REVIEW OF NIE-84: 'PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN GUATEMALA'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010037-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: April 22, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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22 April
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
GUBJEDT: Review of NIE-84: "Probable Developments in Guatemala"
The Board of National Estimates has reviewed the conclusions
of NIE?B4, "Probable Developments in Guatemala", which was
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adopted by the TAC on 12 May 19530
d
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the Boar
consulte
with
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Discussion of critical
aspects of the problem is contained in the Enclosure,
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ALI
CONCLUSIOM
la We consider that the conclusions of 1-84 remain
essentially valida In particulars we reaffirm the first conclusion,
as follows:.
The current political situation in Guatemala is adverse
to US interests,, The Guatemalan Communists exercise a
political influence far out of proportion to their small
numerical strength,, Their influence will probably continue
to grow as long as President Arbenz remains in power,,
2a The Communists now effectively control the political
life of Guatemala* Arbenz a decisions on domestic and foreign
policy are reached, not in the official cabinet, but in a
kitchen cabinet composed of Communists and prooCommuatstso
There is no prospect of a break between Arbenz and the Communistsa
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3a There has probably been an increase in popular
disillusionment with the Arbens regimes There is certainly
increased desperation among opposition elements., In present
circumstances, however, the possibility of effective internal
political action to alter the situation does not exist., We
believe that effective revolutionary action would require the
active support of a major portion of the Armlro
bo The disposition of the Army toward the regime is
therefore crucial., We note indications of unresst$ even of
disaffection, within the Army and consider that a revolutionary
potential now exists there* We do not believe, however, that
the Guatemalan Army is likely to take spontaneous action
against the Arbene regimso
5o The Communists will be concerned to neutralize the
revolutionary potential in the Army, and, with the passage
of time, may succeed in doing soq
6o The solidarity of the other Central American states
in opposition to Guatemala has weakened during the past year
and may further decreased
7o In view of the foregoing considerations, we believe
that time to on the side of the Communists in Guatemalan
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