THE PRESENT SITUATION IN INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020027-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: August 31, 1951
• Content Type: MF

25X1
Approved For Release 2005/11/ P79R00904A000100020
00
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
31 August 1951
Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: The Present Situation in Indonesia
The Securit Situation in General. The security situation
in Indonesia has deteriorated steadily since the first of the year.
Although the over-all strength of the dissident elements is re-
ported to have declined in recent months, there are indications
that some of the larger dissident groups have recently coordi-
nated their activities. A series of incidents and strikes that
occurred throughout Indonesia during the past several months
reached a climax in early August when a group of 200 men,
composed of Communists and Moslem fanatics, attacked the
port area in the capital city of Djakarta. Probably in reaction
to this attack and in anticipation of intensified dissident demon-
strations on the Indonesian Independence Day (17 August),
government forces staged a security sweep in the most troubled
areas of Java and Sumatra between 11. and 16 Auguste At the
end of this operation several hundred Communist party leaders,
officials of Communist-dominated labor unions, left-wing
journalists, and sixteen leftist members of Parliament had
been arrested. Although 17 August passed without incident,
reports during the 10 days since the government arrests indicate
no decline in the activities of the armed dissident gangs.
tDOCUMENT NO.
'
1-1
DECLAS; IFIED
X
LASS. CHANGED TO:
TS , C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: _1 JR 70.2
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020027-2
 Approved For Release 2005/1P79R00904A00p100020027-2
*W01 W
The Dissident Elements: There are an estimated 15,000
armed dissidents in Indonesia belonging to one of four general
categories of dissident groups:
a. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Although
the Communists received a severe setback at the
hands of government forces when they tried to
seize control of the Republic in 1948, the PKI has
apparently recovered and is now the third largest
political party in Indonesia. In addition, it exerts
considerable influence over many of the smaller
leftist parties as well as on the left-wing of the
National Party, the second largest political group
in Indonesia. The PKI also controls the largest
of the federations of labor unions and has placed
many of its members in key posts within the
Labor. Ministry and possibly the Defense Ministry.
The Communists carry on guerrilla activity
principally in Java, Recently there have been
indications that the Communists and a group of
religious fanatics (Dar-u1-Islam) have joined
forces in operational moves against the govern.-
ment.
b. Dar -ul Islam. This group of Moslem fanatics,
which aims at achieving a Moslem state, is a
guerrilla organization operating principally in
West Java. Many guerrillas in this group served
with the ex-Dutch officer, Captain Westerling, when.
he (possibly with official Dutch backing) organized
an aggressive armed movement against the Republic
immediately after the achievement of independence.
This group is reportedly well armed with Dutch
equipment.
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020027-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/2 ff79R00904AQ100020027-2
co Demobilized Members of Dutch Units. After
the demobilization of the indigenous contingents
serving with the Dutch forces in Indonesia, thou-
sands of troops in these units organized into
guerrilla bands and turned against the Republica
Many of these associated with Westerling (who
has since escaped Indonesia) in an attempt to
maintain or establish control over areas in the
South Celebes and West Java; others centered their
activities in Macassar and Amboina. Although
many of these guerrillas have since been incor-
ported into regular government forces, others
are still. creating havoc throughout Java. On 17
August, for example, four battalions of a former
guerrilla organization in the South Celebes failed
to appear at the ceremonies that were to mark their
integration into the government's forces and dis-
appeared with large. quantities of supplies and
equipment.
do Bandits. After a period of guerrilla operations
during the Japanese occupation and subsequent
``police actions," many younger men organized
into bandit gangs. The Dutch were reported to have
used these gangs to foment disunity during the early
months of the new Republic.
The Chinese Problem. The Chinese in Indonesia number
approximately 2,000,000 out of a total Indonesian population of
80,000,000. Although most of these Chinese are descendants
of immigrants who began immigrating to Indonesia as early
as 1700, they still have strong bands with their ancestral home-
land and are vulnerable to pressure from the Chinese Communist
Embassy in Djakarta., Many Chinese have firmly established
-3-
,ftefflyf
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020027-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020027-2
themselves as economic middlemen and consequently have
a strong position in the Indonesian economy. The relation-
ship between the Indonesian Communist Party and Peiping
is close and contact is undoubtedly maintained through the
Chinese Communist Embassy in Djakarta.
The Government and its Security Forces.- The present
government of Indonesia represents a tenuous coalition of the
Masjumi (Moslem) Party and the Nationalist Party (PNI)
formed in late April after many weeks of failure to form a
government. It is comprised of mediocre personalities.
The Indonesian Army of 100,000 and Police Force of 160,000
are neither well organized nor well trained. Despite these
weaknesses, the recent; security sweep may be an indication
of a growing government determination and ability to deal with
dissident elements. The government's statement on the occasion
of the recent arrests that "a certain outside force Is trying to
wreck our domestic conditions" is the first official recognition
that the country's internal security is being endangered by inter-
national Communism. It remains to be seen, however, whether
this more positive approach toward the security prbblem will
continue or whether it was just an isolated effort to forestall
widespread demonstrations on Independence Day.
Current Foreign Policy. The government has agreed
to send a delegation to participate in the San Francisco Con-
ference but, in view of India's position (which strongly influences
Indonesia's foreign policy) its own reservations with respect to
the treaty, and the probable tactics of the Soviet delegation, Indo-
nesia might not sign the US-UK draft, The government is also
engaged in a conference at The Hague at which the present Union
relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia will probl ably
be replaced with a regular treaty,
*BE e RE 9P
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020027-2
 Approved For Release 2005/11/291: CIA DP79R00904AO0000100020027-2
Probable Future Developments: The government faces
many "in erne a to and serious pro ems of restoring law and
order, rehabilitating the economy, and preserving the country's
newly-won independence. These problems could probably be
resolved eventually in a manner favorable to US security
interests in. the Far East if world prices for Indonesia's raw
materials (principally rubber and tin) remain high and if an
able, determined, and pro-Western government could attain
power and remain long enough to provide sustained leadership.
The present government, however, is too weak and inexperienced
and too concerned with political machinations to cope with Indo-
nesia's problems on a sustained basis. If this government falls,
as it may before the first of the year, it is possible that a strong 25X1
but Communist-influenced government may succeed it.
WILLIAM L. LANGER 00/
Assistant Director
National Estimates
-BE IHW&=
Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020027-2