PROBABLE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US REPRISALS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010029-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: August 4, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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TS-18575+
4+ August 196+
SUBJECT: Probable North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist
Reactions to Certain US Reprisals Against North
Vietnam
1. The proposed US reprisals would evoke sharp DRV
military reactions, as we estimate below, but we do not
consider that such enemy reactions would represent a deliberate
decision to provoke or accept a major escalation of the Vietnam
war. We do not believe that Hanoi or Peiping feel themselves
under any pressure markedly to change the nature of the war;
indeed, they almost certainly estimate that the war is going
well for them in present circumstances, and that South Vietnamese
will to resist the Viet Cong's attrition may give way before
too long. The 31 July attack on the U.S.S. Maddox was almost
certainly prompted primarily by considerations of defense and
honor, growing out of what DRV authorities evidently believed
was a US or US-sponsored attack against North Vietnamese territory.
These considerations probably apply as well to the case of the
second attack, 4 August. Also present, however, are probably
these motives: (a) to signal to the US that the DRV is prepared
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to match US determination and it not about to accede to earlier
US entreaties to reduce the war effort against South Vietnam;
and (b) to avoid major escalation of the war by trying to show
the US that any raising of the ante on its side will involve
the US in major hostilities in the area.
2. In our view, these basic enemy motives place a certain
limit on the measures the DRV might take if suddenly hit with
US reprisals. Hanoi's leaders are not damn fools and are not
in a hurry to upset a thus-far profitable war effort equation.
At the same time, they will not hesitate to use considerable
force for essentially limited purposes. Furthermore, they will
probably do so quickly, in response to US reprisals, since they
have the capability and, apparently, considerable freedom of
maneuver vis-a-vis Peiping.
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3. Enemy Reactions.
a. Military reactions. The Communists are likely to
attempt a military response sufficiently strong to signal that
such attacks on their territory and naval craft are dangerous but
not so strong as to precipitate a sharp escalation of the Indochina
war. We believe that probable reactions within this frame include:
1) Introduction of combat aircraft (MIG 17's and
IL 28's) into North Vietnam, with Vietnamese pilots if they
are sufficiently ready, otherwise with Chinese pilots
"volunteers" or"sheepdipped" as Vietnamese. These fighters
would probably engage with any GVN or US aircraft in DRV air-
space, possibly including the Gulf of Tonkin. Over a longer
period Peiping would also very likely introduce substantial
amounts of additional AAA and radar gear.
2) Unconcealed (possibly announced) deployment and
maneuvering of Chinese Communist ground and air forces in
China's southern border regions.
3) A further step-up of VC action in South Vietnam
accompanied by a terror campaign against American personnel.
TOP SECRE
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4) We believe the odds are better than even that
Communist aircraft will attack the UD destroyers. It is
possible that they will also bomb Saigon.
5) We believe it unlikely that the Communists would
respond to either by marching the PAVN across the 17th parallel or
by the introduction of major Chinese ground forces into Indochina.
The Communists almost certainly estimate that an overt invasion
across the DMZ would precipitate a major war with direct US
participation.
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b. Political. The main thrust of the Communist response
will probably be in the fields of propaganda, political action
and diplomatic maneuvering. Hanoi, backed by Peiping -- and
probably Moscow -- will adopt the role of outraged victim of
US "aggression" and almost certainly demand an immediate inter-
national conference, without preconditions, to condemn the US
and "neutralize" the Indochina situation before US bellicosity
sparks a general war. Hanoi might also seek support for UN
condemnation of the US. Such military responses as Hanoi
:initiates, either directly or through its clients and agents
in South Vietnam and Laos, will probably be tailored to
support this image and further this political objective. Hanoi
will almost certainly feel compelled to undertake some retaliatory
gestures for reasons of national pride; but we believe that,
in the main, it will try to make its military ripostes appear
"defensive ,t and will accordingly limit itself to direct counter-
actions that can be portrayed in this light.
In terms of maneuvering (e.g. deployments) as opposed
to actual actions (e.g., raids and attacks), Hanoi -- and Peiping--
will probably endeavor to be as menacing as possible and make it
appear that the whole Indochina area is rapidly approaching the
brink of all out war. The principal object of such maneuvering
however, will probably be the political one of raising the inter-
national temperature and heightening world pressure for a conference.
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We still feel Hanoi does not want to change the general ground
rules on the Indochina struggle or engage in direct conflict
with the US. However, the risk of such a conflict would
appreciably increase; for despite the real purpose of its
bluster and military maneuvering, Hanoi would re reluctant
to lose face by obviously backing down if its bluff were called.
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