Nasser's Next Moves

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 19, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
19 July 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT : Nasser's Next Moves
The attached memorandum is for~v .rded for your infor-
mation. This memorandum will be discussed at the IAC meeting
on 23 July in the review of crisis situations.
25X1A9a
Acting Secretary
1_S
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANCED T6: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
IT T HR 10.2
DATE ~~ 1* WREVIEWER: 618645
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19 July 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISOk7 COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Nasser's Next Moves
1, On the anniversary of the nationalization of the Suez Canal
Company, Egypt's President Nasser finds his position and prestige more
severely challenged than it was a year ago. His policy and outlook
are believed to be essentially unchanged, although he probably now re-
gards the US not only as his challenger but as a successful opponent.
The speeches which Nasser is expected to give on the occasion of the
opening of his newly elected Parliament are likely to provide the
occasion for an attempt to regain the initiative, but it is believed
probable that instead of relying on a single dramatic bombshell Nasser
is likely to inaugurate a drive to restore Arab unity and his leader-
ship by a series of moves forcing Saudi Arabia and Jordan to take the
Arab side against the US on the issue of Israel.
2. Not only does current evidence indicate the probability that
Nasser will continue to resist Western influence and the friends of
the West and the Arab area but it also points to the probability that
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Nasser considers this a propitious moment for a counter-attack. Nasser
has not been passive during the past four months while Saudi Arabia
and Jordan have openly flaunted his leadership and policy, but it is
probable that he has not made the fullest possible use of his cap-
abilities for trouble-making by clandestine. propaganda. and diplo-
matic means.. He probably now believes that there has been a slacken-
ing of enthusiasm. a falling off of assurance, an increase of diffidence
among the anti-Nasser forces in the Arab states. He has noted Iraq's
failure to assume leadership, its unwillingness to support Jordan
financially and its new Prime Minister's eagerness to talk about the
restoration of Arab unity. He has also noted the Jordanian Foreign
Ministers wavering. He knows how little support King Saud and King
Hussein have gotten for their new policies within their own countries
and that both of them are vulnerable to the charge of associating with
Israel's chief supporter and to appeals for Arab unity. As a conse-
quence Nasser probably believes that the trend against him has lost
momentum and that the time has come to try to reverse it.
3. In a campaign to reverse the recent gains of US policy and
to seize the initiative in the Near East once again Nasser could
choose among several opportunities for trouble-making:
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A. Saud's position: Nasser probably regards Saud's
neglect of the ESS Pact relationship and his policy of
cooperation with the US as the most important challenge to
Nasser's position. He probably also believes that weaken-
ing Saud's new relationship with the US would do more to
damage the new US position in the area than anything else
he might do and that this alone might force King Hussein to
shift back to an Arab nationalist policy. He knows that
there are rumblings of discontent within Saud's entourage
and has heard rumors of plots against the King, but he is
probably not anxious to stir up an actual revolution in
Saudi Arabia. He is probably more interested in the ad-
vantages to his own position which would follow if Saud
himself decided to come back to the ESS fold. Nasser pro-
bably believes that if he could confront Saud with a clear
choice between the Arab position and a US stand identical
with that of Israel on a public Arab-Israeli issue, Saud
would have to support the Arab position. The clearest pro-
mise of an opportunity to do this, of course, is now to be
found in the Gulf of Aqaba navigation question.
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B. The Gulf of Aqaba situation: Both in Egypt and
Saudi Arabia Aqaba is generally regarded as an integral
part of the Arab-Israeli issue, the question being whether
Israel is to make another gain in its struggle to establish
an economically viable state. Nasser has been exerting
subtle and effective pressure upon Saud, who has made it
clear that he accepts Nasser's interprete.:.i.cn of the Aqaba
issue. Just how Nasser could most effectively exploit this
situation to get an open break between Saud and the US is not
clear, but almost any aggravation of the situation is
likely to serve his purpose and the more serious the aggra-
vation the more welcome and useful it is likely to be to
Nasser. Nasser might himself seek to create a crisis over
which the US and Saud would be bound to differ by blockading
the gulf. He is more likely to keep reminding Saud privately
and publically of his responsibility for maintaining the Arab
cause in the Aqaba issue.
C. King Hussein's position in Jordan: Nasser is cer-
tainly aware of the numerous and sizeable forces of op-
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position within Jordan to King Hussein's recent course of
policy and of the fact that closing the Syrian border would
strangle the Jordanian economy. Although he probably has,
or could develop, the capability of inducing a coup in Jordan,
such a course has serious drawbacks for him. He would prefer
to see King Hussein disavow his association with the US and
return to the Arab nationalist fold. Nasser will probably
seek to influence this development by play ac, hard on the
Arab unity theme and declaring his willingness to accept
Hussein back on the old terms. Most important, however, is
likely to be an attempt to use the Israeli issue for the
classic purpose of drawing the Arabs together. This could
be forwarded through the Aqaba issue or by expbiting., if
not fomenting, incidents on the eastern borders of Israel.
Nasser certainly does not now want a war between Israel
and any Arab state, but there have been numerous incidents
in the past sizeable enough to accomplish his purpose which
did not result in war.
D. Exploitation of the Arab refugee problem: Nasser
has recently sought to damage the position of the Jordanian
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and Iraqi Governments by publishing reports of negotiations
with Israel to re-settle some of the Arab refugees. Rumors
or evidence of such efforts, particularly when they can be
presented as involving the collusion of the US, will be used as
opportunity occurs.
E. Support of Yemen: By encouragin:, a rd abetting the
delivery of Soviet arms to Yemen and otha ? Arabian Peninsula
principalities Nasser might cause such difficulties for the
British as to encourage Saud to resume cooperation. (This
would not necessarily mean that he would abandon his efforts
to rebuild Egyptian trade with the UK.)
4. It seems unlikely at this time that Nasser will demand the
departure of the UNEF. Although he will sooner or later make such
a demand, he probably now feels that the presence of the UNEF is
advantageous to him.
5. It is possible but unlikely at this time that Nasser would
seek to show his independence of the West by undertaking substantially
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closer relationships with ttn Soviet Bloc. We believe that he will
continue to encourage large scale trade relations with the Bloc and
to welcome economic and technical assistance. He may invite Soviet
leaders to Egypt. However, for reasons of domestic politics as well
as his relations with the other Arab states, Nasser probably will
continue his aggressivly independent line of "pos.'1Jve neutralism. "
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMA25X1A9a
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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