The State of Italian Politics

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040005-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 27, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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C E i 1 T a I A L I I I T E L L ? I G L I 1 ' C E A C E I I AGLUCY
OFFI CL OF II&TI C?It L I: TTI LkTGS
27 June 1957
OAH DISuz;st llgil Oily
D:.iurr I'O;.' TiL D1:10TO21 Oi. ca-IT1:11L :,Tda'i LIC- ICE
Stl?JZCT= The State of Italian Politics
1, Italian politics are in an unhealthy coixiition0 The coa33?
tion formula under which Italy has boon governed since 1946 finally
collapsed two months ago& and no succession arrangement has yet been
fou o With elections required by June 1958,9 the sma13, center parties
were uz tiilix to accept the responsibilities of power without gain.
ing some of the advantages of it, and the Christian Democrats have
been unable to devise a policy which would satisfy their own require.
ments and the conflicting aims of their erstwhile coalition partners*
20 Underlying those maneuvers is the sad arithmetic of Italian
politics; about U0P of the electorate supports leftist and rightist
views opposed to the constitutional system, and it is impossible to
constitute a majority government except on a coalition baaiso The
Christian Democratic Party is ridden iLth factionalism and torn by
personal, conflictso A substantial ri nority of the Italian electorate
DOCUMENT NO, AL CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
SS. CHANGED TO: TS S 0
NEXT REVIEW DATE;
ADTH: HR 70-2 . A8 . APR 1980 REVIEWER: 018645
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is strongly anti??o1oricals and many of those who vote ChristAan
Democratic do so because it jr, the least undosi.rab7.o alternative,
There is almost ovorft hone a cyut c i.sm about governments an intense
desire for a. changes but a notable lack of enthusiasm for being
governed by reds, priestss facista, or monarchists,
3a Italy needs some festal changes in its politics.
The red devile on the loft need to be exercisud and the fascist pug
on the ri0ht reds to be drain off and cast a ,yo The Christian
Democratic party in the center needs u ?.ty and dtscipsi no , A dcmo
cratic-eocialist alternative on the left of center atd'a liberal.
capitalist alternative on the right of center need to be built.
These bsaeverr are ideals; the. irate problem is how best (a) to
prevent the present stagnation and disillusionment from developing into
a revolutionary situation and, (b) to establish g basis for growth
ttatard a healthier political situations
4o. Toward the end of 1955 and early in 1956 it so d as if
there was some chance of cooperation between the center coalition and
the extreme left, The latter, attempting, to end its pariiamentar r
isolations supported several important government reform bills which
otherwise probably would not have been passed. It appeared that
iuzuobilism in Italian policy had cow to an end, at least temporarily,
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as both center and left sought to take crodit for the reforms desired
by the majority of the Italian people. However the Krushchev revela-
tions concerning Stalin and suppression of the Hungarian revolt added
a new dimension by disrupting the unity and mili,tcy of the C st
party and putting it on the defensiveo
Henni8 who had been trying to
create the impression that he was separating himself from the Communists.,
evidently decided that the time had arrived for a bold move to capture
popular attention and to exploit the new situation to establish himself
as the leader of the leftist "democratic " forces. At the same time, the
rank and file of both Socialist parties began urging Socialist reunificaa
tions and Saragat - caught up in the pressure ?a- met with Nenni to
discuss terms and procedures, The consequence was the end of Socialist=
Communist parliamentary unity., the inauguration of an exchange of
Socialist and Communist polemics, and a feeling that Socialist unifica-
tion was inevitable,
5o Center-leftist cooperation to terminate immobilism also cane
to an end, and the old business of political maneuver occupied the
politicians. Saragat was determined not to be stampeded Into unification
lest he.lose both his leadership and his principles. Nenni was trying to
have the beat of two worlds; he was trying to enjoy the benefits of
parading as a democrat and a constitutionalist without offending his own
predilections (and those of many of his followers) toward main: ai ning
=g -
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working lass unity, The Christian Democratic leadership was fearful
of socialist unification because a substantial democratic socialist
party on the left would threaten their p dominance in Italian politics,
tend to weaken their hold upon the workers and ireftis is in their own
ranks, nd deepen the differences in their own party which rape;ir whenever
cooperation with the left is seriously considered, The Communists,, co
incident with attempting to shore up their own position, used all their
assets to weaken Nenni and to confuse the socialist unification move~meat,
The minor center parties, mindful of the coming elections,, were not to
be outdone in protecting their own positions? They refused further to
compromise their policies no as not to eliminate their excuses for
existence, Reform legislation became a secondary consideration as each
of the parties maneuvered to preve>at arealignmeat of the Italian elect=
torate at their expense. The result was the present unresolved crisis.
6. There does not seen to be any easy way out, Nenni in fact has
lost control of his party, and the merger movement has begun to recsedoo
The Cists have recovered their equilibrium,, The Christian Democrats
retain their electoral support and are b peful of wig a parliamentary
majority, The minor center pa roes, including the Democratic Socialists,
sewn to be slipping further despite their efforts to protect themselves.
Not only has immobilism returned, but the whole machinery of constitw.
tional government is at a standstill, defeated by political arithmetic
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and by partisan and personal politics, Vie cannot predict how long this
can continue before Italy returns to the pattern of the ear3,y 192D 'a
and prepares to accept another anti-democratic dynamic solution, If
the Christian Democrats can win a majority at the general elections,
which will probably be held this autumn unless some unforeseen break
in the cabin:: t problem occurs, Italy win probably at least be able to
constitute a government. But the Christian Democratic Party represents
so many diverse interests and is so lacking in parliamentary discipline
that the imnobilism would continue in any case, Thus, no attack upon
the social and econcmlic conditions encouraging revolutionary change
would be made; on the contrary, so long as the social ist parties remain
hopelessly split and out of poorer, the drawing per of Co uunism
probably would increase,
7, If the US is to make an effective attack upon Italian Camcnunism
and to assist in the development of a healthy body politics, it must do
more than support the Christian Democrats and urge them to make life un-
pleasant for the Communists, 'We must recognize that the Christian
Democratic Party is not a capable instrument for carrying out the reforms
which the majority of the Italian people desire. Nevertheless, in the
present situation we have no acceptable alternative to giving it full
support in an effort to assist it in winning: a majority or near majority
m5?
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in the next general election. Since no early change in the party
alignment of the Italian electorate appears likely, the cause of
democracy can be better served by having a Christian Democratic Party
in a safe majority position than by having an unstable coalition which
is dependent upon the continued good will and satisfaction of small
minorities. However, so long as the immobilian which has characterized
the last ten years continues, the Communists will continue to be a
powerful political force, and there is a good chance that they will pick
up additional popular support. Vie must, therefore, do all we am to
encourage the Christian Democrats to get on with a dynamic reform
progrwno
8p The only longuterm policy for cutting into Co nu ist strength
which appears to us to have any reasonable chance of success is the
development of a strong democratic party on the left. The existence of
such a party would have the added advantage of being a constant pressure
upon the Christian Democrats to develop a liberal social program and to
generate the necessary. discipl ne to cmrryr it out. Neither the present
Socialist k'arty nor the Social Democratic Party appears to be a very
good candidate. The former is still tied in many ways to the Coumnunists,
and its directing machinery is ridden with pro4ommunists and party
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buxeaucrato seeking to perpetuate the old relations with the
Communists. The Social Democratic Party is a bourgeois,, intellectualist
party that has failed to draw much working-class support and appears to
be insufficiern,1y concerned with the local problems and local issues
which m:,an so reach to the Italian voter, Both parties lack the strong
trade union ba?.o: which is so esziential to the political strength and
vote-getting crpaci )' of European socialist parties, The leftist tra-
dition in Ita:lya alpays strong, has come under the near monopoly of the
Cmnmunists, and the labor movement - until recently also almost a .
C munist monopoly =-n is not associated with either socialist parse.
9, We do not belie v a that anythini would be gained by attempting,
under present ci aumstanceu to push the Social Democrats into a merger
w Lth the Ital i7,n Socialist t arty,. The party bur eaucrato and the pro--
(aommnuni& is c%ex ise too much control in the latter pane. Ho evese the
present dr,s seem a propitious time to attempt to split the PSI itself
by holding out inducements to those within the PSI who desire socialist
unity :?.n democratic terms. Such. an attempt would have a better chance
of su-.,cess if it were portrayed as a merger and if there were not too
rigid requirements established ii the field of foreign policy,, than if
it
an ai.14empt wer+a made to carry/owl. by simply inviting dissident Sociaii is
t 'i join the Domocratio Sociali e.?. Warty, It would have its best chance
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of success if Nonni could be persuaded to come over without the consent
of, or in opposition to, the majority of the Socialist Party bureaucrats
and pro-Communists? Such a move would oleo have a better chance of
success if the Social Democrats mended their ways,; if they began to act
more like a party bent upon social change and less like a stalking horse
for US foreign policy. They ought to dig more deeply into the mire, they
ought to exert themselves more at the local level, they ought to seek a
stronger position in the trade union movement, The entire trade union
field ought to be reviewed to determine what would be required further
to weaken the Communist hold on the Confederation of Labor and to
determine the feasibility of trying to merge all or parts of the trade
union movement in Ita]y, In short, we think we ought not to put all
our faith in the Christina Democratic Party, but ought to encourage
dramatic moves to strengthen the democratic left, -In so doings, we need
to exercise care that the . socialists do not fal l into Communist hands,
but the stakes being what they are, we should not be too greatly Ooft-
corned over the extent to which a reinvigorated socialist movement
supported US foreign policy.
10, Over the longer run,, if a virile social democratic alternative
is developed an the left, the Christian Democratic Party would probably
tend to move increasingly to the right. This wau]d have some disadvantages;
it would encourage defection from the la rty's left,, and it would encourage
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a tendency to cooperate with the anti-democratic right - a tendency
which the party has so far steadfastly resisted. It would therefore
be desirable at some future time to give consideration to encouraging
a realignment an the right. The neo-fascists and monarchists are
gradually losing strength, and time will probably produce further drops
in strength unless a new popular rightist authoritarianism is born of
growing political frustration. Rather than have the Christian Democrats
become a party of the right, a new conservative grouping based upon
traditional and wealth=holding interests probably should be encouraged.
Thus, the Christian Democrats might come to hold the pivotal position
in Italian politics, turning to right or left for support as needs wad
opinion requi re.
ll. The problen of Italy is insoluble in the short term, The
obstacles and difficulties in ways of developing a healthier, stabler
body politic seem so great that suggestions for revitalizing Italian
socialism or creating a leftist alternative seen like pipe dreams,
Suggesting that the US might encourage a political formation which did
not support its foreign policy seems downright self-defeating and
improper, If the Christian Demoerate can gain power, the immediate
danger will be reduced; however., for the longer term we ought to be
prepared to consider some rather unpalatable alternatives to a steady
corrosion of democratic institutions and a steady accretion to the
political power of the Communist left.
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