YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIET BLOC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001000010014-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: July 18, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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OT' 'ICE OF RMONi L ESTIMA 'ES
18 July 1;63
SUBJECT: Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc
Yugoslavia is presently in a phase of economic progress and
political stability. Moves recently tahen to establish Rankovic
as heir-apparent make a succession struggle less likely and
point to continuity in Yugoslav policy. This is likely to apply
also to the rapprochement with the USSR. The latter has come about
in part because Tito believes that significant changes in Soviet
attitudes are taking place under Ifhrushchev's leadership, and, to
a lesser extent, because Yugoslav concern over potentially troubled
economic relations with the West makes broadened economic exchanges
with Eastern Europe desirable.' Tito remains determined to preserve
Yugoslav independence, however, and ICirushchev appears to have
accepted this.
Internal Situation
1. The Yugoslav regime is making real progress towards over-
coming its main economic and political problems, and towards stabilizing
GROUP 1
,cluc1.ed from automatic
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the present administrative system. Having suffered a recession
in 1961-1962, the econmyis once again on the upsurge. For
example, in the first five months of 1963, industrial production
was up 14 percent over the same period in 19622, and there has been
a continued rise in exports. Some problems remain, notably in
foreign trade and agriculture, but this year's crop prospects are
good and the general outlook for the economy is favorable.
2. The principal features of Yugoslavia's distinctive
internal system have recently been reaffirmed and codified in the
new constitution, adopted in April. At the same time, provision
has been made for regular infusion of new blood into top govern-
mental offices,, and for more orderly transition of the top leader-
ship after Tito's departure. The elevation of Rankovic to the
newly created post of Vice President appears to put him in line
for the formal succession and to make a struggle for the leadership
less likely. Rankovic now is second to Tito in both party and
government, and his erstwhile competitor, Kardelj, has slipped,
after a prolonged period of political eclipse; many of the govern-
mental functions he previously exercised vill now be handled by
Rankovic. Thus Tito has been able to do what Ihrushchev has not --
to establish a clear heir-apparent.
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Relations with the Bloc
3. Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union and with several
of the Satellites have improved considerably over the past year or
so, especially since Tito's visit to the USSR last December. With
respect to his visit, Tito subsequently said that he had found the
Soviet leaders prepared to take a more constructive attitude to re-
lations with Yugoslavia, in which the stress would be placed on
areas of agreement, rather than drawing attention to differences,
as had often been the case in the past. In this most recent period
of rapprochement, party contacts have been established with almost
all the Satellites and mutual exchanges have increased.
The Iugoslavs have indicated an intention to st
up Icon n c cooperation with these countries in the future, and
even to plan joint projects with some of them. Economic chief
Todorovic noted recently that the prospects were particularly
favorable for trade with Eastern Europe, compared with the West,
because of the better market there for Yugoslav industrial products.
I. In foreign policy, Yugoslav leaders who previously
stressed Belgrade's independence of all "blocs," now also stress
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the importance of Yugoslavia's role as part of the "international
revolutionary workers' movement." Similarly, in respect to policy
toward the underdeveloped areas, the Yugoslavs, who once emphasized
the separateness of the non-aligned countries, now stress the
community of interest of these states with the Bloc in working
toward broadly defined international goals, such as "peaceful
coexistence." Yugoslav pronouncements on internal developments in
the underdeveloped countries have also become more doctrinaire,
expressing support for "progressive" elements and opposition to
Western "neo-colonialist" influences -- in general a view similar
to that of the Soviet leaders.
5. The basis for the closer alignment with the "socialist"
countries is in the first place a favorable assessment by the
Yugoslav leaders of the shape of developments in the USSR and the
Communist world. As Tito put it in May:
"We welcomed he decisions of the Twentieth and
Twenty-second Congresses of the CPSTJ~ not only be-
cause of the condemnation of Stalin's mistakes, but
also because a new process was initiated in the
development of economic and social relationships in
the Soviet Union, directed towards a more comprehensive
and speedier development in all spheres of economic
and social life. . ."
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in other words, Tito considered that Khrushchev and his associates
were altering the interna system in the USSR in the direction
favored by the Yugoslavs. More broadly than this, however, the
Yugoslavs also felt that the development under Khrushchev of a
new system of relationships in the Bloc and the Communist movement --
which made allowance for independent behavior of certain parties --
made feasible a closer alignment of the Yugoslav party with the Bloc.
Tito believes that Moscow genuinely accepts his independence and will
not attempt to subject Yugoslavia to Bloc discipline. Thus far he
has been proved right, but he has also been careful to avoid steps
which would give the Soviets an opportunity to make such an attempt.
6. An equally important reason for the rapprochement is
Tito's conclusion that the current struggle in the international
Communist movement is of vital importance for Yugoslavia. Long
in complete sympathy with Kbxushchev's positions in this struggle,
Tito openly tied Yugoslavia's position in the movement to the
fortunes of Khrushchev at the party plenum in May, when he supported
Khrushchev and the "progressives" in the Communist movement against
the Chinese and, the "dogmatists." He also went to some length to
impress Yugoslav party members with the seriousness of the intra-
Bloc dispute, and with the importance of unified support for
Khrushchev in this struggle.
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7. Indeed,, Yugoslavia and its doctrines have become one of
the central issues in th,. Sino-Soviet struggle. The Chinese have
made it a major issue of principle whether Yugoslavia should be
termed a "socialist" country, as the Soviets desire, and whether
the Yugoslav party should be considered a Marxist-Leninist party.
If the Chinese view were to prevail, Yugoslavia would be considered
a capitalist country and the Yugoslav party a renegade "revisionist"
party outside the Communist polo, I{hrushchev's recently reaffirmed
plans to visit Yugoslavia shortly is an earnest of his intention not
to make concessions to the Chinese on this aspect of the quarrel.
The Outlook
8. Will Yugoslavia rejoin the Soviet Bloc? Certainly the
present leadership in Belgrade is determined not to pass once again
under the discipline and control of Moscow. Perhaps just as
important, IChrushchev apparently takes account of this determination
and is not working toward this end. Instead, he wants Tito to
support him in intra-Communist disputes and wishes to use Yugoslavia's
associations with the non-aligned states to further Soviet aims in
these areas. Further, he wants Yugoslavia to illustrate the proposi-
tion that a nation can become a member of the "socialist world" and
can voluntarily enter into an intimate association with the USSR
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without becoming a Soviet puppet. For there appears to be a growing
realization in Moscow that if the socialist camp is to expand it
will have to be on a looser basis than formerly envisaged, vr:_th con-
siderable allowance made for local variation.
9. Since these Soviet ambitions comport fairly well with
Tito's objectives, we expect Yugoslav cooperation with the USSR
and Eastern Europe to continue and to grow. The Soviets almost
certainly will not propose, nor Yugoslavia accept, membership in
the Warsaw Pact. But in other ways, and so long as it does not
prise their independence, the Yugoslavs can be expected to
promote a closer relationship with other Communist parties and
states. In the present context this means greater stress on economic
and other forms of collaboration -- e.g., more long-range economic
planning in concert with friendly "socialist" countries, and even
plans for specialization along certain lines. The Yugoslavs would
like to have a closer relationship with CEMA, perhaps through
participation in some of its subcommittees, though they do not want
to be full members.
10. Concern over potentially troubled economic relations
with the West has also had the effect of moving Yugoslavia into a
closer association with the Bloc. The Yugoslav leaders have not
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been optimistic as to the likely consequences for Yugoslav trade
of Common Market devel,(yZ)ments and the chances of retaining MFN
status in their trade with the US. Slackening trade with the West
would almost certainly lead to increased trade with the Bloc.
11. We anticipate more and closer Yugoslav cooperation with
the Communist countries in relations with the underdeveloped world.
This v rill not be at the expense of 'Agog. 1a%rIa' a already extensive
relations with the underdeveloped countries -- in fact the HLoc
states probably hope to take advantage of Yugoslav influence in
these areas. We believe the Yugoslavs (and their Bloc friends)
will work to promote the "economic independence" of these countries,
and to obstruct Western economic influence. The Yugoslavs admit
that they have long-range economic, as well as political, motives
in this, for they hope eventually to establish sound markets in the
underdeveloped countries for the products of Yugoslav industry.
12. Soviet-Yugoslav trust is of course not whole-hearted, and
the friendship may be subject to upsets of various kinds in the
future. The Soviets have a penchant to be demanding at critical
times, for example, and occasions may well arise again in which they
attempt to coerce the Yugoslavs or use pressure tactlessly. Again, the
USSR might come to feel that its endorsement of Yugoslavia as
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"socialist" was encouraging nationalist-minded Communists in
Eastern Europe, as in fact happened in 1955-1956, and harden its
attitude to nullify this effect. In Moscow, few Soviet leaders
seem to be as enthusiastic as their chief about the value of Tito's
friendship, and the rapprochement therefore depends to some extent
upon Khrushchev's Political fortunes and life span. On the Yugoslav
side, Tito's calculations rest heavily upon his appraisal of
Khrushchev as a progressive who needs his help against a Stalinist
faction in the Kremlin, and should the Soviet leader die first,
Tito would be chary of continuing the same relations with his successor.
13. The present rapprochement is in very great part the
personal work of Tito. His passing (his age is 71) will therefore
bring a new uncertainty into Soviet-Yugoslav relations. It is
possible, though unlikely, that a new set of party leaders would
wish to draw so close to the USSR as to jeopardize national integrity.
This would come about, we believe, only if some faction among Tito's
heirs believed that the regime's position was gravely threatened
and could only be preserved by drastic measures, including vigorous
measures of repression and centralization. We think that Tito's
death, while it may weaken the regime's internal authority for a
time, is not likely to have internal repercussions so critical as
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r
to drive his heirs to this extreme. We therefore expect that
Tito's successors will continue to attach first priority to the
maintenance of 'n independence which has brought Yugoslavia post-
war successes far exceeding those of her Balkan neighbors.
FOR THE BOARD or NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
July 1963
TO: DCI
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
7E12
Headquarters
REMARKS:
This was prepared in response to a
request by the Director. A representa-
tive from OCI participated in the
discussion of this paper.
V
CONCUR: - , __:
Deputy D46-tor/Intelligence
FROM: AD NE
ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION
7E48 (Headquarters
FORM RM 55 24 I REPLACES FORM 36-8 GPO: 1957-0-439445 (47) FEB
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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