CUBA AS A MILITARY THREAT TO THE US AND TO OTHER AMERICAN STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000800020070-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: January 5, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T RAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
5 January 1962
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Cuba as a Military Threat to the US and to Other
American States
1. We believe it out of the question that the Soviets
would give the Cub nn regime the powr-r to t?trPat en the US on
its own initiative. To do so would run counter to the whole tenor
of Soviet policy. The Soviets might calculate that the
advan;;ages to be gained from setting up missile bases with nuclear
weapons capable of striking targets in the interior of the US
were worth the risks involved, but, on balance, we think that they
will be moved by the dangers involved in committing military
strength so far from their base of power and by the various politica]
disadvantages of such an action. There are certain other uses
which the Soviets will probably make of Cuba, however, which will
constitute a threat to the US and to other American states, such
as the establishment of submarine and air facilities and of bases for
subversive and paramilitary activity throughout Latin America.
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The Buildup of Soviet Arras to Cuba
2. Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba d -wing 1960 and 1961 have
consisted of weapons suited to defense and internal security needs
rather than to the development of an offensive, capability. (See
Annex.)Items supplied have included fighter aircraft, axmored
vehicles, artillery, small arms, and trucks and jeeps. No missiles,
bombers, surface warships, submarines,, or other weapons prizlaxily
suited to an offensive role have been Lncludod. It is noteworthy
that Cuba's airlift and sea transport capability have not been
significantly increased.. The 12 IL-14 transp~ 'ts which heave
been delivered are being integrated into the Cubana airlines and
do not appear to have been procured primarily for military use.
The fact that Cubana has been selling Viscounts and some of its
other Western aircraft seems to indicate that the Soviet transports
are replacements and not intended as a net addition to Cuba's air-
lift capacity. Furthermore, there is no evidence that missile, air,
or submarine bases are being constructed in Cuba for offensive warfarE
3. We believe the evidence of observed and estimated Soviet
arms deliveries to Cuba does not indicate that Cuba is now being
built up as a Soviet base or staging area, or that the Cubans are
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being equipped for offensive warfare against other Latin American
states. Quantities of arms supplied are not so great as to in-
dicate plans for large transfers outside of Cuba, although they
are sufficient to enable the Cubans to provide small arms -- either
from new stocks or from the American wrzs which they have replaced
to any dissident Latin American group to which they can transport
them. The fact that the military potentialities of Cuba have not
yet been developed by the Soviets does not mean, however, that
they may not be in the future.
Cuba as a BGzo for Soviet- rontralled 1u,c1 Wca olis
4. We believe that the Soviets will decide against Gig
the Cubans the capability for throateninng the US, but we are less
certain that they will decide tin.st establishing missile bases
under their own control. They will probably conclude that the US
could detect preparations for the establishment of missile bases
before the missiles became operational and in time to take preventiv_'
action. We do not believe that they will be able to conclude with
certainty whether the US will-take such action. They will probably
decide that there is a considerable risk that the tUS would :intervene
and could do so successfully. They will not wish to run any
considerable risk of nuclear war over Cuba, but they may consider
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that they will be in a position to make the decision as to whether
US intervention in Cuba will lead to general war. They also might
conclude that the losses they would sustain as a consequence of US
intervention in Cuba could be cut by heaping opprobrium upon the
US as an aggressor. They might,, therefore, decide to accept the
risk of such losses if they believed there were substantial advantage::
to be gained from establishing nuclear weapons bases in Cuba.
5. The Soviets might calculate that they would gain the
following political advantages from the establishment of missile
bases is Cuba: (a) added prestige for the Castro regime; (b) an
impressive display of Communist might for the Latin American
audience; (c) tangible evidence of the Soviet presence in the
Caribbean; (d) intimidation of the US; and (e) a pawn which might
be used to bargain for the withdrawal of American bases in states
on the Soviet and Chinese borders.
6. On the other hand there would be important disadvantages
to be evaluated by the Soviets before making a decision to establish
missile bases in Cuba: (a) the dangers involved in committing
advanced weapons in so vulnerable a location; (b) the likelihood
that missile bases in Cuba would not significantly supplement the
overall Soviet military strategy vis-a-vis the US; (c) the
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difficulty of sustaining Soviet claims that its interest in Latin
America is not aggressive but stimulated only by its interest in
supporting spontaneous popular reform and revolution; (d) the
weakening of Soviet arguments against America's foreign bases;
and (e) a considerable exacerbation of Soviet American relation.
d-nier Threats From Cuba
7. On balance, we believe it likely that the Soviets will
decide that the disadvantages of locating long-range missiles with
nuclear warheads in Cuba, even under their control, are great enough
as to make assumption of the risk of preventive action by the US
unwise. The Soviets will, however, probably decide that they could
establish facilities for refueling and supplying submarines without
undue danger. They would hope that such facilities would enable
them to extend the time on station in western Atlantic and Caribbean
waters of their missile-firing subriarine fleet. In addition, with
little recognizable preparatory activity, Cuban airfields could be
made ready for emergency landings by Soviet bothers in the event
of general war between the US and the USSR. There is no evidence
at present that submarine or air bases are being prepared for these
purposes. Cuban territory could be used in peacetime as a base for
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radar or CQr1:1U11ications intelligence operations against the US;
there is some evidence that Soviet ships operating from Cuban ports
have engaged in such activities.
8. The Soviets are likely to continue to prize Cuba as a
symbol of a spontaneous and successful. popular revolution in Latin
America to which they are giving disinterested support and to seek
to exploit its appeal to reformist and revolutionary groups through-
out the area. They will support its regime's progaganda and sub-
versive activities to the utmost and will encourage it to make Cuba
a base for the training of Communist leaders and of agents of sub-
version and clandestine activity. They will encourage the regime
and make use of its territory as a depot for the supply of leftist
and Communist revolutionary groups throughout Latin America as
opportunities present thensleves. They will not wish to supply
Cuba with offensive arms and means of transport which will enable
the regime to engage prematurely in dangerous filibustering ex-
peditions. If and when opportunities arise for intervention in
other Latin American countries with a prospect of giving aid to
other revolutionary groups, they will consider each case on its
merits and suit their support to the occasion.
*r5Q& -IM"
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9. With the arms now in their possession the Cuban armed
forces could strike a heavy blow at the US base at Guantanarzo.
We believe such an attack unlikely, however, because the Cubans
are aware that the US could quickly bring overwholring force to
bear. Mere have been many indications that the Cuban regime be-
lieves the US is eager to find an excuse for turning its military
forces against it and they probably believe that the US would re-
,hard an attack on the Guantanamo base as ample justification for
an attack and that the US would, be unlikely t67confine its action
to the Guantanmao area alone.
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