THE CUBAN POT BOILS OVER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: July 15, 1960
• Content Type: NOTES

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
15 July 1960
SUBJECT: The Cuban Pot Boils Over
NOTE: The third and fourth sentences of
paragraph 8 are derived from a
privileged cormunica-tiona Accord-
ingly, this part of the paper should
not be discussed outside the Agency,,
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SIPW
C E N T Ft A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
15 July 1960
SUUJECT: The Cuban Pot Foils Over
la US application of economic sanctions against the Castro
regime and Khrushchevis blunt warnings against US intervention in
Cuba have plunged US-Cuban relations into their most critical phase
to dated Fortified by promises of Soviet support, Cuba has openly
charged the US with interference in its internal affairs before the
UN Security Council. This rapidly deteriorating situation raises
fundamental questions as to how far Castro is likely to go in ex-
ploiting his conflicts with the US and what effects the Cuban, US,
and Soviet actions are likely to have not only within Cuba, but
elsewhere in Latin America.
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2. Consequences Within Cuba. We believe that events of
the past few weeks touched off by the refusal of US oil
companies to refine Soviet petroleum and Castro's subsequent
seizure of the US refineries in Cuba -- have strengthened Castro's
hand in Cuba over the short term. Previously he had been ex-
periencing a slow but steady deterioration in political stature.
While the US economic sanction probably heartened hard core
moderate opposition to the revolutionary Government and demon-
strated the consequences of Castro's ways,, it has also given new
life to Castro's strident anti-US campaign.
3. Moreover, xhrushchev's pledge of support for the Cuban
regime has Given new impulse to the revolutionary leadership. It
has caused new alarm among moderate and conservative Cubans, but
neither it nor the US economic sanctions is likely to provoke the
strong opposition. necessary to threaten Castro in the next few
months. While opposition to Castro continues to grow and broaden
and defections by moderate officials are on the rise, Castro's
popularity is still widespread and we see little likelihood of
the emergence in the near future of an opposition Castro cannot
control. A rallying point for opposition to Castro exists abroad
in the form of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (Frente Revolu-
cionario Democratico - FED).
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zw
6 The cutback in assured., preferentially priced sugar
sales to the US is a blow to Cuba's sagging economy and fiscal
situation and has greatly increased Cuba^s economic dependence
on the Bloc. While the Soviet commitment to absorb the sugar
refused by the US this year will take much of the sting out of
the US move9 because the USSR will either buy at about world
price or make barter arrangements, Cuba will probably suffer a
substantial foreign exchange losses On the other hand, with con-
tinued Communist I3loc help,, Cuba can take care of its petroleum
needs after a period of initial short supply. At the same tune,,
Castro will be able to equate his domestic economic problems
specifically with the US sugar sanction and in this way justify
any austerity measures which he may feel necessary.
5. Castro and the US. Backed firmly by the Communist Bloc,
surrounded by pro-Communist advisers and faced with US reprisals,
the erratic Castro almost certainly is more inclined to destroy
remaining ties with the US than he is to back down in his conflict
with the US. Given the increasingly stormy course of US-Cuban
relations,, we believe that harassment of the Guantanamo naval base
will increase and that there is a good chance of Cuba's demanding
a3-
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US withdrawal from the base -- President Dorticos has already
said that Cuba was returning this yearns rent. There is also
a good chance of dangar to American 'Lives and a Cuban-initiated
rupture in diplomatic relations, The likelihood of these oc-
currences would obviously increase if the US were to break all
economic ties with Cuba or to undertake additional economic
sanctions such as eliminating the sugar quota entirelyy, or the
premli n price paid for Cuban sugary or blocking Cubal s dollar
accounts in the US*
60 'he Reaction Elsewhere in Latin America, US restraint
in dealing with Castro in the first 18 months of his tenure was
well regarded in other countries of Latin America, even though
relations with Cuba hit rock bottom, Latin ~=ericans generally
approved of Washington's adherence to the concept of non-
intervention and insistence on legal forms, Moreover, US be-
havior regarding Cuba was in accord with the slowly evolving
changes in Latin American attitudes toward the Cuban dictator
and his performances
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7o Initially Fidel Castro captured the sympathy and
fervent support of most Latin Americans as the Cuban liberator
and reformer, Today popular sympathy- for Castro2s reform o-
gram is still sufficiently widespread in other countries o?
Latin America to cause many governments to act cautiously :L
dealing with Castro for fear of arousing domestic oppositiono
Castro2s most vocal adherents h-:,.ve narrowed to a trouble-making
minor ty composed of Communists, other extremists., and studont
and labor groups,
3. Nearly every government has felt. the bad ef:ieci.s of
Castro"s subversive actions and interference and resent his
rebel government for this. Government officials.. conservatives,
moderates, and important segments of the Latin American press
have been worried by Castro's excesses and his dictatorial
methods' his offensive remarks about respected area leadersq and
his ever closer, ties with the Communist Bloc. &t least two
Presidents,-- Betancourt of Venezuela and L1.eras Camargo of
Colombia -- are convinced that inter-American act-ion must be
taken eventually to neutralize Castro and to prevent the spread
of his revolution? However' until the Soviet warning against.
US intervention and Cuba?s charges in the UNO Detancourt and
m
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Lleras Canargo insisted that Trujillo be dealt with first. In
Central America, where Cubans intervention in local affairs has
been most obvious, Guatemala has broken relations, Nicaragua has
suspended then, and other governments are probably considering
diplomatic breaks. In short Castro's star has been falling in
the area.
9. On the other hand, Latin Americans -- particu_arly
lower income groups -y still feel important bonds of sympathy
for Castro and Cuba in their present circumstance`, and these
sentiments have worked to divide opinion on what to do about
Castro. Despite apprehensions about certain aspects of the
Castro regime, Latin Americans generally share Castro?s de-
sire to achieve rapid social and economic development, to re-
duce economic dependence on the US, and to better their posi-
tion in their relationship with the US. It is doubtful if many
Latin Americans regard the confiscation of American oil refiner-
ies in Cuba as an outrage; Mexico in particular remembers its
own difficulties with the US over the expropriation of oil
properties, Furthermore, the prompt US retaliation of
cutting the sugar quota will seen to many Latin
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Americans a dangerous precedent. There is also a tendency to
see the Cuba devel.opi ents primarily as a problem for the US
rather than for the inter-American community. Moreover La-'.'n
Americans make a distinction between the T. ;u j1 to dictatorship -~.
with which the US has had good relations in the past -- and that
of Castros the latter is regarded as a reformer who has gone
wrong, but one whoa like probably no other Latin American leader,
has introduced rapid, sweeping socio-economic change and stood
up to the USG
10? Latin American opinion on the Cuba problem has probably
sobered with recent events. Heretofore Latin Americans had gen-
orally criticized the US for overdoing the Communist threat in
Cuba and elsewhere in their areao The intrusion of Khrushchev
into the Cuba situation probably has also gone a long way to
water down Latin American concern over the harsh US sanctions
against Cuban Khrushchev's threat to retaliate if the US inter-
vened in Cuba probably did not impress most government leaders in
the area who probably did not expect the US to intervene in the
first place. At the same time,, in placing Cuba under the protective
wing of the USSR.. Khrushchev almost certainly clarified in the
minds of many politically articulate Latins Cubats growing in-
volvement with international. Communism.
461110
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11. In these circumstances, we believe that a majority
of Latin American governments is likely to support the US against
the Cuban charge in the UN and to support the Peruvian initiative
for a consideration of the Cuban problem by the 0ASo Much will
depends however, on whether or not the US wholeheartedly supports
a strong Venezuelan move now pending in the OAS against the
Truiillo dictatorship, with which almost half of the Latin American
nations have no relations. If the US does this and if the Cuban
case against the US is thrown into the OAS, we believe that the
US can count on the measure of support necessary to counter the
Cuban charges. However, most Latin American governments would
consider that there could be no moral basis for a condemnation
of Castro without a prior condemnation of Trujillo and effective
action against his regime. Even if a condemnation of Castro in
general terms could be obtained, we believe that the US would have
difficulty in securing enough votes in the OAS to cause multi-
lateral sanctions against Castro,
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
Now
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