A NEW CRISIS IN THE CONGO
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79R00904A001200010022-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 14, 2006
Sequence Number:
22
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 9, 1965
Content Type:
MF
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Body:
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
9 July 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: A New Crisis in the Congo
Although President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Tshombe,
working together, have brought a measure of quiet and progress
to the Congo, their relationship appears on the verge of breaking
up. They may realize the probable consequences of the collapse
of their working arrangement, i.e., a revival of political in-
fighting, a major resurgence of the rebellion and even possibly
a new secession of Katanga under Tshombe. However, the situation
is worsening and the Congo may be in for a return to troubles
reminiscent of Adoula's administration in 1963-64-
I. The working arrangement between President Kasavubu and
Prime Minister Tshombe appears to be on the verge of breaking up.
Kasavubu's unassailable legal position, combined with Tshombe's
energy and administrative ability (plus his white mercenaries)
GROUP 1
Excluded from atuomatic
S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and
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have been responsible for the restoration of some order in much
of the Congo during the past year. Both men would have a good
deal to lose from a breakup of the present arrangement and it is
by no means certain that they will not patch up their differences.
But Kasavubu has apparently decided to assert himself and has
begun working with anti-Tshombe figures. If Kasavubu were to go
so far as to force Tshombe out of office the Congo government
would lose its most effective man, Kasavubu would have against
him the man who controls rich Katangaa and who could cause
him a great deal of trouble, and the rebel cause in the Congo
would be likely to revive.
2. Kasevubu's trump card is his power to dismiss the
prime minister or any cabinet official at will. Normally a
"do-nothing" individual content to bask in the trappzf.ngs of
office, Kasavubu has permitted Tshombe to shoulder the burdens
of stemming the rebellion and attempting to install some
semblance of administration in the Congo. However, Tshombe's
overwhelming victory,in the recent parliamentary elections, and
increasing speculation that he would run for president in the
forthcoming elections, apparently have convinced Kasavubu that he
should whittle Tshombe down to size. This has been the pattern
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of Kasavubu'a actions in the pat whenever a prime minister
displayed signs of becoming popular.
3? Kasavubu has taken a number of actions to this end.
He has been intriguing with some influential political outs,
such as ex-.Foreign minister Bomboko, who have been stirring up
his suspicions that Tshombe was scheming against him. More
importantly, he has engineered the annulment of Tshombe's election
victories in three provinces, and fired Tshombe's Katanga
side-kick, Minister of the Interior Munongo. He is in touch with
former prime minister Adoula and may bring him back to Leopold-
ville. His next move may be to terminate Tshombe's "provisional"
government and to set up another government, with a new prime
minister, to hold office until the presidential elections later
this year. Either action would join the issue between the two and
would probably lead to a political crisis.
i. Tshombe feels discouraged and insecure. He knows that
he is boxed-in and that almost any move he can take would be
extralegal. While Tshombe has developed a considerable following,
even outside his native Katanga, he would probably consider it
very difficult to take over in the Congo by a coup. He knows
that General Mobutu is beginning to lean to Kasavubu, and that he
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could take a considerable portion of the Congolese Army with him.
Furthermore, he is uncertain of US support which he regards as
crucial. And he knows that other black African states are
looking for opportunities to do him in. The sine qua non of the
Tshombe-Kasavubu working relationship was a degree of mutual
tolerance if not trust. Tshombe is probably still agreeable to
Kasavubu's remaining as president with himself as prime minister
providing the president's powers are reduced. But the breach
between the ttiio is already very wide -- self-seeking supporters
of both are seeking to extend it even more -- and it now seems
improbable that Kasavubu will accept the relationship with
Tshombe he has had before, unless forced to do so by external
pressure.
5. Meanwhile, the Congolese rebels continue to roam large
areas of the bush, though their cause has not flourished. However,
large numbers still receive hospitality or active support and
training, in part from Chinese, in neighboring countries: 2,000-
4,000 in the Sudan, 4,000 in Tanzania, and at least several
hundred in Uganda. Some of these trained rebels have already
returned to the eastern Congo and the return of more would
result in a considerable increase in the power of radical Africans.
The only effective force which could dislodge the rebels from
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remaining strongholds in the eastern Congo is Tshombe's
mercenaries. If Tshombe is ousted, the mercenaries would
doubtless go with him, and it is probable that the rebel cause
would again flourish, particularly because few of the problems
which brought it about have been dealt with as yet.
6. This is not to exclude entirely the possibility of a
"Bantu" compromise. Tshombe is' aware that Kasavubu is seeking to
improve his bargaining position after his party was humbled in
the elections, and there is some chance that Tshombe may buy off
Kasavubu by expanding his cabinet to include a number of Kasavubu's
backers. Should Tshombe convince Kasavubu that he will not run
for president, or even less likely, should US-Belgian pressure
on Kasavubu prove persuasive, crisis may be avoided. However,
the chances that any of these solutions will come to pass seem to
be declining fast, and there is a good chance that the Congo will
again be plunged into a new round of troubles. These could take
almost any form, but some plausible eventualities include rebel
gains and concomitant radical influence, a primitive kind of civil
war, or the return of Tshombe to Katanga followed by a secession
of that state. In any case, Tshombe's departure would remove just
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about the only Congolese national figure with much administrative
ability, and diminish greatly prospects for stability and progress.
FOR TIE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
-6-
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
S-E-C-R-E-T
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