IMPLICATIONS OF THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV FOR SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010010-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 4, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
4 November 1964
MEMOrtMWUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Implications of the Fall of Khrushchev
For Soviet Military Policy
A, Khrushchev consistently worked for changes in Soviet mili-
tary doctrine and force structure which favored strategic capabilities.
At the some time, he exercised a reetraii:ig influence on the growth
of total military expenditures. He effected reductions in general
purpose forces, and apparently contemplated further cuts. If his
replacement brings any change in the allocation -of resources to
defense, it will be upward.
B. The traditional arms of service, particularly the ground
forces, are the ones moat likely to benefit in the nest term. If
the new regime keeps general purpose forces at present levels, while
continuing the building of strategic forces and the present high
level of milita. 7, the result will be a constant upward pressure
on the Soviet military budget and on military manpower. In this case,
it would not be long before the new leaders would have to consider
a return to policies of restraining the growth of military spending.
C. Despite the removal of the guidepost provided by Khrushchev's
known views, we think our estimates of Soviet military forces for
the coming five years allow for the likely range of options and
alternatives open to the USSR, The new leaders will amost certainly
not find the problems of an unfavorable strategic balance and a
strained economy any more tractable than Khrushchev did.
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D. In the unlikely event that they decide upon a sharp
increase in Soviet efforts to alter the strategic balance, it
would be at least a year or two before such a decision could
begin to affect military capabilities. We would have a good
chance of obtaining indicators of such a development in the
interim.
1. The dismissal of Khrushchev cannot but raise serious
questions as to the future course of Soviet military policy.
Because of his Churchillean concern with the entire range of
military affairs, Khrushchev was personally identified with
virtually every innovation in the Soviet military establish-
ment. Asserting the primacy of missiles and nuclear weapons,
he stimulated their development and deployment. He brought
about changes in military organization, including establishment
of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which he thought to be required
by the nuclear and missile age. He enunciated a strategic
doctrine which, for the Soviets, was revolutionary, and he
sparked a debate among senior military officers intended to
bring their thinking up to date. He pressed hard for reductions
in military force components which he considered to be obsolete
or inappropriate to current strategic needs.
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2. Although Khrushchev accomplished much, he did not
do so unopposed. Our estimates have noted the opposition of
most of the senior military leaders to Khrushchev's views on
strategy and doctrine and their resistance to his recurring
efforts at force reductions. The serious political crisis of
late 1962-early 1963, in the aftermath of Cuba, almost certainly
revolved around his conduct of military and economic policy.
But with Khrushchev's apparently successful reassertion of
authority in early 1963, it seemed reasonable to believe that
if change occurred in Soviet militarr policy, it would be
generally in the direction advocated by Khrushchev, and our
estimates reflected this belief.
3. In NIE 11-4-64, we noted the likelihood that Khrushchev
would "have passed from the scene by the end of the decade," and
stated:
"What the attitude and policies of a new set of
leaders will be cannot be estimated with any certainly*
If, as we believe likely, economic and military questions
are still paramount issues when Khrushchev departs, the
professional advice of the military is likely to grow in
importance. The chances for Important changes in military
policy may improve if a protracted succession struggle
develops, but we believe it unlikely that radical departures
would occur unless at the same time there were significant
changes in the economic or strategic situations confronting
the USSR."
These judgments were based upon the implicit assumption that
death or voluntary retirement, rather than forced dismissal,
would be the cause of Khrushchev's departure. Thus, their
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continued validity depends to some extent upon the reasons for
the ouster of Khrushchev and the circumstances surrounding it.
Involvement of Military Policy Questions and Military leders
4. There was probably no single reason for Khrushchev's
ouster; a number of interests and causes and a variety of
complaints about his style of leadership were no doubt responsible
for the coalescing of anti-Khrushchev sentiments on the Presidium
and among lower levels of the leadership. Among the many policy
issues, the anti-Khrushchev case almost certainly included his
overall handling of economic policies and, in particular, his
plans affecting the allocation of resources among the various
civilian and military claimants. Certainly no other domestic
issue has so agitated the Soviet leadership over the pact
several years, and it was precisely this question of economic
priorities that Khrushchev had raised again in forceful terms
just prior to his removal.
5. Although the resources allocated to defense increased
in each year of Khrushchev's rule, he evinced more and more
determination to confine these increases to advanced weapons
programs and to offset the costs of these programs by cutting
conventional forces and manpower. We are quite sure that in the
post-Cuba crisis within the USSR, some military and political
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leaders applied powerful pressures for a major increase in
allocations to defense. Khrushchev staved off the challenge to
his authority at that time, evidently with the aid of Kozlov's
illness, and immediately renewed his initiatives. Toward the
end of 1963, he put through his ambitious new chemical program,
launched a small reduction in the overt defense budget, and
stated publicly that a further cut in military manpower was
under consideration. During the spring of 1964 a small cut in
military manpower may have been made, and in the summer some
aircraft plants were ordered to make chicken incubators.
6. Military opposition found expression during 196+ in
the continuing debate about strategic doctrine and force
structure. In July, a compendium of articles by senior military
officers was published that contained strong restatements of the
"traditionalist" position that a general nuclear war might be
protracted and that vast armies were required. In August,
however, Marshal Sokolovskiy published an article which accepted
the "modernist" thesis that general nuclear war would be short,
but went on to argue that the USSR mast be prepared to fight
protracted non-nuclear wars. Thus a new and different argument
would appear to have been brought forward to support the mainte-
nance of military manpower and general purpose forces at high levels.
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7. Finally, Khrushchev's major policy speech of late
September gave notice of his position in the next round of
ecc,omic planning. Future plans, he said, should be based on
the premise that defense "is at its proper level" and that the
"main task...is the further raising of the people's standard
of living." Considering the rising costs of advanced weapons,
this signified renewed pressure to cut conventional forces.
Despite differences of opinion among the military leaders, most
of them must have looked askance at these prospects. Thus they
had their ova reasons for Joining the anti-Khrushchev consensus.
8. Our evidence indicates, however, that there was no
direct use of military force in this particular coup. Unlike
the time of Beria's removal and arrest in 1953, no unusual
military concentrations have been brought into Moscow in the
past few weeks. There have been no tanks in the streets. Such
guarding of Khrushchev as may have been necessary has evidently
been handled by the security police. We think that these
differences from earlier times are more a measure of the way
things are done in the Kremlin today than an indication of the
degree of military participation in Khrushchev's removal. It
is also clear that no Zhukov stepped forward, as in 1957, to
stay the hand of the majority against Khrushchev. Instead it
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appears that the conspirators took soundings among the
military leaders in advance and obtained their assurances of
support or at least neutrality.
Er2_s ects for Near-Term Comes in Mili?d Policy
9. Given the strained relations between Ithrushchev and
the marshals, we see no reason to suppose that the cos.spi rators
had to pay much of a price for the support or neutrality of the
military. There may be some significance, however, in the
consistency with which the new leaders and to Soviet press
have asserted that the regime is "taking all measures necessary
to strengthen" Soviet defenses. This stands in contrast to
:~}aru,'hchev ? s statement in late September that defense had
reached its "proper level," and goes beyond the reassurances
of national strength which a fledgling regime might direct
to the general populace. 1 :e 4 11itii wl statements by the poet-
Khrushchev leaders seem to promise something for eveiyi ody,
strengthened defenses and more c casumer goods, better relations
with China and with East Europe, etc. But the tone of their
welfare statements seems designed to warn consiraers against any
immediate optimism. Moreover, the slogans for 7 November drop
long-standing references stressing mechanization of agriculture
and the completion of chemical plfants. TThua, while we think it
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too early to say what changes in policy the new leaders will
make, such indications as we have suggest that if there is any
change in the allocation, of resources to defense, it will be
upwe rd .
10. We think it unlikely, however, that the new regime will
initiate any radical departure in military policy in the immediate
future. In a very real sense, Khrushchev's departure means the
removal of a force for change rather than the introduction of a
new force. At the same time, his ouster removes from the scene
a restraining influence which is not likely to be immediately
replaced. We believe that this influence was used not only to
hold down military spending, but also to cut back or cancel
military projects which he rccg rded as marginal. The new leaders
will probably not be able to deal as firmly with military
recommendations as we think K2ushchev often did. Even
collecti.Tely, they lack his power and prestige. Sirg.y, they
are involved in the struggle for succession,, and may be tempted
to make concessions to the military in order to enlist their
s apport.
11. For a time at least, the new leaders will probably
rely more heavily on professional military advice than
Khrushchev did. We think that in recent years Khrushchev's
initatives kept the military on the defensive. Now they will
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certainly seize the opportunity presented by his fall, and old
issues may be reopened. We believe that their professional
advice will tend to be conservative. The Soviet high command is
made up entirely of ground force officers who won fame in
World War II and who, we believe, lean to the traditionalist
views expressed in the course of the continuing debate over
strategy and doctrine. The untimely death of Marshal Biryuzov
removed from the topmost military ranks the only man we felt
sure was a modernist.*
12. Unless some clearly modernist trend emerges soon, we
think that the traditional arms of service, therefore, particularly
the ground forces, are most likely to benefit from the change in
regime. We do not reach this conclusion solely because we think
Soviet marshals are sentimental about the good old days of
World War II. Large new deployment programs for strategic weapons
Biryuzov was probably the closest to Khrushchev of the favored
"southern" group of military leaders. He was PVO chief for
five years, then Strategic Rocket Forces chief for about a
year, and was Chief of the General Staff at the time of his
death. We thought he would probably have become Defense
Minister under Khrushchev. He was the most experienced of
the Soviet marshals in the field of modern strategic weapons.
His death, like that of Marshal Nedelin in 1960, is a severe
loss to the USSR in terms of professional military expertise.
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are proceeding, and R&D on advanced systems is at record high
levels. However, the marshals have apparently been concerned
that Khrushchev, in his zeal to economize, would cut Soviet
general purpose forces below the levels they considered
necessary -- for a general nuclear war which some of them
believe might be protracted, for a large-scale non-nuclear war
which some of them believe might arise from LIS "flexible
response" policies, and for a variety of other purposes including,
we think, guarding against trouble with China. In this.
connection, one report of the charges against Khrushchev includes
the accusation that, in his passion for strategic weapons, he
unduly weakened conventional forces.
13. Assuming the continued building of forces for
strategic attack and defense aloe, the lines indicated by our
evidence, the maintenance of general purpose forces at their
present levels would in fact require some increase in military
spending in each succeeding year. It would also contribute to
an upward trend in military manpower requirements. It was this
constant increase in the military claim that Khrushchev was
resisting. If the reins are now loosed, the prospect would be
for a steady rise in military expenditures like that which
characterized Soviet military policy in the late 1950s and
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early 1960s. It is possible that with new leadership, more
efficient methods, and greater incentives to production, the
Soviet economy could be made to sustain such a rise and at
the same time meet other demands on it. It seems more likely
to us, however, that before very long the new Soviet leadership,
like Khrushchev, would again be seeking to restrain the growth
in military spending.
Considerations Affecting the Longer Term
1t+. In general, we think our estimates of Soviet military
forces for the coming five years allow for the likely range of
options and alternatives open to the USSR. The factors influencing
these estimates have included, in addition to direct evidence on
the major military programs themselves, evaluations of the strategic,
technical, and economic factors which we thought would affect future
programs. But we cannot exclude the possibility that some changes
in these programs will eventuate, either because Khrushchev's
political colleagues were not satisfied or because the military
leaders were not. We must grant that Khrushchev's known strategic
views were a guidepost to us, that the new political leaders are
as yet unknown quantities, and that a prolonged succession struggle
could bring changes which are not now foreseeable.
15. In this situation, it is worth recalling the facts of
life facing the USSR at present. Under Khrushchev, the USSR made
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basic strategic advances. With the advent of the ICBM, it
acquired an impressive capability for direct nuclear attack
on the US. More recently, it set in motion programs which for
the first time are giving it well-protected retaliatory forces
of substantial size. But despite these veiny real gains, during
Khrushchev's tenure the USSR failed to find a way to overcome US
strategic superiority, and it lost much of the secrecy which it
once was able to use as a major military asset. The unfavorable
strategic belance and the critical economic situation which
confronted Khrushchev still confront the new leadership. We doubt
that they will find these problems any more tractable than
Khrushchev did.
16. In the unlikely event that the new leaders decide upon a
sharp increase in Soviet efforts to alter the strategic balance,
lead-times in major programs are such that it would be at least
a year or two before such decisions could begin to affect Soviet
strategic capabilities. Signals to watch for would include early
indications of some sweeping alteration in economic priorities,
some major intensification or alarming trend In military R&D, or
some drastic change in the Soviet evaluation of the strategic
possibilities.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERM KENT
Chairman
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I~QCar L14"flyn
wab]A 1.1.bot, Auit
' bate for BE Affairs
s LABIA
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Honarable Fb1i1ipa Ta3.bot, Aa eis 6tant
Se tarn Or State for NE Affairs
ler, W, USIA
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