STAFF DRAFT: LAOS . . . THRU THE LOOKING GLASS, DARKLY . . .

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500010070-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: June 12, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved FUF Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79R00G4A000500010070-1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A.GENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
12 June 1959
STAFF DRAFT: LAOS . . . thru the looking glass, darkly . . .
1. On June 6, the Lao Government decided to release the
leaders of the Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ) from house arrest and
to declare the incident of the renegade Pathot Lao battalion
ended. At least for the immediate future this decision has
ended the danger that the Lao Government and military would
undertake an overly enthusiastic effort to suppress all pro-
Communist olomonts. Bach an effort would have risked serious
international roprocussions and further complicated the pro-
blom of getting underway a joint US-French program to train
the Lao Army. The Lao Government's decision will probably
load to some tapering off of the barrage of charges and throats
issuing from Hanoi and Peiping until some now issue presents
itself.
2. On May 29 the US-French talks in Paris on a joint
training program for the Lao Army wcro concluded and a momor-
andum, f1Gonoral Principles Looking Toward a Possible Eventual
Agreement with the Royal Lao Govornmont on Training of its
Army," was submitted to the US and French governments for
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approval. On the one hand, this memorandum calls for a con-
siderably greater role for the US than the French originally
appeared willing to accept. On tho other hand, it preserves
a far greater role for the French than the Lao Government
has indicated it is willing to accept.
3. The vague terms of the Memorandum concerning command
relationships provide many possibilities for friction between
the US and French training personnel. Moreover, the suspicion
of many French military and administrative advisors that the
US is seeking to elbow them out of Laos will almost certainly
complicate the working arrangements. However, we believe that
those problems will be less acute at higher military and dip-
lomatic levels and that the French Government will probably be
more cooperative than it has in the past, particularily if do
Gaulle personally approves the joint-training program, as we
believe he will. The French both in Laos and in Paris, appear
finally to have realized that the Lao have a strong desire to
end the Franco-Lao military relationship. Many French will
persist in the boliof that the growing anti-French attitude
of the Lao is duo to US machinations. However, the French,,
uno, ate rocoivod informal word that the High
on 12 Defense Council, with. do Gaulle presiding, has approved
the Memorandum.
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particularly at higher levels, probably are becoming convinced
that for the short run at least, their best chance of main-
taining a position in Laos lips in cooperation with the US.
4. The manner and timing of presenting to the Lao the
general principles for joint-training arrived at in the Paris
talks are yet to be worked out. No matter how presented, a
plan for a joint US-French training program will probably be
resisted by the Lao. They have become increasingly outspoken
in their dissatisfaction with the French record in Laos and
in their desire that the US take over all French functions in
training, equipping and advising their army. However, the
Lao have little choice but to accept a joint-training program
and we boliovo that they will do so, although probably with
some reservations and dissatisfaction.
5. Initiation of a joint-training program for the Lao
Army will almost certainly evoke strong protests from Hanoi!
Peiping, and Moscow, and probably India. There will probably
for
be a now round of demands for reconvening the EC-Laos and/A
meeting of the Genova Co-chairmen (UK-USSR). Thus ffn,r, the
UK has stood firm on its position that the Lao Government's
actions have not violated the Genova Accords but have been in
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fact tolerant in the face of Pathot. Lao provocations. If the
training program is daftly handled, the UK will probably con-
tinuo to stand firm. It is possible that Hanoi and/or Peiping
may make some military Gestures designed to create crises in
Laos which could be used to latreh a campaign for-
high loyal international conference, including Communist China,
to review completely the Genova Accords a~rto consider broo?dor
Par East issues. Such a crisis, which could involve "volunteers"
from North Viotnam,'would ;:rob ably '.)c iatondod to fall ohcrt c-f
provoking US military intorvontion, but the chances of mis-
calculati:on could be groat. We coi .inuo to seo no direct
connection between the Berlin crisis and Communist actions with
respect to Laos.
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