REVIEW OF NIE-84: 'PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN GUATAMALA'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 22, 1954
• Content Type: MF

22 April 1951i
,
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF. CEt TRAL INTELLI(ENCE
SUBJMT: Review of NIE'81: "Probable Developments in Guatemala"
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The Board of National Estimates has reviewed the conclusions
of NILE?BIt, "Probable Developments in Guatemala", which was
adopted by the IAC on 12 May 19530
Discussion of critical
aspects of the problem is contained in the Enclosure,,
CONCLUSIONS
to We consider that the conclusions of NIEE-84 remain
essentially valido In particular, we reaffirm the first conclusion,
as follows.
The current political situation in Guatemala is adverse
to IS interests, The Guatemalan Communists exercise a
political influence far out of proportion to their small
numerical strengtho Their influence will probably continue
to grow as long as President Arbens remains in powero
20 The Communists now effectively control the political
life of Guatemalan Arbensc decisions on domestic and foreign
policy are reached, not in the official cabinet, but in a
kitchen cabinet composed of Comnnanists and pro-Communistso
There is no prospect of a break between Arbenz and the Communistso
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3a. There has probably been an increase in popular
disillusionment with the Arbors regimes There is certainly
increased desperation among opposition elementso In present
circumstances, however, the possibility of effective internal
political action to alter the situation does not exists We
believe that effective revolutionary action would require the
active support of a major portion of the Ar ra
40 The disposition of the Army toward the regime is
therefore crucialo We note indications of unrest, even of
disaffection, within the Army and consider that a revolutionary
potential now exists there4 We do not believe, however, that
the Guatemalan Army is likely to take spontaneous action
against the Arbens regimso
5o The Communists will be concerned to neutralize the
revolutionary potential in the Ar y, and, with the passage
of time, may succeed in doing son
bo The solidarity of the other Central American states
in opposition to Guatemala has weakened during the past year
and may further decreases
7 In view of the foregoing considerations, we believe
that time is on the side of the Communists in Guatemalan
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SL JEG s Vro ble Consequences i,,
jeetion of the 'a
h re section of
lr*g the probable course of I
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cause
a n ,i1" oble:';.s ? t' a would
probably also be great Prehension In sin Exrope ear-cera
ing to deal with Atar a orn
fear drastic a
statux in the Western alliance would ahar r i.t. ra ent ra,u
r the 1 , to arm the 4est Germans outside the all ..arcs
s t j on the other aar r', many would fear that the W j
revert to a peripheral etrate , There would probable also
concern that a West man w4.1 , has been barred from ems.
xotwithFt dir
eeking
roe this new a ituationa, a,z i
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40
pr bab morId bsco
n?h
roll" would be unUkely ard that the
CDU fold re-main the &-rdmnt
be next f er , elections,
tto , probably voiald, be a der,
of sovereignty.
Adenauer would contlr a bi
tai =rench collaboration by a s tits to fnr u:
sovereignty r a earmr,,ent, The
roluctsnt to proceed vith rearm
since their, 41itar experts. eon
o3W b
pr:L-n
e
Fy i nree
arliwwent ac
6'.
All of the Pft ent govn:r nt, wnpale- probably
by a return to the type of ri bt