THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020096-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 96
• Publication Date: February 18, 1960
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
18 February 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Current Political Situation in Italy
1. The present Minority Christian Democratic government
in Italy, headed by Prime Minister Segni, is able to muster
parliamentary majorities only through the support of various
political parties on the rights the Liberals (PLI), the
monarchists (PD1), and the neo-fascists (MSI). Its stability
is being increasingly threatened by dissension within the
Christian Democratic (CD) Party itself. With the approaching
municipal and provincial elections in view, the CD left-wing
is pressing for more progressive legislation, and also for dis-
association from the rightist parties, in order to win the favor
of the electorate. The government, however, cannot antagonize
the rightist parties upon which it is dependent, and they remain
opposed to the proposed legislation. No broadening of the
government's parliamentary base by an "opening to the left" ap-
pears feasible in present circumstances. Thus the government
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has no room for political maneuver, Its predicament is inten-
sified by the revival of the political crisis in Sicily, and
by President Gronchits repeated threats to bring down the
government by prompting the resignation of left-wing CD ministers,
For these reasons, the fall of the Segni government could occur
any day,
2. Conflict within the CD party has intensified since the
national elections in 1956, when the CD, although making some
slight gains, failed for the second successive time to obtain a
majority in the chamber. The subsequent undermining of Fanfanits
short-lived left-oriented CD minority government by CD rightists
contributed to factional bitterness within the party. Since
then, party policies and tactics have been controlled by the
combination of a large center-right bloc headed by party
Secretary Moro and Prime Minister Segni, and a small far-right
faction. This latter group is just strong enough under present
circumstances to hold the balance of power in the party. To date
the far right and center-right groups have largely ignored the
warnings of Fanfanits leftist bloc, representing almost half the
party professionals, that the party must abandon its present con-
servative orientation or lose the support of its electorate.
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3, The decline in CD fortunes has been recently dramatized
by its elimination from a number of important city and pro-
vincial councils which have been taken over by Communist-Nenni
Socialist (PSI) combinations. In Sicily, where the hybrid
Milasao government, which included all parties save the CD, has
Just collapsed, an attempt probably will be made to fashion a
CD/neo-aFascist coalition. If this happens, Fanfanit s reaction
against the rightist leadership of his party is likely to be
stormy, and he may go so far as to pull down the governments
4, The immediate prospects for the Segni government are
not clear. Almost any group of its present supporters is
capable of pulling down the government. There is a slim chance
that at least the threat from the left-wing of the CD will not
operate until after the local elections, largely because the
Fanfaniani may feel that they do not now have the parliamentary
appeal to secure approval of a minority government under their
leadership, nor sufficient time to put together a workable
coalition before the elections, If it does not fall before the
elections, scheduled for May or June, the Segni government will
almost certainly not long survive them.
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5. Other political combinations might be formed but
none offer great prospects for goverrnenta1 a..ongovr.Lty. One
possibility is a simple reshuffle within the present minority
goverment which would give the left of the CD party the some-
what greater representation. Another is the revival of the old
de Gasperi coalition spanning all the parties from the Social
Democrats (PSDI) through the Liberals, but excluding the
parties of the extreme right. Both solutions would be most
diffioult to implement, however; in the first instance because
the CD right-wing is not disposed to see Fari.fanit s wing of the
party again given access to power,, and in the second instance
because the PSDI would be reluctant to enter a coalition which
contained the Liberals. In the event the Sicilian crisis is
resolved to the advantage of the CD rightists -- i.e.., by
forming a government including the neo-fascists -- the small CD
far right might be emboldened to form a minority government
in which it played the leading role.
6. On the other hand, President Gronchi may soon feel
the time is ripe to provoke a government crisis., or may take
advantage of a crisis, in an attempt to improse an entirely
different solution, constituting a clear move to the left.
JIM,
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With luck and some cooperation from a handful of independent
and floating deputies he miht be able to put together a bare
majority coalition under left CD leadership embracing the
PSDI, the CD, and the Republicans, but excluding the Liberals.
However, to pass controversial legislation such a government
would require additional support -- possibly including PSI
abstention. We believe there is only a slight chance that
such a government could be put together. If, however, it were
formed, it would incur the strong reservations of right-ing
elements of the CD and would probably soon be sabotaged from
within,
7, So long as bitter factional strife persists within the
CD, Italian politics will remain unstable and the life of gov-
ernments unpredictable. Governments leaning to the right or
to the left may be formed for short periods, but the limitations
on their freedom of action are already clear. Continued de-
pendence on parties to the right of the CD will mean that a CH-
dominated government could not hope to strengthen its position
with the electorate by the passage of social legislation.
Dependence on the abstention of the PSI for operation of a left-
oriented government would further sharpen the internal conflict
safteF
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and dissidence within the CD. In neither instance would the
CD party's internal cohesion be strengthened, at least in the
short runj, nor would its bargaining power with other parties
be improved*
8, Instability is therefore likely to remain for some
time the main feature of the Italian political scene. The
principal center party will probably be unable to prevent
some further deterioration to its over-all position. In these
circumstances we can only envisage the strengthening of the
extreme right and of the Communists and PSI; the PSI is likely
to be the greatest beneficiary. Any reversal of the trend
suggested above is not likely before the next national elections
in 1963. For this reason, the date of these elections might be
advanced.
9. During the next several months the CD party will almost
certainly retain the leadership of the government. Accordingly,
we remain confident that our judgments on the course of Italian
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foreign policy contained in NIE 24-58,. "The Political Outlook
for Italy,"will stand up. However, the progressive weakening
of the center in Italian politics -- which has held the key to
government and policies since the War seems to us to suggest
the need for a review of the Italian estimate after the immediate
impact of the local elections of this spring is c'e are
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
# NIE 24-58 indicated that although Italy would probably seek
a greater voice in European circles and pursue a more vigorous
foreign policy., it would maintain close ties with the US and
continue to give strong support to NATO and European integration.
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