REORGANIZATION OF SOVIET FORCES IN EAST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001100030003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 4, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
4 August 196#
SUBJECT: Reorganization of Soviet Forces in East Germany
The Soviets appear to be reducing their military forces in
East Germany. In our view, the cut is likely to involve the with-
drawal of at least one army headquarters and two divisions, and it
may be larger. Khrushchev will probably announce any reduction in
such a way as to turn it to political use against the West.
1. Prior to 10 June 1964, the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
(GSFG), was known to be made up of 20 divisions organized into six
armies. Since that date we have acquired evidence that a reorgani-
zation of GSFG and a probable reduction of Soviet troop strength in
East Germany have occurred.
Coordinated with OCI.
0
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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its former status in GSFG, and
probably already back in the USSR.
elements of that army are
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co There has been a resubordination of divisions among
armies of GSFG.
3?
a. The East European press reported suspension of all
railway express shipments to the USSR via Poland for an indefinite
See attached diagram for graphic presentation of this evidence.
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period beginning 9 June;
the reason to be overloading of the Brest-Litovsk translouding
lave reported
unusual eastward movements of military trains through Warsaw and
Poznan during June.
reported a troop
train carrying troops from the 18th Guards Army area moving eastward
near Cottbus, East Germany, on 17 June.
4. The eastward movement of Soviet troops during June is
highly unusual; troop rotation normally occurs in the fall, and
GSFG is now entering the period of increased field exercises and
maneuvers. Considering the size of the sample of train movements
obtainable by our observers and the reported overloading of trans-
loading facilities, we believe that the exodus of men and equipment
could have already involved a division or more. The sightings of
eastward movement through Cottbus and Poznan, on two distinct rail
lines out of East Germany, indicates withdrawal of elements from
both the 18th and the 20th Guards Armies.
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5. We believe that these movements are more likely to involve
divisions than support units. As noted in NTE 11-14-63, "Capabilities
of the Soviet General Purpose Forces, 1963-1969," dated 8 January 1964,
the support structure of GSFG is extremely austere, and the removal
of nondivisional units alone would make it even more so. According
to USAREUR estimates, removal of only the headquarters and service
elements of an army would involve only about 3,500 men and relatively
little equipment. A withdrawal of this size might eacape observation,
and would probably not account for the reported disruption of civil
rail traffic. At the moment there is one division whose continued
presence in East Germany cannot be confirmed. We conclude that the
reduction of force in East Germany will include, as a minimum, two
line divisions.
6.
~t appears almost certain that
the :L8th Guards Army Headquarters is being withdrawn from East
Germany. The 20th Guards Army, after the resubordination of divisions
mentioned above, has only two divisions,
Thus these two armies
are possible candidates for withdrawal from East Germany, and the
reorganization of GSFG could involve the withdrawal of as many as
three army headquarters and a total of five divisions.
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7. Whatever the scale of reduction and reorganization of
GSFG proves to be, we believe that the reasons for it are primarily
strategic and economic. For several years, the six Soviet armies
and their 20 divisions have constituted a ground force more than
adequate to cope with any NATO attack that the Soviets could
reasonably have expected and to support the East German regime.
At the some time, they remained insufficient to pose a credible
threat of successful surprise attack against opposing NATO forces.
Whatever the contribution East Germany makes to the maintenance
of G.SI'G, it is likely that the cost to the Soviets of keeping such
forces in Germany significantly exceeds the cost of maintaining
similar forces inside the USSR. We believe that any force totalling
between 15-18 divisions organized in 3-5 armies would not be
inconsistent with Soviet doctrines for defense, and would be
sufficient for control of the East Germans. A reduction to some
point within this range would represent a rationalization of GSFG
on the basis of a primarily defensive posture.
8. We conclude that a Soviet force reduction in East Germany
is likely to fall within the range of (a) one army headquarters with
a total of two divisions and (b) three arm headquarters and five
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divisions. In terms of manpower, the reduction would be from about
20,000* to 60,000 troops.
9. If we are correct in believing that a reduction on this
scale is under way, Kha.ushchev is likely to announce this fact in
a way which maxinizes its impact upon the West. He would assuredly
cite the move as a Soviet contribution to the process of "disarma-
men' by mutual example" and press for a Western response.
10. The most serious impact of such an announcement may be in
the area of NATO military structure and posture. Many of NATO mili-
tary requirements are now based on the threat of Soviet surprise
attack, using forces in East Germany with minimum secret rein-
forcement. This concept is already 'viewed skeptically in some NATO
military staffs. The USSR is aware that a reduction of GSPG by
even as little as two divisions would upset NATO planning and
strengthen the arguments of those who are reluctant to meet current
NATO planning levels. More generally, an announcement of GSFG
On 5 June, a Soviet embassy officiall in the course of a
conversation with I I stated
that Soviet troop strength in Est Gcrmariy would shortly be
reduced by about 20,000. While statement supports the
probable reduction of forces in s ermany, his quotation of the
figure 20,000 may not reflect his opinion of the scale of reduction
since it evolved during a conversation about "mutual example" in
disarmament. He stated that the Soviets would withdraw twice the
number that the US has recently withdrawn from Europe (about 10,000).
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reductions, by d1minishing the apparent Soviet threat, would help
to encourage NATO governments to a more independent line in their
overall, attitude to the NATO alliance and the US.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATXONAL ESTIMATES :
S.N ITT
Chairman
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.,.GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES, GERMANY
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(Schematic, armies in relative geographical positions)
rl=-~ TANK DIVISION,
1 JUNE 1964
MOTORIZED RIFLE
DIVISION,1 JUN64
Resubardination of
divisions among
armies since 10 June
1964 does not imply
physicam movement.
Continued location
in Germany in doubt.
A
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10 Am"t 1
1~itp~ Fit t
BUMET Attached Iemorsod+ s for the Director,
"*e xr'ganization of Soviet Vorsees
in west Germany.
ft e attaChed Itemeos *ndum was prepared by us a week
or ten days ago, sed the Director has um asked that it
be sent to you. I enclose also the covering memorandum
with which we sent it to the Director.
The paper has had no distribution outside this
Agenacy, except for this co ;y* to you.
Abating vs pan rector
astio a3. 3stisates
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