NSC BRIEFING KHRUSHCHEV TRIP TO ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001200030009-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 9, 1960
• Content Type: BRIEF

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Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001200030009-2
NSC BRIEFING 9 March 1960
I. Overall public response to Khrushchev's four nation tour of Asia
(11 Feb-4 Mar) did not live up to obvious Soviet expectations,
A. Largest welcome received in Kabul, but Embassy characterized
this as "forced and without enthusiasm."
B. Even in a communist stronghold like Surabaya (Indonesia),
reception only moderate.
II. Perhaps partially for this reason Khrushchev described on much of
trip as glum, dispirited and irritable. In return, he irritated
many leaders all countries by boasts of Soviet achievements, blunt
lectures on virtues of communism and criticism of practices in
individual countries.
A. In India, President Prasad and other leaders annoyed by
Khrushchev preaching of value of one-party system, impromptu
lectures on Soviet methods of farming.
III. Biggest personality clash came in Indonesia. Foreign Minister
Subandrio noted visit was "toughest affair he ever had to handle,"
said there was almost constant bickering between President
Sukarno and Khrushchev.
A. He quoted Sukarno as saying "I didn't invite this man here to
be insulted by him." At one point Sukarno told Subandrio,
"You take over, I can't stand another minute of this."
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B. When Sukarno expressed no interest in detailed economic figures,
Khrushchev told him, "You are no socialist. Socialism consists
of figures, figures, figures." "You are a robot," Sukarno
retorted.
C. At one point, when Khrushchev had urged compulsion and sterner
methods, Sukarno stated, "I will never destroy the happiness
of my people."
D. In reply to Khrushchev's charge that Indonesia's purchase of
Lockheed Electras did not befit a "socialist," Sukarno said
that he was buying what he considered best suited for Indonesia.
E. Despite personality clash, Indonesian leaders found Khrushchev
impressive and man of great ability and visit on whole a mild
success.
IV. In Afghanistan there was reported wrangling over texts of joint state.
ments with signing of cultural agreement postponed six times,
although photographers and press present each time, and
Gromyko on hand four times.
A. At departure ceremonies Prime Minister Daud distinctly unhappy
and somewhat angry, stood aloof from Khrushchev. Khrushchev
spoke of nothing but weather and parting words to King were
"don't be worried; all these difficulties will be straightened
out."
V. Despite these frictions, resentment toward Khrushchev did
not prevent acceptance of aid or final signature of joint
communiques which support Soviet propaganda and policy positions.
Moscow Radio now claiming that as result trip Khrushchev will
represent Asian countries as well as communist bloc at summit.
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for $375,000,000 to be utilized during Third Five-Year Plan
(1961-66) and arranged for Soviet assistance in development
atomic energy there.
B. Khrushchev granted $250,000,000 new credit to Indonesia at
request Sukarno. Reportedly Khrushchev was prepared give as
high as $4-500,000,000.
1. This credit is in addition to the earlier credit--amounting
to $126,300,000--of which only about 20 percent ($26,800,000)
has been used.
2. Impact of the new credit depends on rapidity and effectiveness
of use--Indonesians claim they will try to spread the new
credit equally over the seven year period prescribed by
the agreement (approximately $35,000,000 per year.)
3. Indonesia's five-year development plan, tentatively
scheduled to begin in 1961, is estimated to cost
$2,000,000,000. It is said to call for 20 percent of
needed funds from Soviet Union, another 10 percent from
other bloc countries, and remaining 70 percent from West,
Japanese reparations, and domestic resources.
4. Late reports state that a secret agreement was reached by
which Indonesia is to receive a cruiser, three or four
submarines, and military aircraft, possibly including
bombers.
C. In Afghanistan Khrushchev announced Soviet gift of 50,000 tons
of wheat, and promised continued economic aid. Most significant
was Khrushchev's endorsement on his return of "self-determination"
for Pushtoonistan, calling for plebiscite of Pakistani Pushtus.
(Note this being picked up by Pakistanis for Afghan Pushtus,
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VI. Recent aggressive activities of Chinese Communists loomed large in
background of trip.
A. Subandrio noted that while in Indonesia Khrushchev displayed
real fear that, as result Chinese actions, Indonesia would
alter its non-alignment policy. Khrushchev returned time and
time in conversations to this theme.
B. Khrushchev stopped again in India on his return from Indonesia,
visiting Calcutta where he reportedly discussed with Nehru
situation arising from Chou En-lai acceptance invitation
to talk on border dispute.
C. Peiping, still at odds with Moscow on foreign policy issues,
was virtually silent during Khrushchev's trip, but more
recently has publicly endorsed it as blow against American
"imperialism."
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