THE SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001000020026-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: October 7, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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S-E-C.R-E-T I%W
7 October 1963
SUBJECT: The Soviet-Cuban Relationship
The Soviet-Cuban relationship is under strain. This
results partly from Castro's frustration over his own domestic
troubles -- serious economic difficulties, loss of political
impetus, the step-up in exile raids against him -- and from his
failure to spark revolution abroad. He and the Soviets remain
in disagreement over tac"cics to pursue in fostering revolution
in the rest of Latin America. He almost certainly feels that
the atmosphere ioI d6tente between the USSR and the US prejudices
his regime.
The world political situation and the Soviet and Cuban
economic situations all restrict the Soviets' freedom of action
toward Castro while increasing his toward them. Castro
knows that he cannot survive without Soviet support, but he
also knows that the Soviets cannot afford to lose the Communist
foothold which he controls. He is therefore freer to flout
their interests, for example by failing to sign the test-ban
treaty and in other ways, than they are to withhold economic
support. Castro's recent conspicuous display of independence,
as in the speech of 28 September, shows that for all their wooing
the Soviets have not effectively subordinated him to their will;
his character and personality make it doubtful that they will
ever do so, more than teriporarily.
GROUP 1
S-E-C-R-E-T Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
a, OPlf ' :p. 1
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Their stake in Cuba, as against both the US and the Chinese
Communists, will require them to keep on supporting Castro until
they can find a more tractable replacement for him. But we
believe that the Soviets will follow a cautious line towards
Latin America for some time to come and will try to persuade
Castro to do the same. If tensions begin to rise, the USSR
will probably try to contain any crisis at an early stage.
1. The final paragraph of NIE 85-63,"Situation and Prospects
in Cuba;U dated 11 June 1963, foresaw "varying degrees of ,'ricti,n
in Soviet-Cuban relations, particularly over the long run. Castro
wants all the benefits of Soviet economic and military aid but
insists upon a unique position in the Bloc without submitting
to the discipline and control innoced on Soviet Satellites.
Despite the harmonious tone of the joint communique (23 May 1963},
the partners probably have not reached a fundamental recon-
ciliation of their appraisals of the situation in Latin America.
As time passes and new conditions develop, they will probably
again find themselves in dicz-;reement over the proper course of
action to follow ..."
2. From Castro's point of view events over the past few
months have been generally unfavorable. Depressed living condi-
tions persist in Cuba and prospects for improvement are bleak,
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S-E-C-R-E-T Nw~
at least over the next few years. Castro's efforts to incite
revolution abroad have met with little or no success, and his
hopes of making Cuba and the Fidelistas the vanguard of a con-
tinental revolution are at best remote. Meanwhile counter-
revolutionary pressure in the foxin of exile raids has increased
and probably seems to him at least potentially dangerous to his
regime.
3. We do not believe that conditions within Cuba have
deteriorated to such an extent that Castro's power position is in
peril. But the regime has lost impetus. It has been extremely
inept in direction and administration of the economy, as shown
by serious errors in long-range planning, wasteful use of man-
power, and recurring failures in the distribution system.
Western observers have noted a change in atmosphere in recent
months and a "flat feeling" now apparent in the general attitude.
An increasing proportion of the population seems apathetic and
there may have been an increase in the number, as well as an
improvement in the morale, of those actively opposed to Castro.
fit.. Continuing friction is evident between Castro and some
of the old-line Communists in the government. Castro almost
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certainly realizes that they will try to acquire control of the
apparatus of his new party, the United Party of the Socialist
Revolution (PUBS), and through it of him. We believe this to be
one of the reasons that the massive reorganization and reconstitu-
tion of the party is moving ahead so slowly. We are inclined to
attach some credence to reports of serious wrangling between Castro
and certain of his top officials, in view of the acuteness of the
regime's internal problems.
5. With regard to Cuba's external relations,, Castro must
feel that he is being squ fz ,d into a corner, and in danger of
becoming increasingly isolated. Not only has he made no headway
in fostering revolution in Latin America, but in our view he has
regained none of the ground lost a year ago when the evidence
of his conniving in the introduction of strategic missiles cost
him most of his remaining support in Latin America. His tenta-
tive overtures to the US for discussions on normalization of
relations have been ignored. US-sponsored quarantine measures
are having a serious cumulative impact on the Cuban economy.
More important, the Soviets have apparently given him to under-
stand that their economic aid program has limits. In his speech
of 28 September, Castro again stressed the necessity for a "maxi-
mum effort" to wipe out Cuba's large trade imbalance with the
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Soviet Union. Worst of all, he must have growing doubts about
how much Soviet political and military support he can count on
if a new crisis develops.
6. Castro's speech of 28 September dismissed the relaxation
of East-West tensions as far less important than "the strong
blockade established against us, as a small country, attacked,
blockaded, against which a policy of undeclared war is being
followed, a policy of piratical attacks, infiltration of saboteurs,
introduction of arms and explosives, establishment of bases to
attack and kill." By inference he accused the Soviets of turning
"a beatific smile toward those imperialist enemies" who are also
enemies of Cuba. He almost certainly fears that the atmosphere
of d4tente prejudices his regime: not that the Soviet Union will
deliberately sell him out in bilateral negotiation with the US, or
that the US will invade, but that the Soviets will stand by while
US economic and other measures erode his own position past recovery.
When the Soviets decided months ago to reduce their military
strength in Cuba, they seem to have intended to leave enough for
a trip-wire effect to deter drastic US action against the island;
under the changed circumstances of today Castro may be wondering
whether whatever Soviet presence remains in Cuba will be of any
real use to him.
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7. A recurring cause of difficulty in Soviet-Cuban relations
is the disagreement between the two governments on methods and
tactics -- and the amount of risk regarded as acceptable -- for
support of revolution in Latin America. The Soviets appear to
favor a minimum-risk policy emphasizing the use of legal political
action by the old-line Communist parties. The Cuban leaders believe,
on the contrary, that the only revolutionary action in Latin America
that offers much prospect of success is guerrilla warfare, on the
Cuban model. Castro and his revolutionary theoretician Che Guevara
admit that there is a slim possibility that revolutionary elements
in one country or another could gain power through elections but
doubt whether they could hang onto it against probable counter-
action by reactionary military officers. Above all, Castro and
Guevara seem to feel that the gradualist tactics advocated by the
Soviets are out of phase with the Cuban regime's pressing need for
a parallel revolutionary success elsewhere in Latin America.
8. The attitude of the Cuban leaders is, of course, much
closer to the Communist Chinese formula on the necessity for violent
revolution than it is to the Soviet position, and Castro has
evidently become irritated by Soviet urgings that he exercise re-
straint in promoting his revolutionary plans. Such counsel is
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probably particularly galling to Fidel since the exile groups
have intensified raiding activities against Ceiba and begun to
establish new bases in Central America.
9. Such are the broad issues, but the Soviets cannot reach
any decisions affecting Cuba (or even some which do not) without
constantly assessing the character and personality of Castro.
After the missile crisis Mikoyen danced attendance upon him for
a month without persuading him to conceal his resentment over
its outcome. In May they wooed him with more flattering attention,
week after week, than they have ever shown any other visitor to
the Soviet Union,. In June he reciprocated with a long television
speech in Havana which was remarkable for its adulation of every-
thing Soviet and of Khrushchev personally. But by July he was
returning to his old truculence, and by September was saying,
"Naturally, we will not calmly accept a situation in which tensions
decrease elsewhere while they increase for us...This situation
will determine our policy in the international arena, in the
United Nations, and everywhere. It will determine our stand on
the nuclear pact, and toward the proposals on denuclearization."
Castro knows that he cannot survive without Soviet support, but
he also knows that the Soviets cannot afford to lose the Communist
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foothold which he controls. The Soviets for their part must be
convinced that they cannot count on him for loyal consistency to
their political interests. His egomania, his confident drive,
and the ease with which he shifts course all operate against
them; a canny instinct for survival is his one trait which can
offer them hope that prudence will govern his actions. To the
oscillations which have already occurred Castro may of course
add another, back toward the Soviets, for example on the occasion
of a visit from Khrushchev. This would be only temporary comfort,
since they would have to expect him to keep on oscillating.
10. The Soviets learned nearly a year ago that they could
not control Castro, when he vetoed their offer of on-site verifica-
tion of the removal of the missiles. It must be even more
troublesome now, after their ccnspicmous courtship throughout
his visit, for him to demonstrate that he is freer to flout their
interests than they are to curb him by withholding aid. Cuba can
remain the only country in the Western Hemisphere not to sign the
test-ban treaty; Castro can with impunity denigrate the Communist
parties of Latin America and exclude the old-line Cuban Communists
from any dominant role in the government or even in his new party.
On their side the Soviets find their principal sanction against
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hlm~ economic aid, being forced into a gradually narrower range
of maneuver, with upper limits imposed by growing competition
for their resources and lower limits imposed by the necessity to
keep Cuba afloat. In the fundamental conflict with the Chinese,
in which Cuba has been a central issue, dependence upon Soviet
economic aid has been strong enough to prevent Castro from join..
ing the Chinese outright, but not strong enough to keep him from
expressing a kind of coy neutralism, laced with arrogant offers
to mediate, which must please the Chinese and infuriate the
Soviets. So far the USSR has been able to use its economic
sanction only to the extent of convincing Castro that he must
revert to an economy based upon maximum production of sugar
rather than the rapid industrialization to which he had been
committed. In sum, for the present, the world political situa-
tion and the Soviet and Cuban economic situations all restrict
the Soviets' freedom of maneuver toward Castro while increasing
his toward them.
U. Meanwhile the USSR must hang on and try to make Cuba
viable, as an example to other small nations and as a project to
which their prestige is committed in the face of both the US and
Communist China. For all their troubles with him, Castro's regime
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represents the best victory for the Communist camp in the last
several years, and is of special importance as a foothold in this
part of the world, where they believe long-term political and
economic trends seem almost certain to produce conditions con-
ducive to expansion of communist influence. Against these
possible advantages stands the necessity of preventing Castro
from undertaking provocations against US interests, triggering
counteractions which would force the USSR into precisely the
situation it is eager to avoid. We doubt that it has yet hit
upon a formula for achieving this objective.
12. The USSR is continuing with preparations to turn over
a surface-to-air (SAM) defense system to the Cubans. The decision
to do this was reached some months ago, probably no later than
May. It appears likely that what has been agreed to is complete
transfer of operation and control from the Soviets to the Cubans.
If this is the case, the Soviets have probably warned Castro that
he should not count on them to back up militarily any ill-considered
use he might make of the system; they are aware of his militant
attitude toward US high-altitude reconnaissance flights over
Cuba. They might, under these circumstances, let the US Government
know in advance that, with the turnover of the SAM system to Cuba,
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the USSR's restrainIng influence on its use will end. They would
hope in this case to create a situation and atmosphere in which
any incidents arising from Cuban control of the air defense system
could be contained. There is also a possibility, however, that
the Soviets will view the risk involved in complete transfer as
being so serious that they will maintain some measure of control
indefinitely despite the new difficulties this would probably
cause in their relationship with Castro.
13. In general, we feel that the Soviets will probably pursue
a cautious line for some time to come with respect to Cuba and
Latin America. They will not be enthusiastic about dealing with
Fidel; if party regulars in Cuba had a clear opportunity to replace
him and a good chance to hold onto power after they did, we believe
Moscow would give the signal in an instant. Lacking this alternative,
we think the Soviets are prepared to accept uncertainty and face
some risks to help maintain Castro in power. We expect that they
will continue to urge him to exercise restraint, however, and that
they will act early to try to contain any crisis while it is still
in the developing stages.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
sHUIMart KENT
Chairman
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Memorandum
The AD/NE
SUBJECT: Attached Memorandum re Soviet Cuban Relationship
The attached memorandum was undertaken initially at the
request of SAS/DDP (Desmond Fitzgerald's group). It is in
part a relook at the main estimative judgments of the last
NIE on Cuba (NIE 85-63, "Situation and Prospects in Cuba,"
dated 14 June 1963.) It also assesses certain developments
C4A 44.,
l~1L ~
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MEMORANDIUM FOR: Sherman Kent ,O Al C-
DCI approves distribution to USIB for
info and the White House, too.
9 Oct 63
(DATE)
FORM NO. to I RIEPLACES FORM 10. 101
1 AUG 54 WIiICH MAY BE USED.
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