The Situation in Cuba

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 13, 1957
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R00904A00030004000 -/,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE G E N C Y
13 June 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRILL INTELLIGENCE'
1. The Cuban situation was recently treated in NIE 80-57,
"Political Stability in Central America and the Caribbean through
1958," 23 April 1957. During the preceding 18 months the regime of
Fulgencio Batista, had been considerably weakened by growing unrest,
largely political but, to some extent military, The conclusion
reached in the estimate was, "Inasmuch as we do not believe that the
Cuban government can fully restore public order or check the emergence
of new civilian opposition elements, there is only an even chance that
the Batista regime will survive the period of this estimate. A military-
dominated junta would be the most probable successor."
This memorandum has been discussed with DD/P, OCI:, ACSI, and OIR.
A particular effort was made to ascertain the views of the
intelligence community on the likely succession to Batista.
DOCUMENT No. NO CW iiiGE U CLASS.
DECLASSMED
A, C ASS, CH4&.7D TO. TS S C
NEST RZ:V!EW 6ATE:
/~i 1 BAVSN: RI 70i?2
r~ APR r9
,,~,, pproved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79F~ ~?? 1 01 $
 Approved For ReIe a 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO09 A000300040006-8
2. Batista's position has been further weakened during the brief
period since publication of NIL' 80-57. His government has been confronted
with signs of increasing -aivil resistance, continued terrorist activity,,
extensive sabotage of Havana's electric power system on 28 May, renewed
fighting with Fidel Castro's rebel forces, and an additional small-scale
landing of rebels, possibly sponsored by ex-President Prio. Rivalry
between the pro-government labor confederation and disaffected leaders
of the electric, telephone, and bank workers has introduced a new
element of unrest. In addition to guerrilla activity and labor unrest,
there is the usual opposition from political parties who are seeking a
peaceful return to normal democratic processes by negotiation with the
government parties. These negotiations -- concerning agreement on next
year's elections
3. On the other hand, Batista's civilian opponents appear to lack
army support while Batista thus far apparently has that support. His
opponents have not stimulated any great response from the public except
in the important province of Oriente where a majority of the inhabitants
are probably sympathetic to Castro's movement. The opposition seemingly
is not yet sufficiently well organized or united to eliminate Batista
except possibly by assassination, and agitation remains primarily a
terrorist and guerrilla operation. While the Communists (numbering about
10-15,000) are making a clever and determined propaganda drive, there is
no evidence that their efforts are meeting with much success. Batista
ve For e`lease 1 p/ 4 r61 ` igRt('709W' i r0~0~300040006-8
2 -
 Xpproved For Rele a 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R009 A000300040006-8
1k.. Serious unrest will probably continue, and Batista is likely
to meet it with increasingly authoritarian measures,; he may again resort
to a suspension of constitutional guarantees. Although he will probably
try to limit the use of such tactics, he is apparently determined to
eliminate guerrilla activity by almost any means. He probably hopes
that the government's current all-out campaign against the guerrillas will
lead to a settlement of the over-all problem.
5. As long as Batista continues to command the loyalty of the army,
he will probably be able to remain in power. The army is likely to support
the president only so long as the majority of officers believe continued
support of Batista will not place their own positions in jeopardy. So
far there is no evidence that they are turning aai.nst him. But there are
some reports of disaffection among the ranks, plotting among the officers,
some antagonism between junior and top echelon officers, and lower morale
in recent months. Army leaders, as well as high government officials,
are showing concern over the possibility that new revolutionary attempts
are imminent. Thus Batista's future position vis-a-vis the army is
uncertain at best; in the event of prolonged or intensified revolutionary
unrest, the army might turn against him.
6. There is still only an even chance that Batista will retain power
through 1958, In the absence cof any clear alternative leadership with wide
Approved For Release 2001/03/0 P79R00904A000300040006-8
 Approved For Relee 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R00A000300040006-8
popula1 and army support, a military dominated junta remains the most likely
successor to Batista. We do not believe that such a junta would adopt an
attitude toward US interests very different than that of the current regime.
7. Bati.sta's fall would be followed by considerable maneuvering
for power in military and civilian circles, and probably by a period
of renewed instability. A junta would be under strong civilian pressure
to effect a transfer of power to an elected government. However, it
probably would be willing to transfer only after assuring protection of
military interests. In the interim the junta might assign the caretaker
function to a provisional president.
8. It is too early to estimate which military and civilian figures
would comprise top leadership in the post Batista period. It seems
unlikely that Castro or ex-President Prio would achieve dominant positions,
but Castro as well as pro US Colonel Barquin* might play important roles.
While Castro's supporters in this revolutionary period have been somewhat
bitter toward the US for its lack of support, there are no essentially anti-
US groups in Cuba except the Communists.
SHERPLI~N KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
* Imprisoned leader of the abortive military conspiracy of April 1956.
_4-
25X1 A9a
Approved For Release 2001/03 DP79R00904A000300040006-8