FRANCE AND THE ALGERIAN PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000700030012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 11, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE; OF NATIONAL NSTIMATES
11 May 1961
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: France and the Algerian Problem
1. The collapse of the generals' mutiny in Algeria has
apparently cleared the way for do Gaulle to begin negotiations
with the Moslem rebels, but the serious weaknesses in his regime
laid bare by the revolt still remain. Although the conspiracy
was primarily confined to a few activists in the army, the belief
that the objectives of the activists enjoyed broad passive support
within the military, and the fear that many public officials
would not act against the insurgents in a showdown, caused
near panic in some government circles during the crisis. Moreover,
it appears that tho public which :respects de Gaulle's determination
to pursue negotiations and most of the military and police
units that rallied to resist Lr1e.: coup did so more in response
to do Gaul.le's personal force than out of respect for the
legitimate authority of his government. Since the revolt the
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repressive and authoritarian measures undertaken by the President
have caused serious misgiving even among those who supported
him during the crisis. Thus, France approaches the delicate
business of negotiating a peace settlement shaken and sorely
divided.
2. Although the failure of the mutiny revealed the futility
of organized opposition to do Gaulle, there is still some
immediate danger that individual army extremists, European
colons, or ri?.ht-wing terrorists will relieve their frustrations
over the recent debacle by acts of violence that will either
delay the opening of negotiations, now scheduled for 20 May,
or touch off a blood bath botwe.:n Moslems and whites. We
cannot rule out the possibility that attempts will be made on
the life of de Gaulle or of his prominent associates. Passions
are running high on all sides: the army, pained by the spectacle
of a few officers being punished f,-,r views shared by many,
is apprehensive lest de Gaulle's threatened purge destroy what
remains of esprit de corps. The Luropean settlers feel
themselves completely isolated by the puncture of the army revolt,
Most arc resigning themselves to a bleak future in a Moslem-
dominated Algeria, but a few, at least, are certainly at least
tempted to take their vengeance on the government first.
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3. The enthusiasm of the M:o;slem.population of Algeria
for do Gaulle is hilh one ar;ain and should strengthen the
President's position both in tie negotiations and in dealing
with his own military establis'hment0 However, it is unlikely
to remain so unless he fiv,:s c:ntinuing evidence of his deter-
mination to control terrorism by the colons and to elim'nate
Algerie Frandaise elements in the army. Indeed, the Moslems
of the cities,, although generally disposed to lie low while
things are going; their way, would probably respond violently
to provocation by colon troublemakers. In these circumstances
they would view French military or police action in defense of
the colons as indicating that do Gaulle was still a captive
Negotiations
t,.. The chances of neggotiat:ions between the PGARZ and the
French being :Lniti.atud and successfully carried out depend as much
on the attitudes of the PGAR leaders as on do Gaulle's capacity
to curb French extremists who w quid sabotage the talks. Some
reports have depicted the rebel leaders as alarmed during; the
mutiny that their last opportunity to negotiate a settlement with
France would evaporate if the army putsch succeeded.
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SE CULT
Nevertheless, the PGAR remains divided and vacillating over the
preconditions of nepotiatir ins and the strategies to be employed
if they are begun. Its moderate win,- is uncertain whether rebel
field commanders, some of whom arc convinced that the French
will ultimately tire of the stru lc, can be counted on to
observe a truce arrangement. In adds-tion the moderates are
somewhat hesitant about opening discussions for fear that if there
is another breakdown as at Mclum last June, they will be
stigmatized as dupes ,)f the French,
5. The more militant wimp of the rebel movement apparently
has been under heavy pressure from Cairo to resist any French
offer to negotiate that was net accompanied by an implicit French
undertaking to recognize the PG It as the legitimate government
of an independent Algeria. While the militants are aware
that do Gaulle will not net oti'tc (:n this condition, and while
they probably would not hold )ut for it, they have boon made
fearful that unless the Dominant position of the PGAR in ~;1 { Grin
is secured in advance it mi;ht be jeopardized after negotiations.
accordingly, this wing is wary of -any nepooti.atio~ s and tends to
take comfort in the thought thhot if no d: ?tiaticns in fact do not
take place the FLN will ultimately achieve a military triumph
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with the military aid promised by the Bloco It has recently
been reported that large new stocks of small and light arms are
stored in Egypt awaiting tr^nsshipmcnt to Algeria should planned
nerotiatic.ans break down.
Do Gaulle Is Negotiating Position
6e After months of painstaking political effort and
pressure, de Gaulle, had, oven bt.:f-re the Generals' revolt,
developed a negotiating po.sitii?n that was not only stripped of
any mention of a "French Algeriafl solution, but was specifically
designed to meet most of the principal Moslem demancfls.
Apparently he does not f_::el that his bargaining strength has
been reduced in any significant degree because he has since the
mutiny reiteratel the basic -outlines of his position. France
will offer the Moslems a choice between "association" nn.'L complete
independence. The "ass, ciation?i concept now appears to amount
to virtually complete national sovcreii my with provisions for
the maintenance of limitel base rights. To the independence
option the President has attached the somewhat ambiguous threat
that in a fully independent Europeans and pro-French
Moslems will be withdrawn to urban centers where their porsonal
interests may be defended.
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7a This position pry_bably contains a sufficient mixture
of enticement and threat to lure the reluctant PGA^R into
fruitful discussions. However, substantial areas of ambiguii".y
still exist on such questions as the disposition of the
Saharan regions (which the rebels claim as part of Algeria and
which do Gaulle has suggested might be administered by mixed
commissions), the manner and pace of French troop withdrawals,
and. the role of the PGA- Burin,; the interim period between a
truce and a referendum. Given ~I.o Gaulle's determination to
liquidate the war, there is a fair possibility that even these
difficult points can be settled by compromise. On the other
hand, the PGAP extremists, who may feel that rifts exposed in the
French Army insure their ultimate victkry with or without
negotiations, will almost certainly keep pressure on the moderates
to insist on exacting stiff c ncessions on these issues from
the French. Moreover, of those issues can easily rouse Moslem
suspicions of French good faith; the talks could break down on
differences over r,ne or all of them at any time.
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Prospects
8. Over the sh, rt run it is likely that do Gaulle will
act vif;orously to eliminate all obstacles to successful
initiation of negotiations with the PG dt. He will not hesitate
to make full use of his emerf,cncy powers to root out potential
saboteurs of his policy an6 tr. stifle any French criticism
of his moves. While he may win the confidence of the PG 1,7)
negotiators by such tactics, it is probable that he will repel
some of his current supporters in. France and he might drive
his enemies to acts of desperation. Even under the best of
circumstances we believe that the negotiations, if they
are to succeed at all, Will take many months. Frequ t
breakdowns and postponements .^.r,: likely and on each such occasion
opponents of an independent Alt aria will take new hope and suck
new means to assure that the talks are not resumed. On balance,
we do not rate the chances o,f a ie otiated settlement bcinp
worked out d_urin -; this round at ! ny more than even.
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9. Over the longer run it seems clear that recent events
in Algeria and Fran,--e ha-;- made the situation in both countries
dangerously fragile., The PGAR probably regards the forthcom.:ag
peace talks as the last effort it will make to end its rebellion
by peaceful means if the effort fails, the PGAR will almost
certainly rapidly come under the domination of its extremist
wing, which then probably will not hesitate to solicit heavy
Bloc aid. In France do Gaulle may find himself sorely taxed
by the necessity to preoccupy himself with the Algerian problem
at a time when he is anxious to take vigorous steps to assert
French leadership over the continent. His frustrations will
almost certainly be reflected in the French public -- many
elements of which are already dueply troubled by the authoritarian
cast of his leadership, and the tendency of his government to
monopolize credit for breaking the generals' mutiny. We believe
that although de Gaulle's government may no longer be susceptible
to a rightist overthrow, his political future and that of France
will almost certainly be difficult and possibly hazardous, whether
he obtains a settlement in Algeria or not.
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