POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A US PROPOSAL FOR A WORLD-WIDE MORETORIUM ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100050033-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: May 14, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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GEWTR~L I~4TELZI(~EWCE &CE1~GY
~ ' 19~r
~~! ~ THE D3~EGT~ GF GENT~L IY~7~,IC~I~CE
~~EGT: ~lit2aa~ iDo~gv~s~~se~ o~ a iJS Propoa~a]. for a S~Torld~
~.de Nl~ara.~o~3.tt~ on Ntzcl~ar W~,poffiel T~>~a
~,~ yma d~a~ ~ a~~smpt '?.a ~a't3xi;~"9rre ~h~ e,~~.
cry this gold m~a~.um~ . tits U3 dear p~g~ ~
a~paYa th?: s~l+s~~.i~re mili~s~ c>~pab~lit3.ea of ~:h~ 1~ a~~d ~tb~e &~.St3.
1~ ~ at~d ~aplea +~!' ~h? old
~e~tl~ slmc>~a~ e3aly ~pp7.avd aid ~ ~ ~ ~ ~'~
>~ war1.&~w9.de s4,~i~ ca- av~l~~ $ss~s. Thy .d tid~r
~~h >~- per]. a ciT ~ ~~ aid rests ~d
~~te~d r~g~' ~o C~ +:;3~ur~e #~ ~ i~~ks fio ~=~ar~+~
~d dal' ir,~e old. ~ RATC~ a~.limrss e~sp~sisl~.y t3g~,.
~vld ~ .~ mps~e ~'3.~ei~9.~ 3~ t,~te ~ psl. e
~r es~aaltalaga~s :~i1r~ $~em.
DOCUMENT NO. ~ ~ .,
NO CHANGE IPJ CLASS '~
+-~~, ~ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT FiEV4EW DATE: _
RUTH: (~ 70-2
DATE; ~ ~ RE1,'iEWER
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a. The ~'+~es~eoxLs of ot~ alliesq anal their ~i19.tas~r
seed sas~.ent3.~'ie ~clss, .d alr~st ~~ta3x~1~ estic at that
'i~e~'ose ma2~g the ~ the tiS hsd eaPe~l.1~r aal~ar~late8 the
et'feet the nsmatosiwn ~rould ham the tJS Teas ~o
axed t4~ T~estesa s~sat?gic ~ait3an. Tb`ore~ y~litiesal.
lead?ra tamed p~?olbab3~- gonelude that the ~ator~.tua tamed ~tr~rpade
the TiSa~ 8t ~.@99$i 8$ 81L1Ch 88 ~'Pi Wed ~'ih~ Tb'y ~3d~ '~Sl E11~ 189
th~ [,i+0~l1~d~ ~~6~~f ~~t~,'~ tbB'~r #ihs po].itica3. ad,~ta~i
ud cnitts3~3t atp~' osierrti~Sc arsd teal~ica3 di?advanta~es.
Spa ~ieratif'io and aches teehaicsel74 c}t~elified leasla,re in allied
atates ~rould psobab3~y be distus?sed about t~ e~'fettt the mosato-
riu~ told have ~ Ag sualeas seseas~sh ~d de~slop~msnt,~ but
others ur~uld ea~~as3~ieally auppost the masm'~a~sium.
3. S ~-~ ens allies9
that the m~att~itam app~,gr oal~r to tests of areas era ~':
l~ ~. In wing as sasti~ this psapo~l.s the; waruld
gsa'~.b~gr seasc~ that auelear testa belo~e that magnitudes could
~ de~t?ated with absolute a~Ys and that a mossetosiv~
of testa bela~r that ma~.itude wrns7.d not be ob ~ th~- t15SFi
Tout std ha'v~e to ~ ho~ar~sed ~ the ~-4 i'Etey v~x3d
~?o'bab~}r also s?ason that t~stsi+otia,~ ~apama tests in thia
.d be po~+slar 3a tIm ~c~-Cast ~ararid, Wrn~ld ~.to~ West
-i?E1P-!?~-
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taste +od` x.19.-~.e3~d taeapa~, ~d d d3t ~r att~ntfa~a
fraa~ fi Y~-9a.
~,. Together- faith the 3niti~. ap~a~? of tho ga].~
hoer, theta wrnald s~east a~ta3ssly be a spread iPeelit~
thro~ghc~t ~e aon.-Gom~anist tirorld that the m~atari~ .d
ha~a 13ttie ~a3.va Mess it oonatituted the first step tvtaard,
a ~d-~ridda ~am~ ~tl~ 't?estrieti~g air ibit3~
the use of ~a3ear wag Pressure t'c~ stt~ah $n agreame~
d pa^~hab],~ 3.nc~ase dtn*ing the per3red of the mo~rata~.ut~.
. the end of the moratoriums period ay~paraaoh9d~ ~ strong d~-
posii~io~ wouicd ~ah1y develop fiDT +eatend3ng it.
egs 7.d derelop i~ some cotes to kept a p38n
for nnal+eer a~ t~h ~e ~ ~l+d consider umsatis~'ao-
tom.
5. ?.~' the i1S s~nuSd oa~,~ opt nuo teats ding
d~.ecussons of the , thsre+ ~auSLd sat oer~ainZy be
etrong critiois~m and hostfa.ity thratighcu~ the uaa~-C
old. Nb~ec~r, retsu~a-tion of ano7.esr testa ?~ter ion
?~' the moretorinm wt~d alreost asi~tl~r ~ a wade of ~
fee~,i~ag .inst ' ;te .ash first rc~so~d its #.est:~ ~?
6. the Indian nt ~. presbah~ aoa~sidar tha
~ T~5 s~render to Inds and a~~her eritio of t~
-3-
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I~a~c2~ icsst~. ~~ th~+ ~aP~~es~ :a$ ate ?e~,3~,jt v~tald ~
ee~3~.ad t~ rt~.s~~ th~a n~ato~.mn, Tm+dia t~t].d p~+oba'b~q ~e1c to
~~ the tl5 p~og~aa~ ~o ag ~tceea,~s~ ~sa~ use a~'
~,nacl~ar ~s~,pcmns eaac~ ~~~i-' : a aeaa~.i?r e~ pro~at3~o~
c~ ~.a3.?@r sa~apaa~e. 5 an ~ ~tti.~~tfi.'~ p~ob~
g au'beiGla~ C 3n fi,~ fliQ.
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II. The Ca~nunist Reaction
7. The Communist leaders would almost cer~inly make a
careful stuffy of the proposal and its significance before th+oy'
made an official reply. In their estinn.~te, we believe that
they would consider the following factors:
a. IIS motives in making the proposal. The Co~nuniat
leaders would probablry be uncertain concerning the motives
behind the US proposal. They would probablq estimate, at
least initially, that the following motives were all
involved in the i~ decisions
(1) That the U5 hoped to obtain a positive
political sx~d propaganda advantage from the prc~poasl
and at the same time to dgf3ate the Cornmuaist "peat"
c~paiga.
(2) That the U5 hayed that a moratorium would
crippl? or at laaat hamper 3aviet weapons dev,elop~
went, at a time when the US research and devrilapment
program had reached established goals.
(3) That the US, alarmed by the storm of pa~o?
teats over the March nuclear weapons tests, disturbed
about the growing atreapgth of the catapaign to prohibit
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the use of auclear w?agors~, and distressed by th+~
resent $traina upon the alliance, had bees farted to
issue the proposal.
b, The_Monito~ and Policing Problem. The Commu~sts
are probably well aware that the US has substantial capabilt~
ties for detecting Soviet nuclear tests. They grobab~y
behove that US suraeillance i~olv~es the use of information
and techniques which the U3 would not wish to disclose, and
that the evidence or proof of teats derived through these
teahniquuas might not be sufficiently clear to convince worltP
opinion that the USSEt had violated the moratorium, Indeed,
they might believe that a US effort to aos~tlemn the USSR far
an alleged violatioa a~f the mdratoriwn would offer the Coan-
munists oppartunit3.es to confuse and divide the non-Com-reunist
world.
Effects of a I~orator3,um on Communist and W?stern
Military Capabilities. The USSR almost certainly estimates
that it will need to stage a few weapons tests reasonably
soon 3.n order to incorporate recant research work into more
advanced and efficient weapons. Howetrer, the Kremlin
Frobab3y believes that, in general, weapons test+~ are more
important far the t~ nuclear program than th~r are for the
Sovi?t program, It almost certainly believes that nuclear
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weapons, especiglly those for strategic use, play a more
important role in Western military strategy than they do
in Communist strategya Therefore, provided the IISSR had
complgt~ Sts neat series of fasts, it would probably esti-
saate that a moratorium on weapons taste would not impair
Soviet capabilities more than it would those of the US.
d. Political Effects of a Moratorium. The Com~ninists
would probably estimate that they could counteract the
initial favorable effects of the tJ.S proposal on the non-
communist world. They would probably estimate that they
;could incorporate tY~ proposal-into their "peace" campai~
:and (w3.th left-wing and neutralist supports could canvert~
it into the standard Saviot proposal to ban the use of ~ruclear
weapons. They would estimate that mangy peoples ax-d sours
government$,.notably the Indian and Japanese, would support
the eyctension of the US groposal to one including sash a baap
Iai their views such a development would probably destroy the
iniltia~. profit the US had gained from making its proposal
wou]~d increase the urgency of the demand for some k3.nd of
weapons control or ban, and would help to blur the distinction
in world opinion bet~re~en the US program for international
atomic control and the Soviet program.
8. Probable Comm~niat Courses of Action..
ao Ia their propaganda, the Comnuniats would probably
denourree this proposal as an American trick designed to
..
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quiet the "universal demand" for a ban on nuclear
weapons. At the same time, they would probably declare
that the t~ proposal, unsatisfactory as it was, had been
forced by the Comm~u~3at "peace" campaign and that it
should be regarded only as a step toward banning"the use
of nuclear weapons.
b. The Kremlin would. probably examine the proposal
for a moratorium for some time before making an official
repay. We believe that it would seek to delaq discussion
until any tests which it may base scheduled had been aom-
pletedo The Kremlin would then probably agree to discuss
the proposal, either at a large int+arnational conference
called by the UN Disarmament Cormrd.ttee or at a "Big
Five" conference, but it would a]raost cartainliy suggest
that the proposal be expanded into a larger p~a~ogram in-
volving aban upon the use of nuclear weapons. It would
probably oppose anar attempt to exclude tests of weapons
under ID ST, arguing that on]y a moratorium on all
weapons tests would bring progress toward peace.
c. In the last analysis, we believe that the Krem-
lin would probably accept the moratorium, convinced that
would be forced bg world opinion,
Ito honor
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the agreement. It wou]~d almost certain]y observe the
moratorSum until such time as the Soviet research pro-
gram had progressed to the point where nsw testa would
be desirable - approaimata]y one year. The Soviet da-
cision then would depend upon the political situation
throughout the world and upon the Soviet estimate of the
advantages it would gain from violating or denouncing the
moratoriu~. In ate case, the Aremlin wou'~.d continua re-
search in and production of all types and aiaes of weapons.
CDR THE BDARD OF IdATIOATAI, ~STINIATES s
c ng
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