines. However, Macapagal and his
leaders would take the occasion to solicit increased US
military aid.
2. Filipino public reaction would probably not be
significantly adverse to either Macapagal or the US. The
majority of the population would be either favorable or
indifferent, though a few Filipinos would be fearful of
retaliatory Communist actions, especially in the event of
an attack on the DRV. Small-scale leftist demonstrations,
similar to those of recent weeks, would probably occur in
Manila.
3. GRC. The Government of the Republic of China
(GRC) would probably welcome the use of its air bases by
US B-52s for operations against either the VC or the DRV.
The government would construe the attacks as a further
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J i
indication of US determination to stop Communist expansion
in Asia. It would use the occasion to try to involve the
US more deeply in support of GRC operations against the
mainland. Outside the government, there might be some fear
that US use of Taiwanese airfields would expose Taiwan to
Communist Chinese retaliation. However, any popular
opposition that did develop could easily be controlled
by the GRC.
i.. Japan. The US has no legal obligation to inform
Japan of military deployments involving Okinawa, and the
US has not done so in the past. Nevertheless, it is highly
unlikely that B-52 operations of the magnitude contemplated
could be mounted from Okinawa without their being known to
the Japanese government and public. Hence, failure to
notify the Japanese government in advance would almost
certainly reduce its confidence in the US and impair Sato's
political position. The Japanese press and a fair volume of
public opinion have been strongly critical of US actions in
Vietnam.
Although most Japanese are accustomed to Okinawa's
growing role in support of US military activities in Southeast
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Asia, the use of Okinawa-based B-52s, even if restricted
to raids on South Vietnam, would significantly upgrade
the importance of this role in Japanese eyes. Many
Japanese would resent the use of what they regard as
Japanese territory to prosecute a war in which they see
Japan holding no vital interest. The Sato government,
though it would not share this sentiment, would find
itself more vulnerable than before to attacks on its
support of US policy in Vietnam. Sato would probably
remain steadfast, but he would almost certainly lose some
public support for himself and his party which faces upper
house elections next month. These reactions would be
considerably intensified were the B-52 attacks to be
launched against the DRV and, in this case, Sato might
seek to disassociate himself from or even oppose the US
action. If Sato misjudged the public temper and was pushed
from office, a successor government would almost certainly
be more resistant to the US course of action and less
favorably disposed to the US generally.
6. On Okinawa itself, the US action would provide an
issue for the leftist opposition parties and increase
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Okinawan sentiment in favor of an early return of the
island to Japan. The legislative elections in Okinawa,
now scheduled for November 1965, are expected to be close
in any case; the impact of the US actions might tilt the
balance against the incumbent conservatives. This in turn
would help undermine Japanese popular and political support
for Sato's relatively permissive attitude toward the US
occupation of the Ryokyus. Ultimately, Okinawa's heightened
involvement in the Vietnam war could become an important
factor in the leftist campaign to discredit the US-Japan
Security Treaty.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
L
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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ATTACHMENT
(28 Jun 65)
(Statute Miles)
Saigon
Hanoi
Philippines (Clark Field) to:
975
1050*
Taiwan (WC Coast) to
1275
900**
Okinawa to
1700
1375**
Guam to
2600
2600*
--Overflies Hainan Island if most direct route used.
**Overflies China Mainland if most direct route used.
SECRET
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
This paper was distributed to the following
only:
DCI /
DDCI
DDI
AD/Cl
C/FE/DDP
Board of National Estimates (1 copy)
ONE/FE
(DATE)
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10.101
I AUG 54 l01 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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