IMPLICATIONS OF THE REFUGEE BOOM ON THE HONG KONG BORDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000800020005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 22, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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~UNFIDENT~AL
CENTRAL SNT'E T,LSGEN!'
4FF:CCE OF N1~`~SON~,L E,~TZI~";3.`ES ~' G E N C Y
22 May 1962
MEMORANDUrg FOR ~~ DIRECTOR
s~`~~' % Iuplications of the Reftx~ee I3ooti on the ~ion~; Kong Border
I. TfIE SZT(TATIOIV
~ p
1. Durin the ast few weeks the nunber of refu ees ille
~~-7.Y
entering Honk Kong frog Coiuiunist China by land has increased
dramatically. Until recentlyr the fion~ Kor.~ authorities were appre-
hending only a handful of such illegal iz~iprants per month. In
e~'~' May this nuuber rose to around 200 per dtiy. It has continued
to rise rapidly, reaching 1,51+3 in the 21+ hours endin8 at 8 AM l~+ May
and has continued at around 1+,OG~9a day since that tine.
2+ Most of those apprehended have been fed (sore clothed and
liven medicine) then sent back a.eross the border via the railway
bridGe at Lowe. Thus far, Host refuGees have not resisted arrest,
al~ou~h there have been so~;e instances of v3,olence. Virtually none
ncctsE4cr~rT NO.
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Exc~.uded from autozlatic
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of the escapees carried exit ~
permits or other docuuents, but
Cor~iunist border wards have been very cooperative in receivita
them back into China. According to some reports, however, the
returned refugees have renained near the border -- ttilling
about in thousands -- awaiting another opportunity of slippin6
across the border.
3? The generally chaotic condition a1on~ the border pokes
the ~atherin~ of precise inforuation difficult. The fi'on~ Kong
police, already trying to riana~e a popu],ation with rsore than a
pillion refu~,ees, is ouch rsore interested in ~ettinQ the escapees
off their hands and buck across the border than in colleetin~
intelligence. Thus iriterro~at~.on has been very spotty and inad-
equate. Also the authorities Ziave kept foreign observers and
the press away frog the border zone.
4. Such evidence as has becoue available indicates that
the refugees are mostly peasants (sorle with their farlilies } frori
Kwan~tun~ province. So~:e are students and workers who were
CONFI~~~~ ~.i~L
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L ~ Q =~.
~ ~~~
S-E-C-R-E ~~' 1C
recently expelled frari the cities to rural areas, The Bong Kong
authorities hove unequivocally denied sensational rur;ors and
press stories that xiea_ibers of security forces were found among
the refugees. A large proportion of the border Grassers are
between 15 and 30 years of age. Although they are uniforri],y
lean and nearly all claim hunger as their principal votive far
fleeing, satsple medical checks have indicated that they are
generally not in bad health. They are hungry but not starved.
5~ It appears that Chinese Car~unist afficials and
frontier guards have relaxed their controls along the bander.
6. Troops of the regular ari_~y began to replace sorsa units
of People's Arrzed Police along the border on 1 May after a rela-
tively heavy surge of illegal crossings. The reason for this
action is not known; thus far tt~e behavior of the troops toward
ECRE-T
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r~AL
the refugees has not appeared to differ frors that previous
exhibited by the police. The ~
total strength of Cor~unist
security forces now in the border area is not known,
II. ~ICATTONS FOR IN~,Nl~L SECUI-tzTy IN COMM[>rIIST CIiIHA
~? There ~'~ at least tl2ree possible explanations for
the recexzt sure of refugees s,e~oss the Hon
~ Kong border: (l~
a general breakdown of the: Chinese Cor-u:~unist internal security
systez~; (2) a localized breakdown of the systez~; and (~) a
deliberate policy of pertlittin~ the refugees to escape, Fxesent
evidence is scanty and insufficient to prove conclusively the
correetn~;ss of air of these alternative explanations. However,
it ib worth exaz~inin~ the factors which strengthen cx weaken
the plausibility of each interpretation.
8? ~ t~ situation outlined above is indicative of a
eral breakdown i.xi the disci ~en-
pline and effectiveness of Chinese
Cor.~zunist security forces, we would expect to find sozze evidence
of such a breakdown elsewhere in China.. White there has been
deterioration of morale and effectiveness in local administration
and even in the security forces s
' there is no persuasive evidence
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of a general breakdown in the internal security systems. ~
estirlate to this effect was made in SN2E 13-3_62 and NIE 13-~+-62
and the Iion~ Kong Country Tears expressed essentially the sane
conclusion as recently as 12 Mayes.
~? Fl better case can be glade for the second interpretation
a localized breakdown in the security apparatus. The events on
the HonU Kong border certainly raise serious questions about the
effectiveness of the security system in that locality. however,
two thir.~s should be considered before the "breakdown" hypothesis
is accepted even on a local basis, First, aPPaxentSy no r~enbers
of the security forces have joined the escapees. If there were
a serious pxoble~ of discipline in the security apparatus, we
would expect at least a few of the border ~uaxds to loin in the
flight across the border. Secor~l.ay, the border wards have
uniforri].y abstained frot_1 the use of force to restrain the f food,
and no incidents are known to have occured, zn the .case o# a
breakdown soz~e border garde, in the absence of orders to the
contrary, would alriast certainly have shat persons atter~ptin~
to escape,
10. Such evidence as we have tends to support the third
explanation; that the sudden exodus has been t~,de possible,
jAL
~.~.~
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~DENTIA(
perhaps even encouraged by official Chinese Covnunist policy.
The apparently unif ox~l and sii-lultaneous switch all along the
border to leniency toward the escapees can best be explained
by this thesis. Besides the synpatby or indifference shown by
frontier wards and local officials, there are unconfirmed re-
ports of an official policy encouraging 'the ttass exodus. Re-
ports concerning oz~ public secuxity station. in Canton indicate
that in Apxil officers were told to process as riany exit pex-
nits as passible far persons desiring to emigrate to Iiang Kong
and Macao. Othex reports describe in detail various schemes
worked out by public security cadres to facilitate illegal entry
into the two colonies,
11. If a policy of perrlitting escape has indeed been adopted,
it probably derives froze riar{y considerations. Tn the present
critical period before the new harvest, the Chinese authorities
nay have decided that to halt the outflow of xefugees violently
would have worse effects than allowiW~ same to Hove across into
Hong Kong. They xaight have reasoned that if Hong Kong authorities
continued strictly to xeturn the illegal border -erassers, it
would be unnecessary to carry out the unsavory task of shooting
down uaaxried xefu~;ees. Tn this way the Chinese ~-lY and police
~O~N.F~,D-~~~~~.A~
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~~F~~~ Ti
could avoid anta~on3,zin~ the population and the onus of en-
25X6
forcing; border security with the inevitab]~ incidence of
violence would be on the I3ritish.l
12. Whatever riay be the explanation for the recent flood
of refugees, it must be politically eubarrasein6 to the Chinese
Corsx~unist regime and constitutes further testir.~ony to the de-
teriorat3,n~ situation in China. Public morale and discipline
have probably declined to the lowest point since the Cararaunists
took over the mainland i~ 1~~+9. Howevex, we believe that the
public security systen reuains essentially intact and effective
throu~haut the country. Present indications are that the re6ine
will continue to be able to isolate and repress any likely in-
ternal challenge to its authority.
F4R TILE DOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES: 25X1
SIiERM11N ICEI3'1.'
Chairrz?~n
CONFIDENTlA~
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