CRITICAL FACTORS UNDERLYING THE VIABILITY OF A SOUTH VIETNAM STATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100050021-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: July 12, 1954
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2007/01/19: CIA-RDP79R00904A000100050021-5
C A, D 4 T R A 19 I F .C E L L I G E N C E A C E N 0 S,
12 July l9t
"ROR ila 14 FOR THE DIRECTOR OF MINM L INTELLMFNCE
SUBJECT Critical Fact-ore Underlying the Viability of a South
Vietnam State
To e;3tii; t' :what factors would be of critical importance in the
ea" ah : sh nt of a viable South Vietnam s taste after the withdrawal
of the nnCoruux.sts from Worth Vietnam.
DISCUSSION
We consider the ollo~: ng factors to be essential in the
esta hliobinef .t of a viable Saudi Vietnam state:
a. That he government of S th Vietnam receive of -
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a tional r Lf-nePaaition and Ly :r m It would be rlAcuiar]y adVc nt geoe.s if the military strpeng-th of the US and IM were comitted
pr tec ting the integrity of the South Vietnam state arid L" ^ ~.e
Colo.ntn powers ended dip3.ortatio recognition and support.
b? That the 31ne between North and South Vietnam and the
horder=a of Laoa and Canbodja be re cured. In h event of a cease
fire j, this Ynould have to be, done by mans of an international! gwr" c.
tc (p sferably including the US and the 11K),, combined with inter .
ncat:.o 1 supervision, If r cease fire obtained, ? ubstantial out-
side fors ? could be required to secure the borders. The location
of the xoorth-?south border is not a critical factor so long as it:
(a) bisects Vietnam north of Tourane,and (b) is so drawn ag; to
facilitate into"national supcri lion and military defers,,
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c, That South Vietnam be independent of France and that this
be manifested in terms risible to the average Vietnamese. Although
the government probably could not maintain the necessary appearance
of independence while holding mewbership in the French Union as
presently constituted, the Vietnamese might be willing to be members
of a less formal organization, somea'hat similar to the British Common.
wealth, In addition, it would be important to assure them that uni-
fication of Vietnam was the long-range goal,
d, That the overnmont be eaoable of maintainininternal
s+ , It would be essential that Viet Minh regulars and guerrillm
be withdrawn, preferably through international agreement under effective
international, supervision, and that a corgetent national police force
be established. Provided that South Vietnam was :n-t required for the
short term to assume more than a minor share in the defense of its
borders, adequate forces would probably be available from among present
Vietnamese forces in Central and South Vietnam,
e, That the government achieve short-term ,contr. a viability by:
(i) reducing share of national income being withdrawn from the coun-
try; (i.i) exporting sufficient raw materials, principally rice and
ruby, to pay for imports of manufactured goods; and (iii) obtain-
ing the substantial tecbni cal and financial assistance refired to
support Vietnam during the initial period,
f. That the new South Vietn, ovvxraaent quickly establish a
amputation for corpetence and efficiency. There are a few individuals
who have displayed genuine leadership and others may emerge when an
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~%W BE
independent South Vietnam state is established. In any event,
foreign administrative assistance would be required for an in.
definite period of time. Administrative reform of the extent
required would be impossible under the present leadership of Sao
Da.. and his entourage.
2, We consider that it would be possible, if all the critical
factors listed above were present, to establish a viable South Vietnam
state, We recognize,, however, that the difficulties would be enormous.
Even assuming that the US and the UK were willing to support a South
Vietnam state and guarantee its integrity and that France relinquished
its political and economic dominance, it would be extremely difficult
to organize an effective Vietnamese government in the chaotic situation
which would exist following the signing of a come-fire agreement be..
tween the French and the Communists, Such a government would have to
establish itself as a rallying-point for non-Commudst nationalist
elements, even though it had accepted the loss of Tonkin and a division
of the countrys, however temporary. Once established, the new goverment
would be immediately confronted, in addition to the security problems
already present in Vietnam, with the task of coping with a Viet Minh
underground which would almost certainly be left behind as the Viet Minh
withdrew their regular troop formations. Moreover, even if international
supervision of the borders was effective in preventing the movement of
large military units, it would be impossible to seal the border against
the infiltration of individuals. The government would therefore be the
target of an increasing campaign of Communist subversion in addition to
overt political pressures from the north.
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