Political and Psychological Effects of a US Program for Cooperation with Other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2000
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: August 9, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTD%TES
9 August 1954
DRAFT 1 iORANDUM FOR THE D]I TOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Political and Psychological Effects of a US Program for
Cooperation with Other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy
That the program would be as outlined in the draft report to
the NSC on "Cooperation with other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy," 4 August 1954. DOCUMENT NO, T
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. U
Sg!VtCLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
DISCUSSION NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH:
DATE/ ? REVIEWER: 372044
1. ral Re nse. The response of the Free World coun,-
tries to the proposed program would probably be generally favorable
and would bring important political and psychological benefits to
the US. Mawr nations, particularly those which are more advanced .
scientifically, would regard the program as a long overdue relaaa-
tion of US policies of secrecy and exclusiveness in the atomic
energy field and as a practical implementation of the Presidentts
speech of 8 ,December 1953. Among the underdeveloped nations of
Asia and Latin America the opportunity to participate in the
program would probably be regarded as conferring prestige and as
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an indication that the powerful and advanced US was willing to
treat them as peers in a field which is associated with the most
advanced developments of the twentieth century.
2. There will be elements in most countries, however, which
will have qualms about participating in any such program because
of: (a) the belief that the principal use of atomic energy is in
weapons of mass destruction and that further research and develop-
ment can only increase the likelihood that such destruction will
take place; and (b) fears that association. with the Min a program
for the development of atomic energy would involve their countries
in US military plans and insure their participation in any future
atomic war. Such qualms will, for the most part, affect the general
public rather than the official and scientific communities and are
unlikely to cause any goverment to decide against participation,
3. Some criticisms will probably also be made: (a) that the
proposed program is too modest and is not commensurate with the
resources of the US and the scientific capabilities of the more
advanced countries or the needs of underdeveloped countries;
(b) that it should provide for installation of power rather than
research reactors, (countries which already have research reactors
may argue that they are ready for the next step in their atomic
energy development programs., and may backward countries will
argue that their need is for a source of cheap energy quickly);
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and (c) that some elements will be disappointed that the US does
not propose to finance the entire program,
4. However, proper presentation of the proposed program
could largely allay the above fears and justify the program to its
critics, particularly if effective publicity were given to the uses
of research reactors and the fact that the proposed program would
not advance the military utilization of atomic energy except in an
indirect and theoretical way. The desire of many countries for
more tangible and immediate benefits through power rather than
research reactors would probably be largely satisfied if it were
emphasized that the program, even though modest, is an essential
prerequisite to wider peacetime uses of atomic energy and that
assistance in the development of power reactors could be expected
to follow in due course. Informed foreign opinion would also
probably recognize that work on the peacetime uses of atomic en-
ergy is still in the experimental stages and that the program
would give participating countries an opportunity to train per`
sonnelFwho would be able to utilize the products of this.research
as they became available,
5. Longer j g= Reaetioo. There is some danger that even
the longer term various countries participating in the program
would become disillusioned as experience taught them the cost
of maintaining an atomic research program and that they would
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endeavor to persuade the US to make additional financial contribu-
tions., but this problem would probably not be greater than is the
case with present technical aid programs. There might be some
popular dissatisfaction due to the lack of tangible and spectate
lar benefits produced by the program, but this is unlikely to be
great if care is taken to warn against excessive expectations.
Nevertheless, the general political and psychological advantages
brought the US by the proposed program would tend to fall off
markedly over the longer term unless the momentum of the program
were maintained.
6. Rec i roQjj Co nts. There would be dangers in
attempting to tie bilateral US assistance in the development of
research (or power) reactors to specific reciprocal commitments
to the US in other fields. Most participating countries would
probably expect that no political coupitments will, be attached
to participation in the program, because of the President's em-
phasis in his "atomic pool" speech upon the fact that his proposal
was being made for the general benefit of mankind. These expects..
tiona will be reinforced by the modest character of the program
presently proposed. Moreover, those countries which supply the
US with atomic materials - Belgium, Canada, Union of South
Africa, Brazil, India, and Australia will probably regard the
US offers under the proposed program as no more than they are
due. These circumstances will probably not exclude the possibility
A.
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of obtaining limited quid nro ouos by bilateral negotiations in
some cases, particularly from countries which do not supply the
US with atomic materials. For the most part, however, the advan-
tages which the US is likely to receive from the proposed program
will be in the form of good will.
7. tilateral vs Bi i sa4 era a ?ree nt u A concrete US
proposal for creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency
affiliated with the US as part of the proposed program would evoke
a highly favorable Free World reaction. Among other things, it
would encourage those countries not receiving immediate benefits
from the program to expect that. they would benefit later through
a multilateral spreading out of these benefits. Many countries
would also anticipate that in an international agency they would
have more leverage upon the US and be less directly committed to
the US. At the same time a US proposal for eventual creation of
an international agency would ease the way for prior bilateral
agreements. Some Asian countries might prefer assistance via a
UN agency to direct US assistance., but we do not believe that
this factor alone would persuade any Free World country to forego
the benefits of bilateral aid from the US.
a. lyd$~sdt 7 r.~?ProblM. Those countries which
supply nuclear materials to the US will, like Belgium, almost
certainly demand special consideration. They will expect US
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assistance under the proposed program as a 9.QLp
.Zo cuo for their
continued supplying of such materials.
9. Among the potential participants in the proposed program,
the ,following countries are best qualified by reason of their
sciAntific capabilities: the UK, France, Norway, the Netherlands
Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, and West Germany. An of
these countries have fairly advanced atomic research programs of
their own; some already have research reactors, and the others
are building or planning to build one or gore; some are working
on power reactors. Most of them would probably be highly inter-
ested in benefiting from US technological assistance and in obtain-
ing supplies of refined fissionab]e materials. West Germany, of
course., would be able to participate only if present restrictions
upon its activities in the atomic energy field were modified,
10. A second group of Free World countries which are less
advanced scientifically than the above countries, but which have
initiated atomic research programs, includes: Italy, India,
Argentina, Brazil, Australia, the Union of South Africa, and
Japan. These countries would require considerable aid and assis-
tance before they could make effective use of an atomic research
reactor,
U. A third group of countries have demonstrated active in_
terest in the development of atomic energy for peacetime uses, but
b-
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have no programs of their own or are engaging in research of a
peripheral nature only. These countries would require a still
greater degree of US assistance and support than those in the
second group. They include: Israel, Yugoslavia, Spain, Portugal,
Greece, Turkey, and Mexico. Most remaining Free World countries
are either not actively concerned with atomic research or com-
pletely lack the necessary capabilities,
22, Reg'io Al P= g, However carefully the proposed
program is handled, there is likely to be dissatisfaction and
discontent in some countries which do not immediately participate,
either because they feel that the US has underestimated their
scientific capabilities, or because they feel that there are
special circumstances which justify their inclusion in the program
at an early stage. In some areas., intraregional antagonisms mg
be sharpened if certain countries are declared eligible to the
exclusion of others. This factor will be particularly important
if it proves difficult to demonstrate the ooaulete dissociation
of a program for the use of atomic research reactors frm ax r
increase in military potential. The establishment of an inter..
national organization under UN auspices for the administration
of research done under the proposed program would ultimately do
a great deal to allay the fears and suspicions that may be created
by the construction of an atomic research reactor in one country
in regions where there is great sensitivity to any changes, real
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or surmised, in the balance of power. Such regional problems
might also be overcome if regional research centers were set up
to utilize the research reactors constructed under the proposed
program.
13. If Argentina and Brazil were the only countries declared
Immediately eligible in Latin America for participation in the
proposed program, their neighbors' fears would probably be aroused,
and if a reactor were constructed in only one of those two covi-
tries, the other would probably react unfavorably, If, however,
facilities could be provided for qualified scientists from all the
Latin American countries to work with a research reactor con-
structed in some suitable location, regional tensions would
probably be minim. On the other hand, if a reactor were con-
I
strutted in Argentina with US help, Peron would probably find
that it was easier to bring to a successful conclusion his attempt
to invite foreign participation in Argentina's petroleum development.
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17. The most important regional problem in Europe is likely
to be the opposition of other countries to the creation of an
atomic energy program in, West Germs. There already exists in
Europe an international organization formed for the purpose of
cooperative action in the atomic energy development field. Sow
European states would probably prefer to see US assistance under
the proposed program go to this organizations rather than to
individual states.
1$, Sours} Reaction, The USSR, for reasons of both prestige
and security, would probably reject participation in the proposed
program, It is also unlikely that the USSR would seek to counter
the US offer by indicating that it too was willing to help supply
atomic reactors and technicians to underdeveloped countries. At
most, Moscow might report with considerable fanfare the establish-
ment of atomic reactors in the Satellite states or Cozo nist
China, citing the conditions of their establishment as exemplary
of relations among sovereign states,
19, The Soviet Union would probably rely primarily on'psopat
ganda to counter or "expose" the US program, Moscow would stress
above all else that the US was seeking to divert public attention
from the major international problem of banning the use of nuclear
weapons. It would minimize the significance of the VS proposals
arguing that only with agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons would
sufficient nuclear fuel be diverted to the peaceful use of atomic
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energy to be of substantial economic benefit to other nations. It
would point out that the US planned to continue the full scale
production of atomic weapons. The proposal, it would be charged,
ie a direct descendant of the Baruch Plan and., as such, is designed
to secure, US control over atomic research and production throughout
the world. Nevertheless, we believe it is unlikely that such a
propaganda assault would significantly reduce the US program's
appeal to the Free World or would d4minish appreciably the bene-
fits which the US would receive.
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U:' MOM= FOR COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS IN TBE PEACEFUL
OF ATOMIC ENERGY (As outlined in the Draft Report to the
of 4 August 1954)
1, Under the proposed program information,acientific
assistance, fissionable materials, and equipment suitable for
the construction and utilization of atomic research reactors
would be made available to selected countries by the US in order
to assist them in the development of the peaceful uses of atomic
energy.
2. Operation of the reactors would be carried on under the
authority of an International Atomic Energy Agency under the
aegis of the United Nations,, devoted to the development of the
peaceful applications of atomic energy, It is anticipated that
arrangements for the establishment of such an organization can
be cospleted not sooner than two years hence.
3e
However, negotiations for and agreements concerning
the financing of the program and the construction of the atomic
research reactors would be worked out by the US and the recipi-
ent, nations bilaterally. Initiation of such negotiations need
not. await the establishment of the international organization
referred to, above and would probably begin within the next few
months,
4. Costs of construction and operation would be not by
the participating countries, but these are expected to be so
modest as to warrant excluding from this paper any detailed
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