PROBABLE REACTIONS TO A US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000800020022-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 10, 1962
• Content Type: MF

TR# 342507
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMA Fit
I)Q^.:iJ MENT
+Jci C'??(Ai (E !N Ci..ASS. ^
L_I DECLASS
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CLASS. CHANC,r`_J) T0: T
NEXT IIEViEW DATE:
Ali i H: HR 70-2
DATE: REVIEWER
MEMORANDUM FOR TEE DIRECTOR it 4 JUN 1a80
C 1O April 1962
SUBJECT: Probable Reactions to a US Military Intervention in
Cuba
1. For the purposes of this estimate., we assume that:
a. The US military intervention in Cuba would be made
in sufficient force to overcome, within a few days., the frontal
resistance of the Cuban armed forces and to consolidate US con-
trol of the principal governmental centers and the primary means
of transportation and cora>~aunications.
b. The US would declare its intention to turn over the
control of Cuba., as soon as possible., to a Cuban Government re-
sponsible to the Cuban people., committed to social reform., and
dedicated to the preservation of Cuban national independence
within the inter-American community of nations.
Reactions Within Cuba
2. The Castro rein has made extensive preparations to
resist a US military intervention. It apparently plans for both
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a strong initial defense against invasion and'protracted
warfare in the interior. A portion of the armed
forces would be destroyed in the initial battle. Many of the re-
mainder would probably surrender or desert when they realized the
strength of the invasion and the hopelessness of further resistance.
Substantial nunbers,, however., would continue a guerrilla resistance
in the interior,., according to plan. Their operations would be
facilitated by caches of arras and supplies already established in
relatively inaccessible areas,
3. Some Cubans would welcome the US military intervention
as a liberation. At least as many more would regard it as de-
signed to reimpose upon the Cuban people the yoke of "Yankee
imperialism" and would accordingly be disposed to resist insofar
as they were able. The great majority would be primarily con-
cerned to keep out of harm's way and to avoid exposing themselves
to retribution by either side in the continuing conflict.
4. The establishment of a representative and accepted
Cuban government would be greatly hindered by the persistence of
terroristic underground resistance in the cities? and by continu-
ing guerrilla resistance in outlying areas. Out of fear as well
sympathy, moat Cubans would probably be disposed to cooperate at
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least passively with the resistance, unless convincingly assured
of effective US protection. Although the overthrow of the present
regime might be quickly accomplished, the pacification of the
country, to the extent necessary to permit the development of a
credibly representative alternative regime, might be long delayed,
5. In these circumstances, a prolonged US military occupation
of Cuba would probably be necessary. Resistance elements would
deliberately seek to provoke the occupying forces to take such
arbitrary measures against the general population as would tend
to confirm Cuban suspicions that the US intervention was anti-
Cuban rather than anti-Castro, to the further detriment of the
prospects for a satisfactory political solution.
6. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Cuban people would desire
the restoration of peace, order, and national self-government,
and the relief of economic distress. If the US was able eventually
to establish reasonable security in most of the country, the in-
habitants of the pacified areas would probably cooperate in the
establishment of a new and more representative Cuban government,
in part as the only effective means of obtaining the withdrawal
of US military government. In this phase, however, the estab-
lishment of such a government would be hindered by the personal
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factionalism characteristics of Cuban leaders and the desire of
all with political ambition to demonstrate their determination
to protect Cuban national sovereignty against Yankee doi:iination.
The International Reaction
7? The USSR would have no means to intervene effectively in
Cuba with its own forces, and almost certainly would not resort to
general war for the sake of the Castro regime. However, the USSR
would exert every means of political and psychological pressure at
its disposal to procure a universal condemnation of US aggression
against Cuba and, if possible, a restoration of the status uco ante.
To this end, it might make threatening references to Soviet missile
power. Communist China and the other Bloc states would support
these Soviet efforts. In the circumstances, there would probably
be a first-class war scare, with panic among the neutralists and
a high state of alarm in NATO.
8. Latin ./aeriean political opinion generally would be
shocked by a US military intervention in Cuba, regardless of
sympathy or antagonism toward the Castro regime. Most Latin
American governments would be glad to see Castro effectively dis-
posed of, but would be constrained by domestic opinion to deplore
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Publicly the US action. If ~~f``o3' d to vote in the UN., virtually
all would probably feel compelled to vote against the US. However,
they might seek to forestall that embarrassment by proposing an
OAS political intervention designed to get the US out of Cuba as
quickly as possible, and at the same time to provide for the
establishment of a democratic government in that country.
9. NATO governments would deplore the US action, Rembrabering
Suez and other occasions, they would feel justified in voting to
condemn the US. At the same time, however, they would work to
find a political solution of the crisis, in order to reduce the
risk of general war.
10. The Afro-Asian neutralist states would condemn the US
military intervention in Cuba, and would therefore be disposed
to support Soviet initiatives against the US in the UN, where
their numbers count. At the same time, however, apprehension of
the danger of general war might influence the more responsible
neutralist governments to work for a political solution of the
crisis.
SHNRMAN KENT
Chairman
25X1
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