THE COMMUNIST POSITION IN INDONESIA*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400020009-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 2, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

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130::UMENT NO.
NO 6N CLASS.
o DECLi,,Ci,IREL4
GLASS,. TO: TS S C
NEXT rnViCiN DATE'
11411: REVIEWER: MGM V
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ObkiCE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Communist Position in Indonesia*
'2 May 1958
DOCUMENT NO. 11
NO CRINGE 6N CLASS.
X....DECLASSiV1110
CLASS. CHANELO TO: TS S C
NiAT DEVii.1 DATE:
STAT
018645
AUDI:
2 1 APR 1980
DATE: REVIEWER:
1. This memorandum appraises the Communist position in Indonesia
in light of the present conflict between the central government and
the rebel group and the apparent impending collapse of the revolutionary
movement.
I. POSITIVE FACTORS WORKING TO THE COMUNIST ADVANTAGE
1. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is Indonesia's best led
and only unified and disciplined party. It is probably the second
largest party on Java. It controls PERBEPSII a para-military veteran's
group, and units of the Village Guard. It also controls SOBSII the
principal labor organization, and several mass organizations.
2. The PKI has vigorously supported Sukarno and the central
government in opposition to the revolutionary movement, thereby
* This memorandum has been discussed informally with OCI and DD/F.
"larPf
STAT
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increasing its aura of respectability as a loyal and nationalistic
party. Sukarnots dependence upon the Communists has increased and
the crisis arising from the rebellion has provided PKI leaders new
opportunities to capitalize on their close relationship with the
President and to influence his attitudes and decisions.
3. As the leading advocate or the Apparently successful military
action against the rebels, the PKI may have increased its stature and
influence in the armed forces.
4. The PKI apparently has expanded its influence in rural areas
of Java while the attention of the army and the government has been
focused on military operations against Sumatra and the Celebes.
5. PKI capability for civil disturbance and armed action against
the government on Java has been increased as a result of the dispatch
of many of Indonesia's best trained and equipped and most dependable
troops to Sumatra and the Celebes. The PKI has probably increased its
infiltration of the army, particularly in the non-commissioned ranks.
We do not know the extent of this infiltration.
6. The air force, which is CommUnist infiltrated at-the top
command, ha's achieved new prestife and stands to increase greatly its
capabilities-as a result of MIG-1s and IL728ts"being supplied by the
Bloc. Reportedly, some MIG's have already arrived in Indonesia, and a
number of Indonesian pilots and crews are receiving jet training in
arynt and Czechoslovakia.
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7. The revolution accelerated the pace of economic deterioration,
providing the PKI with greater opportunities to foment unrest and
dissatisfaction with the existing order, especially in urban areas.
8. As a result of the worsening economic situation the Bloc has
been able to offer economic aid (in the form of long term low interest
loans) and technical assistance at a time psychologically right for
the greatest propaganda and political gain.
9. The revolution created an urgent need for military supplies
and equipment which the Bloc has provided on credit with low down
payments. The Bloc may be able to dispatch a training mission to Indo-
nesia and otherwise advance Communist influence in the armed forces.
By offering economic and military aid, the Bloc has strengthened its
pose as Indonesia's friend, and has placed Indonesia under a financial
obligation of approximately $230 million.
II. NEGATIVE FACTORS WORKING TO COMMUNIST ADVANTAGE
1. The revolution has failed to make the internal Communist
threat a central issue in Indonesian politics or to rally the majority
of political and military leaders against Sukarno's conduct of state
affairs. Many Indonesians, taking their cue from Sukarno, regard the
Communists as a legitimate, loyal political party and give it their
votes. Among those who distrust the PKI, only a few are so strongly
motivated as to overcome the traditional distaste for decisive action.
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2. The revolutionary-movement further fragmented and disorganized
the non-Communist elements in Indonesia. It brought to the fore a number of
substantive issues which have long divided the non-Communist forces
and culminated in an armed struggle among non-Communists.
3. The revolution also split the Masjumi the staunchest non-
Communist political party, into Javanese and non-Javanese factions.
The party, which has played a major role in preventing Sukarno from
bringing the PKI into the government, may not regain its former
strength or unity in the post-revolution period.
4. As a result of having led the revolutionary movement, a
number of Indonesia's most capable men and most important anti-
Communist figures--Sjafruddin, Sumitro? Natsir$ Assaat, Simbolon,
Hussein, Harahap? Sumual, and Djambek--will probably be barred from
important government roles in the post-revolution period.
5. The failure of the West to support, or even to compromise
with Indonesia on the West Irian issue left the field clear for the
Bloc to exploit the issue for its benefit. The failure of the 'lest
to offer economic or military aid to the central government at its
time of need had the same effect.
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III. FACTORS WORKING AGAINST COMMUNIST INTERESTS
1. Non-Communist elements mithin the political parties and the
army have become increasingly aware of growing Communist strength and
influence. Reportedly they are showing serious concern and a desire
to curtail Communist strength. Consequently, in the post-revolution
period Sukarno will probably be under some pressure to alter his past
attitude toward the Communists.
2. Although the PKI is probably having some success infiltrating
the armed forces, most officers and the armed forces in general are
probably still basically anti-Communist, and are probably becoming
increasingly willing to initiate anti-Communist measures.
3. Sukarno is probably not a Communist and is probably not
willing to have Indonesia fall under Communist domination. Further-
more, Sukarno probably still has the political power and personal
influence to cut the ground from under the Communists if he concluded
they were becoming a threat to his personal position. However, he
almost certainly continues to underrate seriously the Communist threat.
L. The Communists run a constant risk of overplaying their hand
or of provoking the government and/or the army into anti-Communist
measures.
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IV. OUTLOOK
1 Java remains the decisive arena in the struggle for control
of Indonesia. With large-scale Bloc military assistance the central
government will have the means to enforce its authority on the outer
islmds, although scattered pockets of resistance might continue to
exist.
2. The PKI is well entrenched at the center of power on Java
and its future prospects appear excellent at the moment. Only a de-
cisive shift in policy by Sukarno himself, a military coup, or a great
stiffening of non-Communist forces on Java can avert a steady increase
in Communist strength and influence. Although the government may take
some measures designed to limit Communist influence in the post-
revolution period, at present the chances of a major and decisive
effort against the PKI appear to be less than even.
3. Unless a serious anti-Communist movement gets under way on
Java, we believe that the PKI will not attempt to seize power by
armed coup in the near future. Rather it will prefer to enjoy the
advantages of legality and respectability, looking toward a major
victory in the 1959 elections. DKI leaders almost certainly expect
to face counter action at some point. However, they probably hope
that it can be delayed until they have developed more positive
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'popular support, increased their capabilities for armed action, and,
by subversion, have neutralized the major elements of the armed 'forces.
L. Although the Indonesian goVernment mill probably continue to
seek aid from the US and may attempt to improve its relations with
the 77est, Sukarno and most other government and military leaders will
probably r emain convinced that the US aided the rebel movement while
withholding aid from the central government. They will probably
conclude that the civil war would not have happened if it were not
for US encouragement and assistance to the rebels. As a result, in
the post-revolution period US-actions and motives will probably be
under even greater suspicion than in the past, and the PKI and the
Bloc will probably have increased opportunities to tip Indonesian
neutrality toward the Communist side.
FDR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
((ta,44 //).
;
I) SHERMAN KENT
l? Assistant Director
National Estimates
-7-.
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