The Outlook for Afghanistan

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200040004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 30, 1955
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200040004-1
C E N T R A L INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOCUMENT NO. C ~ -
NO HANGE IN CLASS. C]
30 November 2,955
!_ASS. c, M "GED TO: TS
s fiM A2g
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH HF s
DAT~ R
IEIVb~, The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : The Outlook for Afghanistan
1. In the light of increased policy concern over the trend
of Afghan relations with the Soviet Bloc, we have initiated a
new SNM updating our last Afghan estimate, NIE 53-54, of 19
October 1954, for IAC consideration on 3 January. however, the
old estimate appears to have been quite close to the mark in
assessing the outlook for Afghanistan.
2. NIE 53-54 in essence concluded that Afghanistan was
"highly vulnerable to Soviet pressures" and that its ability to
remain an independent buffer state separating the USSR from the
Indian subcontinent was being undermined as a result of Afghan
receptivity to Soviet lures, particularly in the economic and
technical assistance field. It estimated that Soviet attentions
to Afghanistan -- as part of a general effort to counter Western
gains elsewhere in the Middle East-South Asia area -- would "prob-
ably increase substantially" and that consequent Soviet economic
* As revised pursuant to IAC comments made on 29 November,
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penetration might result in "a gradual drift of Aghanistaan toward
the Soviet orbit." It noted that "Afghanistan will probably con.
ti nue to accept Soviet aid offers" and that 5S in doing so the Afghan
leaders may misjudge their ability to curb Soviet political and
subversive activity" and the willingness -;rd ability of the Western
powers to bail them out in event of a military or diplomatic crisis.
Finally,, NIE 53-54 pointed out that Afghan-Pakistani feuding --
which has played an important part in Afghanistan's receptivity to
Soviet lures -- showed little promise of ies.soning.
3. NIE 53-54 nevertheless expressed the belief that the
USSR was m-ilikoly to gain act= 1 control of Afghanistan, at least
within the next few years. It estimated that t'hz:e Afghan govern-
ment ' s dealings with the Bloc ware prat of a continuing effort
to play the great powers off against each other to Afghanistan's
advantage and that Afghanistan would probably seek to obtain addi-
tional Western econo iic and possibly aid to counterbalance
assistance from the Bloc. It concluded that the USSR was unlikely
to exercise its capability to take over Afghan:.stun militarily and.
that the small p:-o-Corlmanist ale-ients in Afghanistan would probably
not gain sufficient strength to overthrow the goverrnmen-t.
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4. Ji 'ghanistan's growing dependence on the Soviet Bloc duaHHng
the past year has underlined the dangers foreseen in the estimate,
The NI; noted that Afghanistan had received the equivalent of more
than " 11 million in Bloc credits, together with technical assistanoo,
for development projects, Another- "r10 Million credit has n-)w reportedly
boon extended by Czechoslovakia, Deliveries -)f arms from Czochoslova.~;ia
under a $3 million cash deal are already being made. The Soviets have
reportedly even offered to take over. and complete the American-financed
and (directed Helmand Valley project,, the countryts largest dovolopmer-'%
project,, * Afghan be::-tor trade with the Bloc has been increasing.
Finally, the bfhhan government is taking steps to reduce its -Vul. -
norability to Pakistani ec.)noraic sanctions by rerouting the bully of
its foreign trade, both with the West and the Bloc, through the USA
rather than via the traditional routes through Pakiston,
5. These growing ties with the Soviet Bloc - which will almost
certainly be strengthened during the forthcoming Ifhruschov-i_;ulga.iin
visit -..- n;: ohab1y result not from a deliberate Afghan decision to
Total US loans and technical and economic aid to Afghanistan since
19.+9 has boon