AN APPRAISAL OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000800010003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 21, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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)ON
'FIDENNI
21 December 1961
SUBJECT: An Appraisal of Soviet Intentions
Exe1 cutive T -
Herewith a memo which I hope will be responsive
to the President's interest in your thinking re "Soviet
Intentions". We have given you rather more than the
bare bones of the problem, feeling that "intentions" must
be viewed in the context of Soviet internal politics and
Soviet relations with other parts of the Bloc -- notably
the Chinese. When you have had a chance to read this,
we would like to discuss it with you. Does it fill your
bill? If not where is it wanting? What should be the
next incarnation -- new draft from our Board to you?
Draft memo from you to the President? Other?
Merry Christmas.
25X1
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
25X1
cc: DDCI
DDI
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CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
21 December 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: An Appraisal of Soviet Intent ions
1. In pursuing their struggle against the West,, the
Soviet leaders follow a strategy which they call "peaceful
coexistence." By this they declare their intention to wage
a persistent and aggressive campaign by a variety of means -
propaganda and political pressure,, military threat, economic
and scientific competition, subversion and internal war -- aimed
at the victory of their cause on a world scale. The new aspect
in Khrushchev! s formulation of Soviet foreign policy is the ex-
plicit proposition that general war is an unacceptable means of
prosecuting this struggle. Unlike Stalin, he has founded Soviet
policy on the belief that the ":imperialists" can be forced into
final submission by a steady undermining of their world position
and that., during this process,, Soviet military power will deter
them fret a resort to arms.
CON! !DEN i IA
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2. This is but one of a series of innovations which
Khrushchev has sponsored in the total range of Communist in-
ternal and foreign policies. His revisions of doctrine and
practice have frequently been radical in Communist terms9
and they have not gone unopposed within the Soviet party and
the international movement, The XXII Congress was the scene
of a great effort by Khrushchev.. using the most dramatic means
available to him: to make these policies binding, both at home
and abroad. This effort embraced domestic, Bloc: and foreign
problems., and while the main lines of the peaceful coexistence
strategy have been firmly reasserted, crucial questions have
been raised concerning the Soviet Party's commanding role in
world communism, The cource of political controversy within
the Soviet Party, and more importantly: of the mounting tensions
in Soviet relations with China will obviously have a significant
bearing on the conduct of Soviet relations with the non-
Communist world.
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Internal Problems
3. We believe that Khrushchev has not had to fear for
his position since his victory over the so-called antiparty group
in 1957. Despite this victory, however, and despite the cult
which subsequently developed around his own personality., he has
continr.ally met with difficulties within the party,, and on two
counts. In the first place, in the past year or two other high
level leaders appear to have succeeded in limiting the revisions
which he wished to make in economic priorities (greater benefits
for the consumer) and military policy (downgrading conventional
forces and traditional doctrine). In the second place,, Khrushchev
has found the party apparatus which he inherited a far from
satisfactory instrument for carrying out his numerous roVorms.
The great majority of party officials were trained in the Stalinist
period to execute mechanically orders from above and to regard the
population as recalcitrant and untrustworthy subjects. They have
tended to become bewildered, resentful.. and concerned for their
careers as Khrushchev demands of them that they display initiative,
elicit it from others, and draw the masses into a positive identi-
fication with the regime and active support of its policies.
Oho
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4. The savage attack upon Stalin was meant, in the
domestic context, to break the emotional attachment to Stalints
person and methods which still exists in the Soviet Party. It
was also meant to discredit certain Stalinist dogmas, such as
the proposition that heavy industry must at all times grow faster
than light industry, which had become imbedded in Soviet ideology
and stood in the way of Khrushchevts reforms. The concurrent
blackening of the antiparty group served to dramatize the
penalties of resisting Khrushchevts demands for a new style of
work and to destroy any luster which the unrepentant and still
argumentative Molotov retains as a -conservative'r spokesman
among the middle and lower reaches of the apparatus.
5. The full internal consequences of the Congress will
be a long time in working themselves out, Certainly Khrushchev
has succeeded in putting his stamp upon the present era and es-
tablishing a direct succession to Lenin. The present compromise
formulations of economic and defense policy,, however, indicate
that his programs remain subject to some sort of consensus among
the top leaders, who share his general outlook but cannot be
equated to the terrorized yesmen around Stalin. Remaking the
entire party apparatus in Khrushchev's own image will, we believe,
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continue to be a long and difficult process. And among
critically-minded elements of Soviet society the youth,
the cultural intelligentsia, perhaps even younger party members virtually the whole of Soviet history has been brought into
question, and along with it the activities of present party
leaders during that period. We doubt that the attack on Stalin
and the cult of Khrushchev will strengthen belief in the partyts
claim to wisdom and the right of absolute leadership. These
factors are more likely to work in the long run toward a weaken-
ing of the propositions on which party rule is based, and to
complicate the problems which Khrushchevts successors must face,
II1oc Politics
6. The consequences of the Congress for Bloc relations
are much more immediate and far-reaching. With his surprise
attack upon the proxy target of Albania., Khrushchev made his
third attempt (the Bucharest meeting in June 1960, the Moscow
Conference later in the year) to repulse the Chinese Communist
challenge to Soviet leadership. In doing so, he chose a time of
great Chinese weakness. He also gave his attack the greatest
possible force, short of an explicit challenge, by coupling it
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with the condemnation of Stalinist principles and practices in
the sharpest form. He intended by this to force the Chinese to
choose between submitting and being openly condemned as deviation-
ist. Yet in the ensuing two months Peiping, while withholding
an equally dramatic response, has made clear its determination
to hold to its positions. It appears that a showdown of
historic proportions may be imminent,
7. For Soviet policy, this is but the latest in a long
series of problems arising from the Soviet leaderst inability
to reconcile the contradiction between the force of nationalism
and their own insistence upon Soviet hegemony over world communism.
For the Sino-Soviet conflict is at bottom a clash of national
interests. While each professes devotion to Communist unity,
each seeks to mobilize the entire world Communist movement in
the service of its own aims. The ideological element, far from
providing a basis for reconciliation, imparts a special bitter-
ness and intensity to this rivalry.
8. As the lines are now drawn,, it seems unlikely that the
dispute can be papered over by a compromise along the lines of
last Decemberts 81-party conference. Economic relations have
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been substantially reduced, and military cooperation,, never
very high, is minimal. The entire Communist world has been
made aware of the deep differences between the two, and each
is vigorously using all the weapons of pressure and persuasion
to hold and enlarge its retinue of supporters. At the least,
it appears certain that full harmony cannot be restored. Yet
the question of whether the two powers, poised now on the brink
of an overt break in party relations, take this final step re-
mains an important one, So long as they do not., the way re-
mains open for a return to tolerable cooperation and a surface
appearance of unity, and the strains on other parties can be
kept within manageable proportions, If they do, the resulting
hostility would be more profound and probably longer lasting
than that which divided the Yugoslavs from the Communist camp
after 19)48, and few Communist regimes or parties would escape
its effects,
9. From their present behavior, it appears that both parties
are able to contemplate this possibility. Each still hopes that
the other will in the last analysis make the concessions neces-
sary to avoid a final split, but neither seems prepared to retreat
on the fundamental issue of the locus of authority over world
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communism. At this moment, a trial of strength is occurring
in the Soviet campaign to bring down the Albanian leaders;
success here would deal a major blow to Chinese pretensions
and to any inclinations in other parties to escape Soviet
domination. We believe that the odds are against Moscow in
this campaign, but even if it succeeds., the present Chinese
leadership would almost certainly return to the lists*
10. In appraising Sino-Soviet relations, we have regularly
stressed the great benefits of a close alliance to the national
interests of both partners and., conversely, the great losses
which each would suffer from a true rupture. Yet the record
of the past 18 months shows a consistent refusal., on the part
of the Soviets, to limit their authority in matters of general
Communist policy. Over the same period, the Chinese have per-
sistently proven unwilling to remain content with the role which
the Soviets would assign them in the movement. barring a
radical change in Chinese outlook or leadership, we now believe
that the chances of a full break in party relations between the
two during the next year or so have increased very substantially.
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11. Should such a break occur, the logic of ideological
conflict and the history of Communist parties everywhere make
it likely that the result would be an acrimonious and protracted
struggle. Each side would be impelled to proclaim itself the
repository of doctrinal truth and to call for the overthrow of
the competing leadership. Communists everywhere would be pressed
to declare themselves; purges and splits would probably occur
in many parties; some, especially those in Asia, might eventually
align themselves with the Chinese,
12. In these circumstances, the military alliance between
the USSR and Communist China would in effect become inoperative.
The Chinese probably already consider it of dubious value; they
probably do not feel able any longer to count on full Soviet sup-
port in the event that they become embroiled in military hostili-
ties with the US.
13, The Soviet and Chinese leaders may still find some
way to got past the current tensions. Even if they dos we believe
that the result will be an uneasy and distrustful truce, marled
by cooperation at various times and placed and by competition at
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others, In short,, we believe that the Sino-Soviet relationship
rests upon an unstable foundation$ and that a breach., if it is
avoided for the present, will remain in the foreground as a
continuing possibility.
Foreign Policy
14. A central problem in Sino-Soviet contention has been
policy toward the non-Communist world. This has involved a
great deal of misrepresentation on both sides. Thus Khrushchevts
allegation that the Chinese regard general war as either
inevitable or desirable., while a telling argument insofar as he
can make it convincing., is not true. Similarly., Chinese charges
that Khrushchevis strategy of peaceful coexistence is a denial
of revolutionary aims are a gross exaggeration, although the zeal
with which Molotovts parallel criticisms were attacked at the
Congress suggests that this indictment finds considerable
resonance in the Soviet and other Parties*
15, The peaceful coexistence line, far from being an
abandonment of Soviet expansionist goals., is a tactical pre-
scription considerrt'.cy more effective than the compound of heavy-
handedness and isolationism which was Stalinis foreign policy,
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It is informed by an appreciation of the manifold opportunities
presented by all the great strains and disharmonies of the non-
Communist world .._ national rivalry, colonialism, the desire for
economic development,, the yearning for peace and disarmament,
Peaceful coexistence seeks to capture these sentiments and turn
them against the 11imperiali?strt states,, using all the weapons of
political struggle, economic assistance, and subversion, and
underlining its points with demonstrations of Soviet military,
scientific, and economic prowess,*
16. At the same time. this policy also embraces the pro.,
position that general nuclear war would bring intolerable damage
upon the USSR itself and should therefore be avoided. The
Soviets are continuing to develop their already formidable de-
fense establishment, But the programs presently underway do not
reflect a belief that it is possible to achieve a decisive
advantage over the West., one which would permit them to launch
general war with assurance cf success at some acceptable cost,
Rather, what we know of these programs, and of Soviet strategic
thinking as well, suggests that the Soviet leaders are aiming in
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the first instance at a capability large enough to deter a
Western resort to general war.
17. The Soviets apparently believe that they have alrea4r
in large measure achieved this end. But they recognize that
the forward Policies which they wish to pursue involve some
element of risk, and that they may not always be able to control
these risks. In building their forces, they are probably seeking
an offensive nuclear capability large enough, not only to deter
their opponent, but also to bring under attack those elements
of Western striking power and national strength which can be
effectively attacked by ICBMs and other long-range delivery
systems. On the defensive side? in addition to improving their
defenses against manned bombers and cruise-type missiles, they
are exerting major efforts to develop and deploy an effective anti-
ballistic missile system. At the same time, they also intend to
retain large and modernized ground and naval forces. In all
these programs, the Soviets will be seeking a combination of
farces which would permit them to undertake a pro-en ;tivc Eck
on the US, should they colaclude that t us ttack was irn_
minent, and to prosa4,Ut + C neral, war effectively if deterrence
should fail.
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18. The Soviet leaders are alert to search out areas
where their military power can be brought into play to shield
Communist efforts to advance by safer means, such as internal
war in Southeast Asia or political blackmail in Berlin. We
believe, however., that the USSR will wish to avoid involvement
of its own forces in limited combat on the Dloc periphery and.,
if such conflict should occur, to minimize the chances of es-
calation to general ware Consequently, it would not in most
circumstances take the initiative to expand the scope of such
a conflict. The degree of Soviet commitment and the actual
circumstances of the conflict would of course determine this
decision. But we believe that,, in general? the Soviet leaders
would expand the scope of the conflict, even at greater risk of
escalating to general war, only if a prospective defeat would,
in their view, have grave political repercussions within the
Bloc itself or constitute a major sotback to the Soviet world
position.
19. Within the limits set by these appraisals,, the Soviet
leaders have purposefully displayed both militancy and concilia-
tion, at various times and in various pr oportions as seemed most
profitable to them. Over the past year or so, however, the
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pressure of the Chinese challenge has been one factor helping
to keep the "hard" line in the foregroundb The thrust of the
XXII Congress in this respect was to reassert the USSRes in-
sistence upon full tactical flexibility. Thus the USSR has
not only continued its attacks on Chinese positions but has
made some conciliatory moves, such as removal of the Berlin
deadlines agreement on a disarmament forum, and publication of
Adzhubeyts interview with the President.
20. These measures have accompanied, not replaced, the
harsher tactics which comprise the militant side of peaceful
coexistence. .fit the same time Finland has been bullied;
atomic tests have been resumed; Soviet military strength has
been stressed; the Soviet position on Berlin remains highly de-
manding. The Congress attacks on the opponents of peaceful co-
existence were meant only to make room for a full range of
maneuver, not to seek a genuine accommodation with the West.
21. Currently, however, Soviet foreign policy is by no
means completely freed of the pressures for more militancy which
stem from the Chinese challenge, Should an open break occur,
Moscow's initial reaction would probably be to emphasize 11hard'1
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tactics in order to justify tighter controls in pastern Europe
and to demonstrate that it was as vigorously anti-imperialist
as its Chinese competitor. Over the long run,, the consequences
might be quite different; a protracted break might give import-
ant support to that tendency in Soviet foreign policy which
seeks to put relations with the West on a more stable footing.
It is conceivable that,,, faced with an actively hostile China
whose strength was growing,, the USSR might in time come to accept,
at least tacitly, some mutual delimitation of aims with the West
and thus some curb upon its expansionist impulse,
22. For the present, nevertheless,, we conclude that the
XXII Congress has initiated no marked departures in the foreign
policies which have emerged under Khrus hchev's leadership of the
last five years. On Berlin, the USSR is presently in an interim
phase,,, marking time in order to determine whether its earlier
pressures will bring the West to the negotiating table with at
least some concessions,, or whether another round of threats.,
and perhaps even unilateral action,, is required. Even a Sino-
Soviet rupture would not be likely to alter the basic Soviet
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position on Berlin and Germany, since a major element in that
position is the desire to stabilize the Soviet-controlled
regime in East Germany and, by extension, those of Eastern
Europe*
23. In the disarmament field, we perceive in recent Soviet
moves no appreciable desire for agreements on terms which the
West could regard as acceptable. Instead, the USSR continues
to regard this as an arena for political struggle and,, via
maneuverings over parity and the composition of a forum, for
enhancing Soviet stature and cultivating neutralist opinion.
In addition to the theme of general and complete disarmament,
the Soviets will probably also agitate such limited measures
as regional schemes, agreements to limit the spread of nuclear
weapons, and other proposals which might inhibit Western defense
programs.
2L. Sino-Soviet strains raise considerable uncertainties
regarding prospective Soviet tactics in Southeast Asia* The
USSR will probably continue to press cautiously its advantages
in Laos and South Vietnam, seeking simultaneously to advance
Communist prospects there, to avoid a major US intervention, and
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