REVIEW OF SNIE 10-9-65, 'COMMUNIST AND FREE WORLD REACTIONS TO A POSSIBLE US COURSE OF ACTION'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200010020-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: July 30, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For please 2007/03/06= =CI,A RDP7'9 00904A001200010020-
TS#185880
30 July 1965
h
SUBJhCT: Review of SNIE 10-9-65, "Communist and Free
World Reactions to a Possible US Course of Action"
1. We have reviewed SNIE 10-9-65 in the light of the
differences between the US actions assumed for the estimate
and the actual decisions announced by the President on
28 July.
2. As far as the DRV and Chinese reaction are con-
cerned we had estimated, in general, that the assumed US
actions would not cause any major changes in strategy or
tactics. We believe that both the DRV and China will
interpret the Presidential announcements as foreshadowing
additional steps, such as the call up of reserves, additional
defense appropriations, and further increase in US force
strength in Vietnam beyond 125,000. Accordingly, we think
these judgments in the estimate are still valid.
and reactions to an expansion of US bombings in the DRV.
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Though the President's announcement did not mention any
proposed expansion of bombing, we believe that the Communists
will assume that these are in prospect, and will react
along the lines we estimated. The recent retaliation
against the SAM sites may lead the Communists to conclude
that the SAM ring around Hanoi will not deter the US from
attacking the area. We continue to believe that the USSR
will replace destroyed equipment and continue a build-up
of air defense for the DRV.
4. As for the Soviets, we estimated that announcements
of an increase in total US force strength, reserve call-ups,
and higher defense spending would put pressure on them for
corresponding countermoves. These pressures may have been
somewhat relieved by the tone and form of the President's
announcement. Although the Soviets probably also estimate
some additional US steps will be taken later, they may now
feel they have an opportunity to react in a less strident
fashion. US handling of the SAM incident, particularly the
"presumption" that the sites are manned by the DRV, may be
a further incentive for the Soviets to adopt a more moderate
5. Quite independent of the President's action, however,
an increased Soviet defense effort, as a result of the general
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A
Vietnamese crisis, may have already been agreed to in
Moscow in connection with the new five year economic
plan (1966-70).
SHERMA,N KENT
Chairman
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