THE PROSPECTS FOR BRAZIL UNDER CASTELLO BRANCO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 22, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved Fp Release 20057' 12i1WWRDP79R0dfi 4A001000050013-4
C E N T RAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
22 April 196+
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Prospects for Brazil Under
Castello Branco
An SNIE on the subject is scheduled for USIB consideration
on 20 May. The present memorandum presents, in general terms,
our preliminary assessment. The new regime has not been in
office long enough to have developed a specific program or to
have proved its own internal cohesion and stability.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
S-E-C-R-E-T declassification
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050013-4
 ApprovedW Release 20050 128:RCI~Q,2DP79R0W4A001000050013-4
1. We are cautiously optimistic about prospects for
Brazil under the Castello Branco regime; our outlook, admittedly,
is partly conditioned by our pessimistic estimate of the prospects
for Brazil had Goulart continued in office. The April revolution
ousted a regime with dangerous tendencies from the point of view
of US interests and one seemingly incapable of useful action to
cope with Brazil's increasingly critical problems. It has brought
to power a regime decidedly more friendly to the US and dedicated
to the reduction of Communist and leftist extremist influence
generally. Moreover, the new government gives promise of taking
some constructive steps toward the alleviation of Brazil's economic
and social strains,
2. The end of Brazil's prolonged crisis is by no means in
sight, however. The country's underlying economic and social dis-
orders are not amenable to quick, painless remedies. Moreover,
the new government must resolve some basic political problems to
ensure its stability and to command the support necessary for
appreciable progress on the social and economic fronts. These
problems include the judicious management of its anti-Communist
purge, the containment of potential insurgency, and, most important
in our view, the control of potential conflicts among the original
supporters of the revolution.
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01000050013-4
 Approved F? Release 200%11 }G`IA-RDP79R0&4A001000050013-4
3. The revolution which ousted Goulart was met with
impressive demonstrations of enthusiasm on the part of much of
the Brazilian population and with indifference or resignation on
the part of most groups thought to be friendly to Goulart and his
extreme leftist supporters. So far, the anti-Communist drive
("Operation Cleanup") launched by the military leaders of the
revolution before President Castello Branco took office has not
noticeably alienated the supporters or emboldened the potential
opponents of the revolution. The drive has largely avoided physical
violence: military and police searches for "Communists" and
evidence of "Communist plots" have frequently taken on a rough
and arbitrary character, but there have been no executions and
only isolated incidents of brutal treatment of prisoners.
4. In addition to Communists and other extremists, however,
a large number of Goulart supporters and collaborators of more
moderate political stripe have suffered arrest or loss of their
government Jobs or military positions. More than 200 military
officers and politicians, some obviously non-extremist, have been
summarily stripped of their political (but not civil) rights for
10 years. These include over 40 congressmen, former President
Quadros (no friend of Goulart, but an enemy of some of the leading
revolutionaries), and Celso Furtado, popular former head of the
development agency for Northeast Brazil. This tendency toward
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01000050013-4
 ri
Approved Frio Release 2003T+i` O &I -RDP79R0QW4A001000050013-4
excess, if unchecked or accelerated, could undermine the
popularity and eventually threaten the stability of the new
regime. There are strong indications, however, that
President Castello Branco intends to exercise a moderating
influence on the zealots within the military, and we believe
that he will be successful for the most part in keeping the
drive within reasonable bounds.
5. we believe that the extreme leftist elements which
supported Goulart's aborted drive for increased power will not
be able, over the next year or two, to muster enough strength
for a successful, counter-coup. These elements now are in con-
siderable disarray, with many key leaders in jail or in hiding.
Some extremist groups (more likely the Brizola forces or other
Castroist groups rather than the Moscow-line Communist Party)
may attempt to discredit the new regime through demonstrative
acts of violence, but they probably do not now command enough
trained and willing activists to launch insurgency on an impressive
scale. The government security forces probably would be able to
quash or at least contain such operations as these disaffected
elements do undertake. There also may be extremist-inspired or
spontaneous protest demonstrations by leftist-leaning student
and worker groups, but the government security forces probably will
be able to control these as well. Only in the unlikely event that
-4+-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050013-4
 Approved %rRelease 2005/11/29: CIA-RDP79R00 4A001000050013-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
the anti-Communist drive turns into a "reign of terror" do
we see much danger of insurgency or protest demonstrations
on a level that would threaten the stability of the regime.
6. In the short run, the principal danger to the Castello
Branco regime would be a major falling out among the original
supporters of the revolution. In moving against Goulart and his
immediate band of extremist supporters, the military have also
tended to repudiate the political modus 2Rerandi of postwar
Brazil -- the Vargas and Kubitschek as well as Goulart style of
administration. The new regime is almost certain to develop a
distinctive style of governing, reflecting its strong military
influence and limited political experience. President
Castello Branco, who will enjoy extraordinary executive authority
throughout his 21 month term, is a senior career Army officer
with no previous political experience and probably with only a
limited tolerance for the demagoguery and deviousness, the cronyis::x
and outright corruption which have become SOP in Brazilian politics.
War Minister Costa e Silva, who at least initially will exercise a
prominent influence on all phases of government operations, also
lacks political experience and probably has an even smaller
tolerance for Brazilian politics and politicians than does the
President. Moreover, the new government has appointed civilian
cabinet officers more noted for technical competence than for
political finesse.
-5 -
Approved For Release 20054Ji 2ft_p I ..- DP79R00904A001000050013-4
 Approved Felease 200581/2t9-jTRDP79R00A001000050013-4
7. We foresee, therefore, conflict between a military desire
to get on with the job and the desire of politicians -- congressmen,
governors, and especially ex-President Kubitschek, the leading
candidate for the presidential election of October 1965 -- to get
on with "politics es usual." This conflict could lead to serious
divisions among the anti-Goulart military leaders, with some
supporting the tack adopted by Castello Branco and others pressing
for a tougher or softer line towards the politicians. The personal
animosities and ambitions of key military leaders may also come
into play. General Kruel, comma:iding officer of the powerful
Second Army stationed in Sao Paulo, has political ambitions and is
a personal enemy of Castello Branco. War Minister Costa e Silva,
the dominant figure during the interval between the fall of Goulart
and the inauguration of Caste ].o Branco, will probably be reluctant
to relinquish all of the political authdrity he :?ecently exercised.
8. A major falling out among the victors would tend to
improve the opportunities for extremists of both the left and the
right -- a slippage into an out-and-out military dictatorship could
result. What seems to us a more likely result, however, would be
chronic bickering between the Castello Branco government on the
one hand, and po_Li4icans and some military groups on the other,
which would tend to distract the government from efforts to deal
with Brazil's urgent economic and social problems. The new government
-6 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050013-4
 Approved F&Ak elease 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R009 001000050013-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
must in short order devise as palatable as possible a combination
of austerity measures and social reforms; in this, what one man
calls a "social injustice" another man will call a "sacred right."
Appreciable progress will require a broad consensus behind the
program the government does adopt.
9? The burden of accommodating potential conflicts among
military leaders and between the military establishment and the
politicans will fall largely on President Castello Branco. Initially
he commands the strong support of most military officers and the
respect of a large number of political leaders. Moreover, he
apparently is a man of considerable intelligence, integrity, courage,
and leadership potential. In good meaanrr because of our respect
for his abilities, we estimate that the interim regime probably will
manage to survive and to hold free elections next October and that
it has at least an even chance of laying a helpful foundation for
the elected government which is scheduled to succeed it in January
1966.
10. The Castello Branco regime probably will break diplomatic
relations with Cuba and adopt a cool and correct posture toward the
USSR and other b:Loc countries with which it now has relations. It
almost certainly will seek substantial new economic assistance from
the US and other Western countries (in addition to the efforts already
-7-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050013-4
 Approved F Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79RO09VA001000050013-4
S-E-C-R-E-T
underway to refinance old debts), and is likely to adopt a
moderate and reasonable policy toward foreign investors. The
regime, nonetheless, will probably go'out of its way to avoid the
appearance of subservience to the US, even on issues where US and
Brazilian interests now appear be nearly identical: e.g.,
sanctions against Cuba. Its failure to maintain at least the
appearances of an "independent" foreign policy would probably
cause a loss in domestic popularity and also in prestige elsewhere
in Latin America, especially in Mexico and Chile where the pursuit
of an "independent" line in foreign relations is a key governmental
policy.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
25X1
ABBOT SMITH
Acting Chairman
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01000050013-4