Reports of Impending Revolutionary Action Against the Governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica. (For Consideration by the Board)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200040005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 30, 1955
• Content Type: MF

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30 November 1955
DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELISGENCR
SUBJECT: Reports of Impending Revolutionary Action Against the
Governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
(For Consideration by the Board)
1. For some time there have been reports of an impending
attempt to overthrow the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. A Nicaraguan
official has recently alleged that this attempt will be initiated
by an incursion from Costa Rica on 7 December. Meanwhile, the
Costa Rican government has begun to express alarm regarding alleged
*mpafttions in Venezuela for an attack on Costa Rica similar to
that launched from Nicaragua in January 1955. A secret source reports
that such an attack is being organized in Venezuela, that it will
consist of an internal uprising at San Jose in conjunction with a
landing at Puerto Limon, and that it is scheduled for 8 December.
2. It is unlikely that Presidents Somoza, of Nicaragua, and
Perez Jimenez, of Venezuela, will ever be reconciled to the continued
existence of the Figueres regime in Costa Rica. President Figueres
cordially reciprocates their sentiments, but lacks their capabilities.
It might be supposed that all three presidents would be restrained
by their experience a year ago, which involved mortal peril for
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Figueres, acute embarrassment for Samosa, and great chagrin for
Perez Jimenez.
3. President Somosa has dominated Nicaragua since 1932, through
his control of the Guardia Nacional. Conservative Nicaraguans
desire a change and fear with reason that, if it is not accomplished
soon by conservative elements, it will be accomplished eventually,
with violence, by radicals. The approaching expiration of Somoza's
present term (in May 1957) is a spur to action to prevent him from
rigging the presidential election in favor of himself or a stooge.
There is no indication, however, that Somoza has lost control of the
Guaardia, the source of his power, or that the movement against his
amoaunts, as yet, to more than talk. in particular, there is no
evidence of actual preparations in Costa Rica for an incursion into
licaragua on 7 December.
4. Investigations by Embassy Caracas have tended to disprove
the circumstantial details of Costa Rican allegations regarding
hostile preparations in Venezuela, but nevertheless there is reason
to believe that an attack on the Fi;,ueres regime similar to that of
last January is being organized under the patronage of president
Peres Jimenez.
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5. The Costa Rican gav+eat is now preparing to meet such
an attack. If it should occur, it is likely that the Costa them
people would rally in support of Figueres, as they did in January,
and that Costa Rica would demand the immediate intervention of the
Organization of American States, as before.
6. To contemplate such an operation, President Perez Jimenez
would have to believe that he co",ld prevent effective intervention
by the O.A.S. With Costa Rica alerted, it is not likely that he
could obtain a decision before the O.A.S. could act. The rationaliza-
tion given by one source is that the O.A.S. would hesitate to deal
with the president of Venezuela as summarily as it did with the
President of Nicaragua last January. Perez Jimenez is not a modest
mans this may represent his awn opinion.
7. In this connection, the coincidence between the alleged date
for an attack from Costa Rica on Nicaragua (7 December) and the
independently reported date for the attack on Costa Rica (8 Dezember)
may be significants that is, a staged attack on Nicaragua may be
offered as justification for Nicaraguan and Venezuelan support of a
real attack on Costa Rica.
8. It is unlikely that the O.A.S. could be imposed upon in
this manner. Nicaragua and Venezuela could expect the sympathy of
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Peru, but not their firm
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support. On tie other hand, tiead.co, Ecuador, and Uruguay would
probably be outspoken in support. of Figueres. As compared with last
January (when Venezuela was a minority of one in support of
Nicaragua) political developments in Argentina and Brazil have been
favorable for Figueres.
9. In sum:
as The Somoza regime in Nicaragua appears to be in no
immediate danger.
b, Somoza and Perez Jimenez are probably conspiring to
overthrow the Figueres regime in Costa Rica. It would be an
ill-considered and probably unsuccessful operation, but their
animosity and capacity for self-delusion could lead than into
c. The Organization of American States probably could and
would intervene as iromptly and effectively as in January 1955.
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TIAL
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