The Current Situation in Indonesia

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000300030007-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 1, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A GE?V 'C:'Y
1 March 1957
DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: The Current Situation in Indonesia
1. President Sukarno, in an effort to overcome a rapidly
deteriorating political and economic situation in Indonesia,
and possibly to enhance his own prestige and power, is attempting
to make some major revisions in the nature and composition of the
Indonesian government.
Under'
Sukarnots plan, the roles
and influence of political parties and the parliament would be
sharply curtailed. National authority would be centered in an
advisory council composed of representatives from functional 'groups,
such as youth, veterans, labor, women and the military. With
Sukarno as chairman, the advisory council would guide the cabinet
in reaching decisions. This would reduce the decision-making
authority of the cabinet while retaining it as the responsible
executive body. A new cabinet would be formed to include rep-
resentatives of all political parties holding seats in the
parliament.
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2. The background to Sukarnots concept includes his long-
standing belief that the Indonesian political parties, by their
continual dissension, bickering, and partisan politicking, are
primarily responsible for the country's failure to solve its
many basic problems by parliamentary methods. He was impressed
by the achievements and discipline of the cadres in Communist
China and he is now insisting that Communist participation in
the advisory council and new cabinet is essential to national
progress and unity.
3. The Communist party of Indonesia, Indonesia's fourth
giving
largest party, is/enthusiastic support to Sukarno and his plan
and has thrown the full force of its organizational and mass
propaganda talents into the campaign. If Sukarno's plan is
implemented along the lines he now advocates, the Communists would
be represented in the cabinet and stand an excellent chance of
gaining multiple representation in the advisory council through
their leadership or infiltration of labor, youth, student, veterans,,
and women's groups. The Communists probably also see #,m. the present
situation opportunities to drive a wedge between the anti-Communist
parties and the Nationalist Party (PNI), and to identify them-
selves with Sukarno, who continues to be the leading symbol of
Indonesian independence in the eyes of most Indonesians.
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4. The non-Communist political parties have shown little
enthusiasm for Sukarnots plan, The PNI, Indonesia's largest
party, is supporting Sukarno, but important segments of it are
doing so with considerable reluctance.. The Nasjumi is strongly
opposed to Sukarnots plan and to any Communist participation in
the government. The third largest party, the new and inexperienced
Nahdatul Ulama (NU), is seriously divided on the issue. Among the
smaller parties, the Socialists, Catholic, and Christian parties
are opposed, and most of the others are either undecided or guided
by the personal opportunism of their leaders.
wc'
5. lthoouugh most army leaders dare dissatisfy
with . dr.#t,, inefficiency, and corruption of the past a
present many are hostile towards the Communists and do not share
Sukarnors willingness to bring them into the government. However,
recent army reorganization programs and the transfer of a number
of military commanders have probably increased the number of higher
level officers, especially in Java, willing to support Sukarno,
in implementing his plan. Also, recent reports indicate that
the Communists have had some success in infiltrating a number
of military units and some important positions in the arnr in Java,
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Nevertheless, the army remains divided and it is impossible at
this point to predict how the various commanders would react
if Sukarno should can upon them to use force to implement his
concept. Even if the Java commands were to give Sukarno full
support, it is probable that some of the commands in the outlying
islands would not go along.
6.. To date, Sukarnots maneuvers have only complicated the
serious problems confronting Indonesia. Thei?e has been no progress
toward a settlement of the rebellion in Sumatra, and the inclina-
tion to revolt against economic and political domination by the
central government has spread to most non-Javanese areas of the
country. Most of the non-Javanese areas will probably oppose
Sukarnots plan because, as it now stands, it. includes no promises
of greater regional autonomy or of a greater share of the economic
benefits which accrue as a result of their exports. {In addition,
many Sumatrans will probably oppose the plan because it envisages
no important role for former vice president Hatta
7. The immediate course of events is unclear. It is possible
that the opposition leaders may be silenced by the threats of
arrest and acts of intimidation by squads of youths and veterans
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communists would be greatly improved and their influence in
the government and their hold on Sukarno, would be greatly
increased.
which are reported to have already begun and the plan may be
of the
implemented with a minimum of difficulty. In this event .the position/
8. If the opposition remains firm, widespread violence
may develop with the Communists and the anti-Ccairunists taking
advantage of the opportunity to settle old ccoros. If Sukarno
should declare martial law to enforce his plan, most of the
army units on Java would probably cooperate. However, Sukarno
might find it difficult to control the arzr, once martial law is
declared. If the situation roaches the state of serious violence
and the army has to be called in to restore order, it is possible
that the military and civil leaders in the outlying islands may
take advantage of the situation to follow the example of Sumatra.
9. It is also possible that Sukarno's plan which is still
formulated in vague termer and remains to be worked out in detail,
may be ^djuste:d through compromise and negotiation to meet the
objections of most Indonesian leaders. The advisory council
may become purely advisory, the role of the Communists may be
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reduced and limited to the council? and some means of accorsiodating
regional interests may be found. However., unless some early
progress is made in coping with Indonesia's basic economic and
political problems a compromise solution in the traditional
Indonesian manner is not likely to satisfy for long
the owing
pressures in Indonesia for a federal structure, the complaints
of the army, nor Sukarno+s impatience with parliamentary processes
and party politics.
10. V/~W Although the current crioL3 in Indonesia
may be resolved peacefully by compromise and accommodation,
situation ffe rs excellent opportunities for the Communists
improve the it position and has the potential of leac'ing to c
war, an attempted coup dietat, or political fra nentation.of
Indonesian Republic.
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