THE SHORT TERM POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN ITALY (THROUGH 1955)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100040013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 9, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
9 November 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: The Short Tann Political Outlook in Italy
(through 1955)
SUMMARY
A0 Italy faces a period of political instability with
the prospect of a further weakening of the democratic center
and strengthening of both left and right extremes* Any settle.
ment of the Trieste crisis which does not appear favorable to
Italy (i*0,, does not approximate the US.UK 8 October decision)
will probably lead to the fall of the Pella cabinet and further
strengthen these extremes.
Bo A Trieste settlement favorable to Italy would bolster
the present Italian government but would not, in itself, be
sufficient to avert the gradual weakening of the democratic
center in Italy,
C, However, we believe it unlikely that during the next
two years a Connunist.dominated government will come to power,
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whether hy coup or by legal means. Any changes in the political
complexion of the Italian government over the next two years are
more likely to be toward the right than toward the left, but a
right dictatorship would be highly unlikely.
ESTIMATE
1. An extremely unstable political situation obtains in
Italy. The immediate cause lies in the center's failure, by a
fraction of one percent, to gain a popular majority in the
national elections of June 1953. This result lowered the morale
of the center parties, and encouraged the extremes. It under.
lined the fact that, while the Christian Democrats were still
the largest party, the Communist.Left Socialist Bloc was by far
the better Organized and more homogeneous, The center parties
are confused and divided, and in straitened financial circum.
stances.
2. Impact of Trieste Developments on the Pella Government.
Pellet's government is avowedly ?transitional" and was to have
expired October 31st. However, Pella has sought to strengthen
his position by securing a political victory on the Trieste issue,
la
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the focus of Italian nationalist sentiment. We believe the
rainimum that the Italians would accept at any Five Power Con.
ference would be a solution returning the bulk of Zone A to
Italy. The Italians would probably be willing to cede to Tito
some predominantly Slovene areas on the edge of Zone A as well
as to the north in return for comparable concessions in Zone B.
However, they would not cede the port of Zaule (Servola) to
Yugoslavia, except possibly in return for major concessions in
Zone B. Italy would grant Yugoslavia extensive port and access
rights in Trieste itself and would accept mutual minority
guarantees. It probably would also accept demilitarization of
both zones.
30 The short,run political outlook in Italy depends largely
on the outcome of the Trieste issue. If a solution were soon
reached along the above lines, Pella would almost certainly
remain in power. However, failing a prompt solution which
appears at least as satisfactory to Italian opinion as the US-UK
October 8th decision, Pella will almost certainly resign or his
government fall.
4. Pellets fall on the Trieste issue would increase
Italian political instability, and further strengthen the left
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and right extremes at the expense of the center. Even if Pella
does not fall on the Trieste issue, we believe that the govern-
mental situation will remain unstable and that the present
government will not survive the next two years, Growing popular
demands for social and economic change will place further strains
on the stability of the government. There is a possibility of
major strikes, Moreover, the Monarchists, who now support the
Pella cabinet, will sooner or later insist on representation in
it and thereby will precipitate another political crisis?
50 Unlikelihood of Communist Accession to Power. Although
over the longer run the chances of Italy going Communist may
increase, we believe it unlikely that failure to satisfy Italy
on Trieste, or developments subsequent to this, would lead to
accession of the Communists to power within the next two years.
ao It is possible, though unlikely, that a wave
of emotionalism sweeping Italy as a consequence of a
Trieste setback, perhaps combined with a prolonged
general strike, could create a revolutionary situation
in which the left might seek to overthrow the govern.
ment, In the unlikely event of a sharp government move
to the right, it is also possible that the Communists
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would feel compelled to attempt a coup. However, we
believe that the Italian security forces could and
would put down such an attempt.
b, Another possibility is that heightened politi.
cal instability might force new elections, in which the
Cormunists might be voted into power, Although no
national elections are presently scheduled through 1958,
they might be held earlier if: (1) developments such as
a Trieste setback or labor strife made it impossible to
form a government from the present parliament; or (2)
the Christian Democrats came to believe, possibly conse.
quant to a Trieste success, that the center could recoup
its losses, However, the non-Communist parties would be
unlikely to call for an election if a Communist?Ieft
Socialist victory seemed possible, Even if elections
were held during this period, we believe that they would
not give the extreme left a sufficient increase in votes
to necessitate its being included in a government,
Co The most feasible way in which a shift to the
left could take place would be through creation of a
more left.oriented center coalition which the Nonni
Socialists would agree to support, just as the Monarchists
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support Pella today-0 A less feasible alternative would
be the so-called "Nonni Solution", i.e,? creation of a
government composed of the Nenni and Saragat Socialists
and a large portion of the present center parties?
However* we believe that the advent of any left-oriented
coalition is unlikely, notwithstanding any Italian set.
back on Trieste. Even in the event that Nenni could be
detached from his Communist alliance, his independent
voting strength plus that of Saragat is so limited that
about four-fifths of the CD parliamentary representation
would still be required to form any government with
Nannies participation or support? Such deep differences
exist between the CD and Left Socialists on foreign and
domestic policy and on clerical issues as to make such a
government extremely difficult to form and had together?
In any event this government would still be dominated by
the center parties, and if Nenni later proposed including
the Communists* it would almost certainly break upo
6. Likelihood of Center4tight Governments. We believe that
the most likely successor to Pella would be a center or canteroright
government, probably involving continued Monarchist support?
Despite the inherent differences between the reformist left wing
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of the CD Party on the one hand, and its own conservative right
wing and the Monarchists on the other, these differences are
probably easier to reconcile than the differences between the
CD latticing and the Venni Socialists. Indeed this proved to be
the case in the formation of the Pella cabinet, in which the Cl)
left wing was given important posts in return for their collabora..
tiono
70 We believe that any changes in the political complexion
of the Italian governments over the next two years are more likely
to be toward the right than toward the left. Among the general
public some further growth of leftist sentiment is probable,
weakening the center and forcing the government to rely more on
the right ming parties? Sooner or later the Monarchists will demand
inclusion in the government. We do not believe that the Monarchists
will insist on a vote on restoration of the Monarchy as the price
for their participation. They are a conservative party, whose
attachment to the Monarchy is probably more symbolic in nature
than an urgent political demand?
8. Although a moderate rightist government might eventually
become more authoritarian in its methods, we believe it highly
unlikely that any shift to the right in Italy will lead to a right
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dictatorship within the next two years, The support of moderate
groups would still be essential to any rightist coalition, And
these groups would almost certainly resist such a development.
9. Implications of the Fall of the Pella Government, In
discounting the likelihood of a short term shift to left or right
extremism in Italy, we do not mean to understate the seriousness
with which We view the Italian political situation, Any new
government formed if Pella fell on the Trieste issue would be
even more nationalistic in its foreign policy and less disposed
to cooperate with the US. Although Italy would almost certainly
remain in NATO, domestic support for Italy's NATO effort would be
greatly weakened and the prospects for Italian KW ratification
diminished. Moreover, governments of an increasingly rightist'
character might be less able to deal effectively with Italy's
underlying social and economic ills, thus further enhancing the
popular appeal of the Communist.Socialist left,
100 US support of a Trieste settlement favorable to Italy
would be the most immediately effective step toward strengthening
the present Italian government. However, given the present con.
fusion and organizational and financial weakness of the center
parties, we believe that an Italian success on Trieste alone would
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not be sufficient to arrest the gradual weakening of the
democratic center in Italy.
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
if Our long.term Italian estimate (NIE-71, "Probable Long
Term Developments in It4y; 31 March 1953) examines the
basic factors in the Italian situation which support this
conclusion.
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Wararlifer
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