POSSSIBLE EARLY COMMUNIST ACTION IN BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020110-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 110
• Publication Date: February 6, 1951
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2005/11 A-RDPR0090 0100020110-9
_ ir CONFIDENTIAL,
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
6 February 1951
SUBJECT: Possible Early Commmist Action in Burma.
1, We believe that the Chinese Comtmmists are unlikely to
exercise their capability for direct military action in Burma and
Thailand in the ixr ediate future. Such action against Thailand
at least will probably not be taken until after Coam mist control
is established over Indochina (with or without the aid of Chinese
Communist forces),, because the rugged mountain terrain of northern
and wasteru-Burma makes access to Thailand much easier from Indo-
china. Moreover., with Indochina in Communist hanc3% direct Com-
munist military action against Burma and Thailand might prove
unnecessary, Present Chinese Communist involvement in Korea and
fears of a possible invasion of South China from Taiwan are other
factors which would tend to deter an early Chinese Co?mnmist mils.
tary action against Burma. and Thailand, Finally,, the lack of
strong and well-organized indigenous Commmist parties in Burma
and Thailand might cause the Peiping regime to hesitate until the
sabotage and subversive potentials in these countries were increased.
2. We believe that Communist propaganda, infiltration and
subversion in Busma and Thailand will be considerably intensified
in the immediate future and that indigenous Communist groups in
these countries will be given increasing support.
3. There have been reports in recent weeks of increased
Chinese Communist interest in Burma and Thailand. lbv of these
reports (which are generally of low reliability) state that inten.
sified Cemmmist activity in these countries will take place In
Februry,
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4. Possible Comm mist action in Burma:
(a) Several recent reports point up the probability of
increased Chinese Communist support to.Comunista in Burma An
aid agreement between Peiping and the Burmese Communist Party has
reportedly been signed,and Chinese Coist military and political
training for Burmese Commnmists has been reported as scheduled or
already under way? An indication of increased aid from China to
insur emt groups in Burma (or of direct military action against
Burma) is the reported Chinese construction activity on the Burma
Road. In addition, both Peiping and Moscow have been intensifying
their propaganda attacks on the Government of Burm,
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(c) Despite the difficulties of mountainous and densely
forested terrain, the Chinese Com-nmists, who have an
estimated 185,000 troops within 100 miles of the Indochina and
Burma borders and approximately 5,000 troops at the Burma frontier,
are probably capable, in the absence of foreign intervention, of
reaching the Rangoon area within eight weeks after crossing the
Burmese border.
(d) Because the rainy season (from May until October) in
Burm seriously limits cross-country movement,, the Chinese Commmt.-
nists will, if they intend to invade Burm during 1951, probably do
so within the next few months or postpone such an operation until
the end of the year,
(e) The Goverment of Burma has been threatened by vari-
ous political and racial insurgent groups (including two Comm mist
factions) for the past several years. During 1950 the Government
has improved its position, however. and, unless these groups receive
substantial outside support, the Goverment can probably eliminate
the insurgents as a significant threat by the end of 1951. Recent
reports, however, indicate a program of intensified Communist sub-
version which will materially increase the Government's difficulties
in maintaining internal. stability, Barring the outbreak of global
hostilities, we estimate that the Chinese Commmists will pursue a
program of subversion and infiltration in Burma, at least during
the next several months, rather than launch an invasion of that
country,
2,
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5. Possible Communist action in Thailand(a) The principal Ca mwnist threat to Thailand at prevent
is that of subversion and intimidation. The local Chinese Cc mist
Party,, though wall., exercises considerable influence over the econ-
omically powerful Chinese community (numbering over 3,000,000). In
addition,, there-are 60,000 Vietnamese In Th a:.d located largely near
the Indochina border who are influenced and to same extent controlled
by the Coounist Viet I?iinh..
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(c) Thailand does not have a common border with China,
To enter Thailand, Chinese troops would have to move through the
rugged terrain of north T3urmi or northern Indochina. The Thais do
not have the military capability to resist invasion ands until the
armed forces have been greatly expanded, probably would seek a
political accommodation in the face of strong Commnist pressure an
its borders. We believe that the Chinese will not undertake direct
military action in Thailand in the imemediate future, but will inten-
sify their subversive activities and build up the strength of indig-
enous Co munists.
WILLIAM L. LANGER
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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