ITALY IN CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020018-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 12, 1960
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R00904A069500020018-8
12 July 1960
SUBJECT.- Italy in Crisis
to The general strikes and. bloody political :?J,04. s ng ian
Ital represent a deepening of the criji3 which pai?al.yz d the
country during much of the Spring. This crisis resulted from
the collapse of the center and its Inability to agree on any
consistent policy o The '.! embron i government was reluctantly
accepted, in spite of the fact that it doponded on Fascist votes,
in an attempt to buy t,.'-me in which to resolve the polit:t_cal dil9m-
ma?) Though it had severely limited powers9 it Is now under five
from both Left and Right extremes. Regardless of the outcome of
the immediate disorders,, the underlying crisis in Italy cannot be
resolved until fundamental alterations are made in the political
status quo.
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OPOW
2. The recent demonstrations and riots were touched off
by the Fascists whop by scheduling a national convention in the
anti-Fascist stronghold of Genoa; provoked vigorous reactions
from broad sections of the public. The Communists speedily
capitalized on this popular revulsion to Fascism by organizing
demonstrations in Genoa and several other Northern cities. The
Fascists responded with counter demonstrations and threats to
topple Tambroni by withdrawing their parliamentary support. As
the situation deteriorated into a series of pitched battles be-
tween demonstrators and police it became clear that the Communist
aim was to discredit the government by creating situations in
which police were repressing popular demonstrations against
Fascisme
3. An equally important goal of Communist strategy is to
break up the flirtation between the Nenni Socialists (PSI) and
the CD and! if possible, force the PSI back into a Communist-
dominated popular front. The PSITs evident interest in the
emergence of a left-lk.aning CD centrist coalition government
which it would support has led to increasingly bitter polemics
between the Communists and the Socialists in recent months,
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ANWIt
The Communists almost certainly believe that the reemergence
of the anti-Fascist issue' with its profound emotional appeal
to working class solidarity, offers an ideal opportunity for
pulling the PSI back into its orbit., thereby leaving the CD
isolated and identified in popular thinking with the right.
This would be a shrewd move in the Communist long term aim to
destroy the center.
Prospects
It. The present riots can probably be contained by the
Policed However,,, in a situation where tempers are rising on
all sides., and where open violence has erupted in the Chamber
of Deputies., the growth of extremist pressures could rapidly
become dangerous. If there is no solution within a short time
the disintegration of the center will accelerate. Whatever
happens, the present government formula (i.e., CD acceptance of
Fascist support) and probably Tambroni himself will almost cer-
tainly soon be jettisoned, Even if the Fascist deputies have
second thoughts about their threatened withdrawal of support for
the government., the rank-and-file of CD deputies., who reluctantly
accepted the Tambroni formula in the first place., will probably
consider it politically suicidal now that popular anti Fascist
sentiments have been aroused.
AMOPP
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50 After the departure of Tambroni Italy will have re-
turned to the situation it confronted this Spring, but with
tensions at a higher pitch, and the extremes more assertive
than before* Some effort may be made to piece together a
center coalition which could once more serve as an emergency
stop-gap. However, the CD failed to pull this off in Aprils
and recent events will not have increased the disposition of
the minor parties, especially the Republicans and Social Demo-
crats to enter such a coalition. Even if the old center coal-
ition were reconstituted we do not believe it could survive for
long under the growing pressures from the flanks. A Left led
CD minority government, even if it could be invested, would
probably also be short-lived because of opposition within the
CD party itself.
6. The only prospect for easing the political situation
on any long range basis appears to be an opening to the Left
coalition government led by the CD with the participation of
the PSDI and PRI and at least the benevolent abstention of the
PSI. There are strong pressures within the CD itself to adopt
this formula, but such a more is bitterly opposed on the right
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of the CD and by the Vatican, and might result in so many de-
fections from the CD as to jeopardize the viability of such a
government. Opposition from these quarters would be greatly
strengthened if the t'SI in the ?resent disorders appears to
be closely identified with the Communists.
7. We believe Nenni has too much invested in his long
campaign to accommodate his party to the CD to abandon the effort
easily and return to close cooperation with the Communists. How-
ever9 he would have little choice if the CD definitely turned to
an alliance with the extreme Right., or if there was another
dramatic failure of an opening to the Lefty which would once and
for all convince the Socialist rank-and-file that PSI-CD coopera-
tion was a lost caused Moreover, if the present disorders con-
tinue for some time there is a danger that new incidents involving
the "martyrdom" of PSI militants and bitter clashes between the
PSI and government security forces might create differences too
wide to overcome*
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ANOW
So Finally, although we consider it unlikely, we feel
there is some danger that at any time rightists might attempt
to impose an authoritarian rule on Italy, to forestall other
solutions. Tambroni, himself, might be so motivated, if he
felt his control of the police and army were sufficient. If
such a move were attempted it would almost certainly fail, but
would tend to unite the various forces of the Left.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATE3
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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