CUBA AS A MILITARY THREAT TO THE US AND TO OTHER AMERICAN STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000800020069-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: January 5, 1962
• Content Type: MISC

C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ES TIMATE`S
5 January 1962
Prc~poseci Amendments
SUBJECT: Cuba as a Military Threat to the US and to Other
American States
Para, 1, lines 8-9 make the "but" clause read:,,,,
but, on balance, we think that they
would be deterred by the risk of
provoking a decisive US preventive
action before such bases could be-
come operational, and by the various
political....
Para. LL, second sentence delete, ttThey will probably conclude
that the US could detect.,,," to read
"They would almost certainly expect
the US to detect,,..."
Para, 4, delete all after second sentence,
substitute following:
"They would not be certain that the US would take such action, but
they would almost certainly conclude that there would be a sub-
stantial risk that, in such a case, the US would employ whatever
means were necessary to overthrow the Castro regime and prevent
the completion of the missile bases. They would probably consider
raoM}MENTrao vlthat, in such a~case, they could prevent the situation from leading
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to nuclear war between themselves and the US, but that it would
be highly doubtful whether they could save the Castro regime,
Although they might salvage some propaganda value from Castro's
overthrow, by heaping opprobrium upon the US as an imperialist
aggressor,. it would hardly compensate for the psychological and
practical effects of their loss of Ouba.
Para, 5, substitute the following?
Even so, in the absence of certainty regarding the US
reaction and its effectiveness, the USSR might be willing to
incur these risks, if it judged that the advantages to be gained
from the establishment of operational offensive missile bases in
Cuba were sufficiently substantial to warrant the risks. The
advantages to be gained would be primarily political. Such
missile bases would not add materially to Soviet attack capa-
bilities against the US in the event of general war. Once
operational, however, they would be a powerful deterrent against
US intervention in Cuba, They would also establish an impressive
Soviet presence in the Americas and afford a degree of protection
and encouragement to radical revolutionary elements in Latin
America., (They would not provide an effective bargaining counter
for the withdrawal of US bases from the Sino-Soviet periphery) for,
once established, they could hardly be withdrawn without adverse
political repercussions,
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Para. 6, Substitute the following:
6. Against these political advantages, the USSR would have
to weigh certain political disadvantages, such as: (a) the
character of the Castro regime as an indigenous revolutionary
movement would be further compromised - Cuba would acquire the
appearance of a Soviet colony and military outpost; (b) while
some Latin American governments might be prompted to take cover
in a protective neutralism, the general reaction to this extra-
continental intrusion would probably be adverse to the further
extension of Castroism by revolutionary means; (c) any propaganda
advantage which the USSR now derives from the subject of US overseas
bases would be compromised; (d) the USSR would be definitely
committed to the defense of Cuba, far from the bases of its power
-- a commitment which it has studiously avoided hiterto; (e) the
prospects for a political negotiation with the US, which the
USSR has sought to cultivate, would be compromised, and a crisis
in US-Soviet relations would almost certainly ensue,
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