Prospects for Afghan-Pakistani Confederation

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010011-6
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 24, 1998
Sequence Number: 
11
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 15, 1954
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010011-6.pdf253.18 KB
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Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79R00904A000010011-6 %OF Z'E )RANDUH! FDR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBJECTS Prospects for Afghan-Pakistani Confederation 1. Afghan Foreign Minister Raft's recent appeal to Am- bassador Lodge in New York, urging US encouragement of Afghan- Pakistani confederation as the "only way" to keep his country securely in the Free World, is one of several indications that important Afghan and Pakistani officials are considering this possibility. We believe that the idea of confederation does and will continue to have a certain attraction to leaders on both sides. As indicated in our 4 October memorandum to the DD/I, however, we consider the chances less than oven that the two goverranents will reach any formal agreement on the desira- bility of a confederation and, in any event, believe that the practical difficulties involved, both internal and external, would make actual implementation of such an agreement highly unlikely. 2. This assessment of the confederation question is sub- etantially accepted by the working level specialists in O/CI, Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010011-6 15 October 1954 Approved For ReIQas 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79R00904A0QQ p0010011-6 M/P, and OIR, and is reflected in the draft estimate on Af- ghanistan passed by the IAC representatives on Tuesday. A final draft of the estimate, in which we plan to insert a greatly expanded discussion of the confederation question, will be ready for presentation to the IAC after a cleanup session of the IAC representatives today, 3, A summary-evaluation of the evidence available on the confederation question is given below: as Within the last year there have been several indi. cations that the confederation question has been under discussion in Afghan and Pakistani official circles: (1) in February 1954 the Agha Khan wrote Governor General Ohulam Mohammed of Pakistan strongly urging a confederation in which the King of Afghanistan would also serve as President of Poldstaa, (2) In April a Now York Times Karachi dispatch stated that a merger of the two countries had been under secret consideration for a year and was reportedly imminent, This report was denied by the Pakistani and Afghan Governments but follow-up cables indicated that Pakistani Ambassador Shah had discussed confederation in Approved For Release 2001/ A-RDP79R00904A000200010011-6 Approved For ReIAase 2001/0 P79R00904AOQ0200010011-6 Kabul and Atig, his Afghan opposite number in Karachi, had done the same with Pakistani off icials. (3) In September Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed AU reportedly told the Agha Khan in France that six months after Pakistan be- came a republic it would confederate with Afghanistan, with the King of Afghanistan be- coming President of the Pakistan Republic. This report was rated possibly true. On 9 October Prince Naim asked Aaassador Lodge to have the US exert its influence on Pakistan in favor of federation. Contrary to the previous report, he said that Mohonued Ali had been cool and suspicious toward the scheme when Haim had broached it to him? b. The idea of confederation almost certainly has a csr- tain attraction in both capitals. Afghan leaders ray see in it a means of escaping not only from the dangers posed by the USSR's heightened interest in their country but also from the difficulties they have brought on themselves through their espousal of the Pushtoonistan camgaign; they may further hope Approved For Release 2001/08/1 DP79R00904A000200010011-6 Approved For Releasp 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79R00904A0Q02p0010011-6 that under confederation the Pathan tribal areas of Pakistan will once again fall into Kabul's sphere of influence. Various Pakistani leaders, for their part, may sea in con- federation a means of advancing their anti-Soviet defenses to the north side of the formidable Hindu Kush range. Religious-minded men in both countries may share the Agha Khan's unhappiness over the spectacle of two Islamic states engaged in fraternal bickering and may be attracted by his vision of a united Moslem nation stretching from the Oxus to the sea. C. We are impressed, however, by the lack of evidence that the confederation question is being seriously and offi. ciaily considered in any practical fashion. Despite the importance and complexity of the subject, the four episodes summarized above represent the only major indications we have that the subject is under active consideration at all, and the information they provide is far from conclusive. Both Shah and Atig, in their pro-confederation activity last spring, appear to have advanced the idea on an informal and personal basis, The report that Mohamed Ali not only talked sympathetically to the Agha Khan about the latter's confedera- tion scheme but actually promised to put it into effect is at least indirectly contradicted by Prince Naim's testimony ? 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010011-6 Approved For ReleC; 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79R00904A0g02Q0010011-6 . 'rte and is otherwise completely uncorroborated. Even Prince and *in's plea for US support for the confederation was ad- vanced on a personal rather than an official basis. We are left with the impression that at most various Afghan and Pakistani statesmen are talking inconclusively and somewhat wishfully about the desirability of confederation, much as Arab leaders in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan have tal1ad about the ideal of Arab unity over since World War 1, There is no indication that either the Afghans or the Pakistanis have considered confederation as a practical prepositien, d. Even if responsible Afghan and Pakistani officials do reach agreement on the desirability of confederation, the scheme would be extremely difficult to put into effect: (1) The USSR would almost certainly regard such a development as threatening its position and rights in the area and would take determined action to prevent it. Under its treaty with Afghanistan, which is considerably mars sweep- ing than that with Iran, it could argue that the new state had inherited obligations in- consistent with the Turk-Pakistani agreement and Pakistanis acceptance of US military aid - 5 - Approved For Release 2001/08/f2DP79R00904A000200010011-6 Approved For Relpane 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79R00904A000010011-6 ! ice! and that Soviet military intervention was therefore Justifiable. At a niniim m, the USSR would probably increase its subversive activities in Afghanistan. (2) India would almost certainly oppose a union of Afghanistan and Pakistan, both because it would remove an impediment to Pakistani free- dom of action - the Pushtoonistan dispute - which India has covertly encouraged in the past, and because it would further stimulate Soviet military interest in the area. India would probably use diplomatic pressures in an effort to prevent a confederation by diplo- matic means and might also seek to bribe key Afghan government aid tribal leaders in an effort to wreck the scheme. (3) Finally, there would be difficult internal problems to work out. The Afghans would almost certainly want to have the Pathan tribes of Pakistan's northwest frontier province released from direct Pakistan Government control - an Afghan aim which Karachi has stoutly resisted -6- Approved For Release 2001/08/ T79R00904A000200010011-6 Approved For Release 2001/0 CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010011-6 ever since its establishment, Frictions would arias over the division of spoils and office in the new governmental and econmic structure. In addition, the new setup would greatly increase the problems of uwieldinese and regionalism in Pakistan ands while the idea of confederation might be acceptable to some Pakistani leaders it would almost certainly be vigorously and possibly violently opposed 25X1A9a by others. SHERMAN KENT Assistant Director National Estimates Approved For Release 2001/08/1 " glR-RDP79R00904A000200010011-6